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Chapter1
Introduction
1.1 Data Mining and Machine Learning in Software Engi-
neering
The availability of large amounts of data from software development has created an
area of research called mining software repositories. Researchers mine data from software
repositories both to improve understanding of software development and evolution, and
to empirically validate novel ideas and techniques. The first approaches were proposed
by Ball et al. in 1997 to find clusters of files frequently changed together [12], by Graves
et al. in 1998 to compute the effort necessary for developers to make changes [52] and
by Atkins et al. in 1998 to evaluate the impact of tools on software quality [11].
The large amount of data collected from software processes can then be leveraged
for machine learning applications. Indeed, machine learning can have a large impact in
software engineering, just like it has had in other fields, supporting developers, and other
actors involved in the software development process, in automating or improving parts of
their work. The automation can not only make some phases of the development process
less tedious or cheaper, but also more efficient (increasing the work throughput) and less
prone to errors. Moreover, employing machine learning can reduce the complexity of
difficult problems, enabling engineers to focus on more interesting problems rather than
the basics of development. The possible avenues for usage of data mining and machine
learning techniques are many, e.g., they can be used to predict faults [53] or to detect
important crashes before release [72].
Our aim in this dissertation is to make another step towards the use of data mining
and machine learning for supporting software engineering processes, showing how the
1
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Figure 1.1. High-level overview of the development process.
development and the use of machine learning and data mining techniques can support
several software engineering phases, ranging from crash handling, to code review, to
patch uplifting, to software ecosystem management.
1.2 Thesis Statement
The thesis we aim to support is:
The development and the use of machine learning and data mining techniques
can support several software engineering phases, ranging from crash handling,
to code review, to patch uplifting, to software ecosystem management.
To validate our thesis we conducted several studies tackling different problems in an
industrial open-source context, focusing on the case of Mozilla.
1.3 Software Development Process at Mozilla
The software development process at Mozilla [101] is composed of several phases,
where different actors collaborate with each other to achieve the goal of releasing a new
version of the software. The main actors are (i) end users, (ii) volunteers, (iii) bug triagers
[100], (iv) QA, (v) developers, (vi) reviewers, (vii) managers, (viii) release managers
[104], (ix) tree sheriffs [109] . An overview of the phases of the development process can
be seen in Figure 1.1. The phases are not necessarily in order, but they are executed
simultaneously.
1.3.1 Bug sourcing and monitoring health
There are several possible ways in which Mozilla is able to know of problems in the
wild ("bug sources"):
End-user bug report An end-user could directly open a bug report in Mozilla's bug
tracking system.
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End-user web compatibility issue report An end-user could open a bug report in
a web compatibility issue tracking system.
QA A member of the Quality Assurance team could find bugs by performing manual
testing.
Support channels monitoring By monitoring support channels, Mozilla can notice
issues affecting multiple users.
External services monitoring By monitoring external services (such as forums, dig-
ital distribution services, etc.), Mozilla can notice issues affecting multiple users.
Telemetry By monitoring Telemetry data, Mozilla can detect changes to the worse
(e.g., performance regressions).
Automated crash report An end-user can report a crash through automated means.
Not only these are possible sources of bugs, but they can also be used to monitor
the health of the software, which can be measured via a set of metrics, such as number
of bugs reported, number of regressions, number of crashes, performance characteristics,
and so on).
1.3.2 Bug/Feature tracking and management
Once a bug is on file in Mozilla's bug tracking system (Bugzilla), triagers (either
volunteers or the developers themselves) are in charge of a) requesting more information
about the bug if applicable and if needed; b) resolving potential duplicates; c) moving
the bug to the right component, so that it can be seen by the right team. The ultimate
responsibility about triaging in a specific component is due to triage owners [100]. The
priority of a given bug is usually decided by triage owners and developers and project
managers together, but the meaning of the priority field on Bugzilla is not consistent
between teams.
Bugzilla is also used to track feature work and enhancement requests (both enhance-
ments of the product for the end user and enhancements of the quality of the code).
Such bugs can be opened by users, by developers, or by project managers.
1.3.3 Code changes development and review
Once a bug has been triaged, developers might assign themselves or be assigned to
work on it. The developer will then submit a patch through one of Mozilla's review
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systems (at the time of writing either Phabricator [103] or Splinter [107], an interface
integrated directly into Bugzilla which Mozilla has been trying to deprecate for a while).
The developer will choose a reviewer for their patch, which should be a reviewer familiar
with the code changed (a module owner [102]). In some cases, the developer can choose
a group of reviewers, and the person who is available at the time will be the actual
reviewer.
1.3.4 Automated testing and continuous integration
Once a patch has been accepted for inclusion, it will be integrated in Mozilla's version
control system (Mercurial) and will go through a set of automated tests, plus static and
dynamic analysis. In the normal workflow, the patch will land on an integration branch
first ("mozilla-inbound" or "autoland"), where it will undergo a set of automated tests
(a reduced set, using test selection techniques based on historical failures to reduce the
load [65]). If the patch does not cause breakages, it will be merged, together with
other patches, in the branch for the Nightly channel (called "mozilla-central"), where it
will undergo the full suite of automated tests. This workflow ensures that the channel
from which Nightly builds are produced is most of the time in a good state, while also
reducing the load on integration branches (as opposed to running all possible tests on
every possible commit in isolation). Tree sheriffs [109] are in charge of the process, both
merging integration branches to release branches and ensuring the branches are always
in a good state by backing out breaking changes. They also, from time to time, have
to backfill tests to figure out which change is the culprit of a breakage (it is not always
clear, given that on the first integration branches only a subset of the full test suites is
run). For more details about landing code, the reader can refer to [108].
1.3.5 Release process
Mozilla's release process is organized around a development channel (Nightly), a set
of stabilization channels (Beta and Aurora, which has been recently deprecated in the
Dawn project [97]) and a main Release channel (each of the channels corresponds to a
different branch in the version control system). Nightly is an unstable channel mainly
used by early adopters and/or volunteers; Beta is a mostly-stable channel used by users
which want to try features before they are released without incurring in the occasional
breakage; Release is the stable build which is shipped to the general population. Each
build has progressively more users than the previous, and changes in those branches are
thus progressively more risky. Normally, at scheduled intervals changes are imported
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from a less stable branch (e.g., Nightly) to a more stable one (e.g., Beta). Sometimes,
high value patches are allowed to be imported directly outside the normal scheduling.
Release managers are the gatekeepers of the process which allows changes to go directly
from one channel to another, which is called the "uplift" process.
The work developed in this dissertation focuses in particular on the phases of crash
handling, code review, patch uplift, and software ecosystem management, trying to study
and, if possible, improve them by using machine learning and data mining techniques.
1.4 Contributions
The main contributions from our work to the state of the art are summarized in the
following.
 In [23], we have provided documentation about some of Mozilla software engineer-
ing practices, collected during our PhD studies and our work at Mozilla.
 In [118], we conducted a study to obtain an empirical understanding of what makes
a code change easier to review.
 In [28], which we presented in Chapter 2, we applied data mining techniques to a
crash management problem, to automatically describe groups of crashes.
 In [7], which we presented in Chapter 3, we studied the relation between crashes
and code review practices.
 In [24], which we presented in Chapter 4, we examined the uplift process operations,
with the aim to characterize successful and unsuccessful uplifts. This study won a
IEEE TCSE Distinguished Paper Award.
 In [25], which we presented in Chapter 4, we expanded our study on the uplift
process, analyzing additional aspects of it (for example, the severity of the uplifts
compared to the regression caused by them).
 In an article currently under submission, which we presented in Chapter 5, we
analyzed the effects of DLL injection in the Firefox software ecosystem.
Other than software engineering, during my PhD studies I have also worked on a
remote sensing application:
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 In [27], we explored the use of convolutional neural networks for the semantic
classification of remote sensing images, expanding our previous study [26] with the
usage of a new dataset.
1.5 Outline
In Chapter 2, presenting our work from [28], we devised an algorithm, inspired
by contrast-set mining algorithms such as STUCCO, to automatically find statistically
significant properties (correlations) in crash groups. Many earlier works focused on im-
proving the clustering of crashes, but the problem of automatically describing properties
of a cluster of crashes is so far unexplored. This means developers currently spend a fair
amount of time analyzing the groups themselves, which in turn means that a) they are
not spending their time actually developing a fix for the crash; and b) they might miss
something in their exploration of the crash data (there is a large number of attributes
in crash reports and it is hard and error-prone to manually analyze everything). Our
algorithm helps developers and release managers understand crash reports more easily
and in an automated way, helping in pinpointing the root cause of the crash. The tool
implementing the algorithm has been deployed on Mozilla's crash reporting service.
In Chapter 3, presenting our work from [7], we studied the relation between crashes
and reviews, given that some high-impact defects, such as crash-related ones, can elude
the inspection of reviewers and escape to the field, affecting user satisfaction and in-
creasing maintenance overhead. We investigated the characteristics of crash-prone code,
observing that such code tends to have high complexity and depend on many other
classes. In the code review process, developers often spend a long time on and have
long discussions about crash-prone code. We manually classified a sample of reviewed
crash-prone patches according to their purposes and root causes. We observed that most
crash-prone patches aim to improve performance, refactor code, add functionality, or fix
previous crashes. Memory and semantic errors are identified as major root causes of the
crashes. Our results suggest that software organizations should apply more scrutiny to
these types of patches, and provide better support for reviewers to focus their inspection
effort by using static analysis tools.
In Chapter 4, presenting our work from [24] and [25], we analyzed the uplift pro-
cess. In rapid release development processes, patches that fix critical issues, or implement
high-value features are often promoted directly from the development channel to a sta-
bilization channel, potentially skipping one or more stabilization channels. This practice
is called patch uplift. Patch uplift is risky, because patches that are rushed through the
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stabilization phase can end up introducing regressions in the code. This chapter exam-
ines patch uplift operations at Mozilla, with the aim to identify the characteristics of the
uplifted patches that did not effectively fix the targeted problem and that introduced
regressions. Through statistical and manual analyses, we investigated a series of prob-
lems, including the reasons behind patch uplift decisions, the root causes of ineffective
uplifts, the characteristics of uplifted patches that introduced regressions, and whether
these regressions can be prevented. Additionally, three Mozilla release managers were
interviewed to understand organizational factors that affect patch uplift decisions and
outcomes. Results show that most patches are uplifted because of a wrong functionality
or a crash. Certain uplifts did not effectively address their problems because they did
not completely fix the problems or lead to regressions. Uplifted patches that lead to
regressions tend to have larger patch size, and most of the faults are due to semantic or
memory errors in the patches. Also, release managers are more inclined to accept patch
uplift requests that concern certain specific components, andor that are submitted by
certain specific developers. About 25% to 30% of the regressions due to Beta or Release
uplifts could have been prevented as they could be reproduced by developers and were
found in widely used feature/website/configuration or via telemetry.
In Chapter 5, presenting our work from an article that is currently under submis-
sion, we studied the effects of DLL injection in the Firefox software ecosystem. DLL
injection is a technique used for executing code within the address space of another
process by forcing the load of a dynamic-link library. In a software ecosystem, the inter-
actions between the host and third-party software increase the maintenance challenges
of the system and may lead to bugs. We empirically investigated bugs that were caused
by third-party DLL injections into the Mozilla Firefox browser. Among the 103 studied
DLL injection bugs, we found that 93 bugs (90.3%) led to crashes and 57 bugs (55.3%)
were caused by antivirus software. Through a survey with third-party software vendors,
we observed that some vendors did not perform any QA with pre-release versions nor
intend to use a public API (WebExtensions) but insist on using DLL injection. To re-
duce DLL injection bugs, host software vendors may strengthen the collaboration with
third-party vendors, e.g., build a publicly accessible validation test framework. Host
software vendors may also use a whitelist approach to only allow vetted DLLs to inject.

Chapter2
Automatically Analyzing Groups of
Crashes for Finding Correlations
Fixing crashes is one of the top priorities for software organizations, as they are one
of the main pain points for users and might lead them to leave. Even a single crash
can dramatically worsen how users perceive a software, especially if it causes the loss of
important data. Acting quickly is thus really important to avoid losing users and keep
a high quality software.
Several software organizations have deployed automated crash reporting systems,
such as Mozilla's Socorro [4] and Windows Error Reporting [50], which are used to
collect reports from users at the time of crash. A report received by Socorro comprises
typically more than a hundred attribute-value fields. These reports are then analyzed by
dedicated personnel to find out fixes and improve software quality. It should be realized,
however, that these systems collect a huge number of crash reports daily, about three
hundred thousand reports/day for Socorro, which cannot be processed on an individual
basis. Therefore, the typical workflow consists of two key phases
1. crash report clustering;
2. cluster featuring and analysis.
The goal of clustering is to group together similar reports, as they are likely originated
by multiple instances of the same software problem. Once the problem is fixed, all these
reports can be discarded at once from further analysis. Moreover, clustering allows one
to compute precious statistics on the cluster itself, enabling the second phase of the
workflow. In fact, the typical features of interest in a cluster concern the frequency of
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occurrence of attribute-value pairs, which may provide useful hints for the solution of the
problem. As an example, assume that a perfect clustering process succeeds in grouping
together all crash reports originated by a given software bug, and assume that all such
reports are characterized by a distinctive feature which is never observed in reports of
other clusters. While not conclusive, this observation would provide a strong clue for
the analyst, and would probably allow a quick fix of the problem. This idealized process
is summarized graphically in Figure 2.1.
Real-world operations are very far from this simplistic case. On/off features rarely
occur, and the analyst must focus on minor variations in the frequencies of occurrence
of attribute-value pairs across groups. Moreover, the most distinctive features concern
usually joint occurrences. If the number of elementary features is already large, the
number of features concerning more complex behaviors, possibly involving tuples of
attribute-value pairs, makes brute force analysis simply infeasible. It requires very skilled
analysts to navigate effectively through these data and extract useful clues. To further
complicate things, the preliminary clustering of crashes is itself far from perfect, which
may strongly affect the results of subsequent analyses. When a cluster includes reports
that have no relation with one another, the resulting features are averaged together and
hardly distinctive anymore. On the contrary, when there are too small groups, since
reports for the same crash are divided in multiple clusters, features become unstable,
leading to erroneous conclusions.
The above discussion underlines the need of effective automated tools that support
the analyst's work in both phases on the process to i) perform a reliable clustering of
crash reports, and ii) single out the most meaningful features. Many previous studies
in the literature have focused on the first problem, namely, proposing a number of com-
peting solutions to best cluster crashes in groups. Section 2.5 contains a more detailed
explanation of some of them. In this study, instead, we focus on the second problem,
and propose an automated tool to support group understanding after the clustering has
already taken place. Thus, the research question we aim to address in this study is the
following:
RQ: Could an automated tool to analyze crashes be useful for developers to diagnose or
help fix crashes?
We find that in 19 out of 41 (46.3%) manually analyzed cases, the tool's results
directly helped in fixing the crash. This result suggests that software organizations
can use these data mining techniques to speed up and simplify the resolution of
crashes and to reduce the amount of manual tedious work for developers.
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Figure 2.1. Idealized process: with perfect clustering, properties that define the groups
are easily found.
The proposed tool finds statistically significant properties in crash groups, sorts them
by decreasing importance, and submits them to the analyst. Developers are therefore
freed from this tedious preliminary analysis, and can focus on fixing the crash. The
manual analysis, given the large number of attributes in crash reports, is not only tedious
but also error-prone (also due to the effects of fatigue). The proposed tool may happen to
find interesting properties that the analyst could miss. Automatically finding properties
of crash groups also allows release managers to quickly act with temporary workarounds,
for example by blocking updates to a crashy version for a particular set of users.
Specifically, our approach is based on a data mining technique, contrast-set learning
[112], applied successfully to a number of other problems in software engineering [159]
and beyond (e.g., [75]). The approach we present in our study can also help with the
triage of crash groups, in fact release managers can decide on their importance, after
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Figure 2.2. Dialog window presented to users when they experience a crash.
understanding the possible causes and properties of a crash. We evaluate the system
using crash data collected from the Mozilla crash reporting system and bug tracking
system. Although a systematic analysis of performance in not feasible for practical
reasons, we collected evidence that the system may actually help understanding a group
of crashes and reduce the time needed to solve the problem.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 provides background
information about Socorro, the Mozilla crash reporting system used in our study. Section
2.2 describes the proposed algorithm. Section 2.3 presents the validation of the results
of our algorithm, applied to real world cases for Mozilla Firefox crashes. Section 2.4
discusses threats to the validity of this study. Section 2.5 summarizes related works.
2.1 Socorro and Crash Reports
Mozilla's applications are shipped with a built-in automatic crash reporting tool [4].
When end users encounter a crash, they are presented with a dialog window that asks
them to submit a report (see Figure 2.2).
Crash reports include stack traces of the threads that were running at the time of
the crash and other information about the user's environment (e.g., operating system,
memory-related information, modules loaded in the process). A subset of the fields
contained in a crash report is depicted in Table 2.1. The reader may refer to [92] for
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Table 2.1. A subset of the attributes present in a crash report.
Name Description
Platform The name of the Operating System.
Platform Version The detailed version of the Operating System (e.g., uname
-a on Linux).
Addons A list of the addons, with their version, installed in the Fire-
fox profile.
Modules A list of the modules (DLL files on Windows, SO files on
Linux, dylib files on Mac), with their version, loaded in the
application's process.
User Comment A (usually brief) comment left by the user at the time of
crashing.
CPU Info Detailed information (vendor, family, model, stepping, num-
ber of cores) about the CPU of the user.
Adapter Vendor ID The vendor of the graphics card on the user's machine.
There are other related attributes such as Adapter Device
ID, Adapter Driver Version, etc.
Safe Mode A boolean variable that indicates whether Firefox was run-
ning in safe mode.
User Agent Locale The language of the user.
... ...
an up-to-date JSON schema of a crash report. Some of the information contained in
a crash report might be sensitive, which is why the submission of crash reports is not
silent, but requires the user to accept a prompt.
As can be seen from Figure 2.2, the user has a chance to enter a short comment at
the time of crash, to specify details about their crash report. For example, what they
were doing right before they experienced the crash. Crash reports are then sent to the
Socorro server [90], which:
1. assigns a unique ID to each report;
2. performs some post-processing on the reports;
3. groups the reports together using an extremely fast, but not very reliable, algo-
rithm, described below.
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Table 2.2. Example stack trace. The group name is in bold.
Frame Module Signature
0 xul.dll mozilla::storage::Service::getSingleton()
1 xul.dll mozilla::storage::ServiceConstructor
2 xul.dll nsComponentManagerImpl::CreateInstanceByContractID(char const*, nsISupports*, nsID const&, void**)
3 xul.dll nsComponentManagerImpl::GetServiceByContractID(char const*, nsID const&, void**)
4 xul.dll nsCOMPtr_base::assign_from_gs_contractid(nsGetServiceByContractID, nsID const&)
5 xul.dll nsCOMPtr<mozIStorageService>::nsCOMPtr<mozIStorageService>(nsGetServiceByContractID)
6 xul.dll nsPermissionManager::OpenDatabase(nsIFile*)
7 xul.dll nsPermissionManager::InitDB(bool)
8 xul.dll nsPermissionManager::Init()
9 xul.dll nsPermissionManager::GetXPCOMSingleton()
10 xul.dll nsIPermissionManagerConstructor
11 xul.dll nsComponentManagerImpl::CreateInstanceByContractID(char const*, nsISupports*, nsID const&, void**)
12 xul.dll nsComponentManagerImpl::GetServiceByContractID(char const*, nsID const&, void**)
13 xul.dll nsCOMPtr_base::assign_from_gs_contractid(nsGetServiceByContractID, nsID const&)
14 xul.dll nsCOMPtr<nsIPermissionManager>::nsCOMPtr<nsIPermissionManager>(nsGetServiceByContractID)
15 xul.dll mozilla::services::GetPermissionManager()
16 xul.dll mozilla::dom::NotificationTelemetryService::RecordPermissions()
17 xul.dll NotificationTelemetryServiceConstructor
18 xul.dll nsComponentManagerImpl::CreateInstanceByContractID(char const*, nsISupports*, nsID const&, void**)
19 xul.dll nsComponentManagerImpl::GetServiceByContractID(char const*, nsID const&, void**)
20 xul.dll nsCOMPtr_base::assign_from_gs_contractid(nsGetServiceByContractID, nsID const&)
21 xul.dll nsCOMPtr<nsISupports>::nsCOMPtr<nsISupports>(nsGetServiceByContractID)
22 xul.dll NS_CreateServicesFromCategory(char const*, nsISupports*, char const*, char16_t const*)
23 xul.dll nsXREDirProvider::DoStartup()
24 xul.dll XREMain::XRE_mainRun()
25 xul.dll XREMain::XRE_main(int, char** const, nsXREAppData const*)
26 xul.dll XRE_main
27 firefox.exe do_main
28 firefox.exe wmain
29 firefox.exe __scrt_common_main_seh
30 kernel32.dll BaseThreadInitThunk
31 ntdll.dll __RtlUserThreadStart
32 ntdll.dll _RtlUserThreadStart
See Figure 2.3 for an overview of the Socorro architecture.
The reports are clustered based on the top method signature of the stack trace of
the crashing thread (or another thread, if the crash is due to the application willingly
terminating itself after a hang). Table 2.2 shows an example of a stack trace, with the
group name it was assigned by the Socorro algorithm.
There are several rules that allow to skip some methods if they are deemed to be
useless for grouping purposes (e.g., a very generic function, a function from an external
driver, etc.). Some of the rules are general purpose (e.g., C++ standard library func-
tions), some are specific to the Mozilla applications (e.g., XPCOM [93] functions). This
large set of rules has been built over time, manually, by developers.
This algorithm is sometimes ineffective, as two crashes that happen in the same
function might be completely different from each other. This is noticeable with crashes
related to the JavaScript JIT compiler. However, processing speed is deemed more
important than accuracy in this context and new clustering methods should be also very
fast to qualify as a viable alternative.
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Figure 2.3. Overview of the crash reporting system.
2.2 Automatic Analysis of Crash Groups
The analysis method adopted here is a modified version of the contrast set mining
algorithm STUCCO (Searching and Testing for Understandable Consistent COntrasts)
proposed originally by Bay and Pazzani [14, 15]. To illustrate the method we will refer to
a toy example, with the dataset partitioned in two clusters, or groups, with cardinalities
|G1| = 700 and |G2| = 300, and reports including only n = 2 attributes, platform (p),
and graphics card (g), which can take three and two values respectively, p ∈ {W,L,M}
(for Windows, Linux, and Mac) and g ∈ {N,A} (for NVIDIA, and AMD).
2.2.1 The Contrast Set Mining Problem
In the contrast set mining framework, the dataset is a set of n-dimensional vec-
tors, whose components are discrete values. The vectors are partitioned beforehand in
mutually exclusive groups, G1, G2, . . ., according to external criteria.
A contrast-set is defined as a set of attribute-value pairs. For example, cset1 =
{p=W} is a contrast set concerning a single attribute-value pair, while cset2 = {p=
W, g=N} concerns a couple of attribute-value pairs, and is actually a specialization of
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Figure 2.4. Root and all possible specializations.
the former. The support of a contrast-set in a group, S(cset,G), is the percentage of
vectors in the group for which the contrast-set is true. Contrast-set supports are the
features used to characterize groups. So, for example, having S(cset1, G1) = 0.7 and
S(cset1, G2) = 0.3, means that, in Group 1, 70% of crashes occurred on a Windows
platform, while in Group 2 the percentage was 30%. Such a large difference seems to
indicate that the platform is not irrelevant for these crashes. Accordingly, the goal of
contrast-set mining is to find contrast-sets, also called deviations, whose support differs
meaningfully across groups.
More formally, for a contrast set to be declared a deviation, it must be both large
and significant. The first condition is expressed as
max
ij
|S(cset,Gi)− S(cset,Gj)| ≥ δ (2.1)
where δ is a constant (minimum support difference) defined by the user. Significance,
instead, is declared based on the outcome of a statistical test of hypotheses,{
H0 : P (cset = true|Gi) = P (cset = true|Gj)
H1 : P (cset = true|Gi) 6= P (cset = true|Gj)
(2.2)
carried out for all couples of groups, Gi, Gj , with a user-defined false alarm level, α.
2.2.2 STUCCO
In STUCCO, contrast-set mining is cast as a tree search problem. The root node is an
empty contrast-set. Then, for each step of the algorithm, existing nodes are specialized
by appending new attribute-value pairs to existing ones. A canonical ordering of the
attributes is used to avoid visiting the same node twice. With reference to our toy
example, Figure 2.4 shows the search tree after two levels of specialization. Note that
the nodes g = N and g = A have no children, as g comes after p in our ordered attribute
list.
STUCCO performs a breadth-first level-wise search in the tree. We provide a very
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high-level description of the algorithm, going into more details in the following subsec-
tion. For each node at a given level, the number of occurrences for each group in the
dataset is counted. Based on such data, some heuristics are applied to decide on whether
the node should be pruned, become a terminal node, or generate new children. The tree
grows until no more child node can be generated, or a suitable stopping condition (ap-
plied to limit processing time) is met. After the whole tree is grown, each surviving node
corresponds to a valid candidate contrast-set. Contrast-sets that are found to be both
large and significant (deviations), and also surprising, are eventually kept, and submit-
ted to the analyst as an ordered list, from largest to smallest. Algorithm 1 provides a
pseudo-code description of the process. Figure 2.5, instead, shows the first few steps of
the algorithm applied to our toy example. In particular:
1. all possible attribute-value pairs (candidates) are generated for each attribute in
a crash report (figure 2.5a);
2. the number of occurrences for each candidate in each group is counted (figure 2.5b);
3. some nodes are pruned based on suitable heuristics (figure 2.5c);
4. new candidates are generated by merging previous ones which survived pruning,
for example {p =W} and {g = N} give rise to {p =W, g = N} (figure 2.5d).
Steps 2-4 are repeated until there are no more candidates or a suitable stopping condition
is met, for example, the maximum number of iterations. Eventually, all nodes/contrast-
sets are tested, and only those that are large, significant, and surprising are submitted
to the analyst.
The following subsections provide the necessary details for a full comprehension of
the algorithm, describing the tests on largeness, significance, and surprise, as well as the
heuristic rules for tree pruning.
2.2.2.1 Selecting Large Contrast-Sets
This is a straightforward test: For a contrast-set to be large, its support must be
larger than the threshold, δ, defined by the user.
2.2.2.2 Selecting Significant Contrast-Sets
To evaluate whether a contrast-set is significant, we rely on the test of hypotheses
of Eq.2.2. The null hypothesis is that the support of the contrast-set is equal across all
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Algorithm 1: STUCCO algorithm
Set of candidates C ← {};
Set of deviations D ← {};
Set of pruned candidates P ← {};
Let prune(c) return True if c should be pruned;
while C is not empty do
scan data and count support ∀c ∈ C;
foreach c ∈ C do
if significant(c) ∧ large(c) then
D ← D ∪ c
end
if prune(c) = True then
P ← P ∪ c
else
Cnew ← Cnew ∪GenChildren(c, P )
end
end
C ← Cnew
end
Dsurprising ← FindSurprising(D)
Table 2.3. Example contingency table.
p =W p 6=W group size
Group 1 600 (85%) 100 (15%) 700
Group 2 295 (98%) 5 ( 2%) 300
Overall 895 (90%) 105 (10%) 1000
groups or, differently said, it is independent of group membership. To this end, we build
a contingency table like that shown in Table 2.3 reporting the occurrences of a contrast
set across groups and the corresponding supports, our features of interest, that is, the
frequencies of occurrence in the group.
In our example we analyze cset1, namely, platform=Windows. If group and the
platform were independent variables, the proportion of crash reports with the Windows
platform should be about the same across all groups. This is not the case in our example.
However, the supports may differ just because of random fluctuations, and the difference
may not be statistically significant. Hence, we need to determine whether such differences
are the effect of a true dependency between the variables or if it can be attributed to
randomness, which is why we need a statistical test. The standard test for independence
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(d) Generation of a new level of candidates.
Figure 2.5. Sample run of the algorithm in the context of crash reports.
of variables in contingency tables is the chi-square test:
χ2 =
r∑
i=1
c∑
j=1
(oij − eij)2
eij
(2.3)
where oij is the observed frequency in cell ij and eij is the frequency expected under
the hypothesis of independence between row and column variables. We then compare
the resulting value against the χ2 distribution under the null hypothesis, selecting level
of significance α, which represents the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when
it holds (false alarm).
For a single test, a level α = 0.05, implying a false alarm probability of 5%, could
be considered acceptable for our application. However, since a large number of contrast
sets are typically tested for significance, the overall number of false alarms may be
disturbingly large. For example, if we ran 100 tests at α = 0.05, and the null hypothesis
were always true, we would detect on the average 5 significant differences that are not
actually there. To keep the false alarm rate within acceptable limits, STUCCO reduces
α according to the Bonferroni correction: given H1, H2, . . . ,Hk hypotheses, and their
corresponding p-values p1, p2, . . . , pk, the hypothesis Hi is rejected if pi < α/k. The
Bonferroni correction controls the familywise error rate (FWER), which is the probability
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of incorrectly rejecting at least one true hypothesis Hi, at <= α.
FWER = P
{
ktrue⋃
i=1
(
pi ≤ α
k
)}
(2.4)
≤
ktrue∑
i=1
{
P
(
pi ≤ α
k
)}
≤ ktrueα
k
≤ α
This holds no matter how many of the null hypotheses are true and even with dependent
tests [130].
There are two problems in the application of the Bonferroni correction in the context
of STUCCO: first of all, if we report results in a level-wise fashion (shorter first, then
longer), we cannot know how many tests we will perform in total, which makes it impos-
sible to know the exact value of k. Moreover, as α gets smaller, the statistical power of
the tests decreases, increasing the probability of producing false negatives. This cannot
be avoided, since we want to reduce the probability of false positives. However, we can
use different values of α for tests concerning different levels of the tree, ensuring a high
power for tests at higher levels (which are more general and easier to understand) and
accepting a lower power for tests more down the tree. Since the Bonferroni method holds
as long as
∑
i αi ≤ α, STUCCO adopts level-dependent values
αl = min
(α
2l
/ |Cl| , αl−1
)
(2.5)
where αl is the cutoff for level l, and |Cl| is the number of candidates at level l. This
way we assign 12 of the total α risk to tests at level 1,
1
4 to tests at level 2, etc. The min
rule ensures that, as we move to deeper levels, the α cutoff can only decrease, making
the tests more likely not to reject the null hypothesis.
2.2.2.3 Selecting Surprising Contrast-Sets
As already said, contrast-sets are shown in a level-wise fashion given higher priority
to higher levels (e.g., level 1, with a single attribute-value pair) as they are easier to
interpret. Further specializations are then included only if they are surprising, namely,
when the observed frequencies depart significantly from the expected frequencies. For
example, if for all Gi's, S(p = W, g = N |Gi) ' S(p = W |Gi) × (g = N |Gi), that is
the support of the specialization can be derived based on an independence conjecture,
than the specialization itself does not add information (is not surprising) and thus can
be discarded even when it is a deviation according to the definition.
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2.2.2.4 Pruning the Search Space
When building the contrast-set tree, a number of heuristics can be applied to limit
its size and hence reduce the computational burden.
Minimum deviation size. When a contrast-set has support less than δ for every
node, it can be pruned. In fact, if the support is smaller than δ for any given group, the
difference between any two supports cannot be larger than δ.
Expected cell frequencies. The validity of a test depends on the size of the available
sample, becoming scarcely reliable when only a small number of items are available. A
typical lower bound for the χ2 test is 5 [44]. Therefore, when we reach a contrast-set
with a number of occurrences smaller than 5, we can safely prune it, since any further
specialization can only further reduce the number of occurrences.
χ2 bounds. Bay and Pazzani showed that it is possible to define an upper bound on
the χ2 statistic. This can be used to prune nodes, when we know that the corresponding
statistic will not exceed the α cutoff.
Identical support. Specializations with the same support as the parent might be
not interesting and can be discarded. They target the same set of dataset entries as
the parent and often represent findings that are common knowledge (e.g., the support
of {platform_detail = Debian Wheezy} will obviously be the same as the support of
{platform = Linux, platform_detail = Debian Wheezy}: the addition of {platform =
Linux} provides no information).
Fixed relations. Often a group has larger support for a given contrast-set than any
other group and specializing the contrast-set with additional attribute-value pairs does
not change the situation. In those cases, the node can be pruned.
2.2.3 Domain-Specific Variations
The implementation of the algorithm must take into account the large number of
items to deal with in our real-world application. At the time of writing, around 500000
crash reports per week are generated for a single Firefox version1. Moreover, each
report contains a large number of attributes (more than 200) spanning different possible
values. This means that the number of possible candidates explodes very rapidly as
soon as contrast-sets are specialized beyond level 1. Testing candidates for each couple
of groups is clearly infeasible. Therefore, in our implementation, we test each group
against the rest of the dataset, that is, we look for features that present anomalies w.r.t.
1 https://crash-stats.mozilla.com/search/?product=Firefox&version=51.0.1&date=>%
3D2017-02-14&date=<2017-02-21#crash-reports
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Figure 2.6. Detail of the dependency graph.
the average behavior over the whole dataset. In addition, for performance reasons, we
have implemented the tool using Apache Spark [160].
Another specific feature of our application is the existence of strong dependencies
among groups of attributes. For example, the presence of a given DLL might be directly
linked to a particular version of Windows; the CPU microcode version is directly linked
to the CPU vendor; etc. We modified STUCCO to take into account such information by
means of a graph of dependencies (see Figure 2.6 for a detail of the dependency graph).
When a dependency is found, the percentage of occurrence is recalculated restricting
the group to the reports where the dependency holds true. For example, in a group
we studied, the module bcryptPrimitives.dll was present in 83.9% of crash reports vs.
33.91% overall, qualifying for a likely deviation. However, if we take into account the
operating system (Windows 10), the percentages change to 100% vs 98.44%, and hence
this rule could be ignored.
One of the fields of the crash reports is a small text area where the user who experi-
ences the crash can write a short comment. Most users do not provide useful information
but express only their frustration, which makes the comments field widely different from
usual bug reports. Nonetheless, in our manual inspections, we have found comments to
be sometimes useful, even if just as hints.
With the aim to extract some useful information from the comments field, we em-
ployed a well known information retrieval technique, term frequency and inverse docu-
ment frequency (TF-IDF) [66], which highlights the words most frequently used in the
comments for a given crash group vs. other groups. This allows developers to quickly
glance if there is something wrong with a particular setting. For example, in one par-
ticular instance, many users were mentioning playing, and the crash turned out to be
due to a resource exhaustion due to videogames running in the background.
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2.3 Validation of Results
To validate the results, we have selected a set of bug reports where we knew developers
used our tool and we have verified whether the tool
 helped in the resolution of the bug,
 gave compatible clues but did not help solving the bug,
 gave some misleading clues.
The tool has been integrated in Socorro, but we do not know when the developers
use it for their investigations. Some developers, when using the tool, copied the results
of the tool in the bug report they are working on. This allows us to select a set of real
world cases that we can analyze, given that developers have fixed them already, so we
can evaluate if the results of the tool have been useful for fixing the bug.
We considered about 800 crash bug reports (approximately 400 closed) generated
from September 2016, when our tool has been put in production, to February 2017,
mostly from Mozilla developers. For 90 of these reports (41 closed) we have definitive
evidence that our tool was used. We have used regular expressions based on the output
format of our tool to extract these 90 bugs out of the original 800. We have manually
analyzed this set of bug reports and the code changes that are attached to them, finding
19 cases where the tool has been really useful (that is, the results of the tool directly
helped the developers in fixing the bug, as they used the results to understand the root
cause); 19 cases where the tool generated results that were compatible with the resolution
of the bug, but did not help solving it (that is, the information provided by the tool
was not useful for developers to understand the root cause); 3 cases where the tool has
produced misleading results (that is, the results of the tool did not help solving the bug
and were not compatible with the resolution of the bug). These results are summarized
in Table 2.4.
In some of the cases where the tool has been useful, we believe the bug would not
have been solved if not with very large investigative effort. Out of the three cases
where the tool has been misleading, we believe that, by improving the initial clustering
algorithm, two misleading results would have been avoided. These are analyzed in more
detail in section 4 and 5. As already said in the Introduction, the quality of clustering
can strongly affect the results of the algorithm, polluting group statistics with unrelated
reports, or generating groups too small to provide meaningful statistics at all.
When the clustering algorithm fails by generating groups that are too large (cluster-
ing together crashes that have no relation with each other), it is harder for the correlation
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Table 2.4. Summary of the results of the validation.
Type Number of bugs
Very useful  results that directly helped fixing the bug. 19
Compatible  results that were compatible with the resolu-
tion of the bug, but were not useful for fixing the bug.
19
Misleading  results not compatible with the resolution of
the bug.
3
tool to find interesting properties. Indeed, as many crashes which are actually really dif-
ferent from each other get clustered together, it gets more difficult to analyze them (both
manually and automatically).
When the clustering algorithm fails by generating groups that are too small (allo-
cating reports for the same crash to different groups), the correlation tool, and manual
analysis, is more prone to find spurious correlations.
The clusters' dimensions can vary wildly between thousands of reports (the most
crowded cluster contains around 20000 crashes) and a very small number of reports
(even a single one). We only apply the tool to the largest 200 clusters, as they are the
most important ones (after the 200th cluster, we only have clusters with less than 100
reports). These top clusters account for around 55% of all reports, but there is a very
long tail of clusters with very few reports.
2.3.1 Deployment on Socorro
We tested the tool on crash groups which we already analyzed in the past, to assess its
validity, and we put it in production for new crash groups. In this section, we summarize
a few interesting results that we obtained during our analysis.
1. AMD CPU Bug: A group of crashes was found to be correlated with a par-
ticular family of AMD CPUs. We later found that the particular family of AMD
CPUs that was involved in the crash group was affected by a hardware bug, and
developers were able to find a workaround for it.
2. Antivirus-Related Crash: A group of crashes was found to be correlated with
a version of an addon of an antivirus suite. In cases like this, the tool allows us to
act quickly and simply block the addons (or modules) that cause problems, while
we talk with the vendors to solve the problem in the long term.
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3. Crash Without AdBlock: The tool also generates results that are quite open
to interpretation. For example, there was a crash group that was more common
to users without ad-blocking addons. It was a crash happening often with a very
famous Flash game. We believe the crash was caused by some ad network serv-
ing particular advertisement that would cause the browser to crash. The crash
disappeared quickly on its own, which supports that hypothesis.
4. Misleading Result Caused by Clustering Failure (Too Few Clusters):
Crashes related to the JIT compiler for JavaScript are a clear example of how crash
clustering can affect the results of the tool. The clustering algorithm employed by
Socorro does not work well for those kind of crashes, often lumping unrelated
crashes together. The correlation tool is only able to tell that the group of crashes
is related to the JIT, but cannot say much more.
5. Misleading Result Caused by Clustering Failure (Too Many Clusters):
There was a crash, which was later diagnosed to be due to concurrency issues, which
was happening in different functions according to CPU brand or graphics card.
This caused the clustering algorithm used by Socorro to generate a new cluster
for each CPU brand / graphics card, making each cluster obviously correlated to
those. Clearly, the correlations were spurious.
6. Analyzing Crash Reports Before/After a Change: The algorithm is really
useful when analyzing a crash group generated by Socorro, but can be used for
generic groups as well. For example, to analyze the differences in the properties of
crash reports before/after a change, e.g., to assess the effectiveness of the change
and as another means to ensure that it did not cause regressions.
We employed the tool to analyze the differences between the crashes before/after
a change that relaxed the blocklist for graphics acceleration on NVIDIA graphics
cards. We found that the change improved the stability with a particular version
of the NVIDIA drivers (one where hardware acceleration was previously blocked
and unblocked by the change), probably because hardware acceleration is a more
common and thoroughly tested code path.
2.3.2 Feedback from Developers
Developers and people triaging crash bugs generally expressed favourable opinions
about the tool (e.g., posts on one of Mozilla's mailing lists [46]). We collected sugges-
tions from them since the deployment to Socorro. Developers and triagers were able
26 CHAPTER 2. ANALYZING CRASH GROUPS FOR CORRELATIONS
to provide suggestions and requests by filing bugs on Mozilla's bug tracking system, or
by contacting the author directly. Most of the suggestions were requests of addition of
new possible fields to the analysis (sometimes meta-information dynamically generated
from already existing fields, e.g., https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=
1506012). Some of the suggestions were instead related to the way results are shown,
which is actually a pretty important aspect. Indeed, we empirically noticed that, if
the information presented to the user is too crowded (e.g., too many useless attributes,
too much information), the user is more likely to complain or overlook something. In
the remainder of this section, we present some of the more specific suggestions that we
received from developers.
1. Employing the Correlation Results Themselves to Improve Clustering:
The correlation analysis itself might be useful to improve the clustering algorithm.
For example, two groups which present similar correlations might be clustered to-
gether. Groups which do not have any interesting correlation, might be candidates
to be split.
We observed that this operation was done manually by developers in the results
validation. Concerning two bugs where the correlations were very similar, the
developers noticed that the two groups were actually a single one (and closed a
bug as a duplicate of the other).
2. Extract Information from Unstructured Crash Report Fields: The algo-
rithm we presented only works with discrete fields, but crash reports often contain
unstructured information too. The user comment is a clear example. The TF-IDF
solution works for simple cases and it could be greatly improved. For example, if
several users mention the same thing in different ways, TF-IDF will not notice it.
Using a more powerful text mining algorithm might improve the results, although
it is still not clear to us how much information is actually contained in the users'
comments. We noticed some cases where it turned out to be useful, but devolving
time and resources for this might not be too valuable.
3. Driving Automated Tests Configuration: At Mozilla, we developed a tool
which automatically tries to reproduce crashes with different settings and under
different configurations, called BugHunter [91]. The correlation results could help
in driving the tool to directly test under a configuration that is more likely to
reproduce the crash, both saving running time (e.g., if a crash is only happening
with a specific graphics card vendor and a specific driver, there is no point in
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trying to reproduce it with a graphics card from a different vendor) and making
reproducibility easier.
4. Predicting Volume of a Crash in a Release Channel from Pre-release
Channels: By linking the data generated by the correlation tool with data about
the user population distribution, we can estimate how a crash that is affecting a
pre-release version will affect the release version. The reader can refer to the work
by Khomh et al. [71] for an explanation of the Firefox pipelined release model.
This has been attempted in the past using machine learning techniques: in Kim et
al. [72] it was used to predict which crash stack is more probable to become a top
crash and should be fixed first. For example, Firefox Beta users are predominantly
from the United States. The percentage of those users is fairly lower in Firefox
Release. This means that crashes that are easily reproducible on a website that
is not in the English language, are very likely to go unnoticed during the Beta
cycle and explode when Firefox is released. If we had a way to re-rank the crashes
considering the attributes to whom they are correlated and the incidence of those
attributes in different channels, then those crashes would less likely go unnoticed.
2.4 Threats to Validity
Internal validity threats concern factors that may affect a dependent variable and
were not considered in the study. We evaluated our tool on 41 closed bugs, which might
not be a representative dataset. We have chosen to evaluate the results on the fixed
bugs as we needed to check if the fix was compatible with the findings of the tool. We
have manually analyzed the cases where the tool was used, thus reducing false positives
from our regular expression search, but our search might not be complete (there could
be bugs where the tool was used but where developers did not leave any evidence of it).
External validity threats are concerned with the generalizability of our results. In
this study, we only evaluated the results of the tool applied to Mozilla Firefox crashes,
because Mozilla has an automated crash reporting system and its crash data, bug reports
and source code are publicly available. Our findings may not be generalizable to other
systems.
Conclusion validity threats concern the relationship between the treatments and the
outcome. We only analyzed bugs for which we were sure the tool was used, thus our
conclusions on the usefulness of the tool on those bugs should be correct. Our conclusions
on the rates of usefulness instead might suffer from the uncertainty about other crash
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bugs, which we could not analyze because we had no way to tell whether the tool was
used or not for all of them.
Reliability validity threats are concerned with the replicability of the study. To aid in
future replication studies, we share the source code of our tool: https://github.com/
marco-c/crashcorrelations and https://github.com/mozilla-services/socorro.
2.5 Related Work
Bird et al. [19] studied the effect of extrinsic factors on software reliability. In our
experience we found evidence that corroborates their findings: there are several crashes
that are due to external software badly interacting with Firefox. In our case though we
often noticed security applications being the root cause of the crashes.
2.5.1 Automatic Crash Reporting Systems
Several past studies have shown how a crash reporting system, such as Socorro, can
be very valuable for discovering and fixing crashes. For example, Glerum et al. [50]
presented their experience with WER (Windows Error Reporting). Ahmed et al. [4]
studied the Mozilla crash reporting system. One of the problems presented in [4] is the
overwhelming amount of data that is made available through a crash reporting system.
Our work tries to solve this problem by using data mining techniques to handle the
complexity of the data and provide a way to automatically understand it.
2.5.2 Crash Clustering
The crash clustering problem has been studied extensively in the literature and is
closely related to the technique presented in our work. Indeed, a good clustering tech-
nique is needed in order to avoid false positives or false negatives. Lohman et al. [81]
and Modani et al. [88] adapted stop-word removal to call stacks, removing recursive
calls, and using similarity measures like edit distance, longest common subsequence, and
prefix matching. Bartz et al. [13] used edit distance, proposing seven types of edits
assigned with different weights. Dhaliwal et al. [42] proposed a two-level grouping of
crash reports, using Levenshtein distance [125] to evaluate the similarity between stack
traces. Dang et al. [41] presented ReBucket, an algorithm for clustering crashes based
on a custom method (called PDM, Position Dependent Model) that uses the position of
a function in the stack trace and the offset between matched functions for calculating
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the similarity between stack traces. Lerch et al. [77] proposed using a well known in-
formation retrieval technique, term frequency and inverse document frequency, to rate
stack traces. Campbell et al. [22] presented an overview of several clustering algorithms,
including the one presented by Lerch et al., evaluating their results in the same set-
ting (Ubuntu Apport crashes). They found traditional information retrieval techniques
to outperform techniques specifically designed for crash clustering. The proposed algo-
rithm is strongly related to crash clustering, as it operates on clusters of crashes. Thus,
its performance is directly affected by the quality of the clustering algorithm employed.
2.5.3 Visualization of Crash Reports
Another related area of research is the visualization of crash reports to aid in the
understanding by developers. For example, Kim et al. [73] proposed an approach based
on an aggregated graph view of multiple crashes. They also presented a way to use
the crash graphs for clustering. Chan et al. [29] presented three types of graphs to
analyze field testing results under three different perspectives. The above approaches
could be combined with our proposed approach to improve understanding of group of
crash reports.
2.5.4 Triaging of Crash Reports
Kim et al. [72] presented a machine learning technique to predict which crash stacks
are more probable to become top crashers and should be fixed first. Khomh et al. [70]
proposed an entropy evaluation approach, taking into account volume of crash groups
and distribution among users, to rank the crash clusters by importance. The above ap-
proaches focused on prioritizing the groups of crash reports for bug fixing. Our approach
instead identifies generic properties of the groups, which can be later used by develop-
ers and managers, not only for prioritization, but also to directly understand possible
causes.
2.6 Conclusion
Crashes are one of the main pain points for users of a software. Fixing them promptly
can improve the users' perception of the quality of a software. We found that analyzing
crash reports in an automated manner can help developers in fixing crashes, by removing
manual analysis burden from developers, or by finding properties that would have been
really difficult to find with manual analysis, or can give clues in the characterization of
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crashes. Software organizations can use these data mining techniques to speed up and
simplify the resolution of crashes and to reduce the amount of manual tedious work for
developers.
2.6.1 Future Work
We identified two interesting directions for future work. First, as discussed in the
Validation section (section 2.3), with examples in section 4 and 5, the results of the crash
clustering can greatly affect the results of our tool. Thus, improvements to the clustering
algorithm used by Socorro, other than being useful by themselves, would benefit our
results as well. Second, it could be useful to have a dashboard to simplify finding
reproducible crashes. At Mozilla, we are often helped by volunteers in reproducing
crashes that are specific to some configuration that we do not have readily available.
The correlation results might be useful to create a way for volunteers to automatically
find the crashes that they might be able to reproduce, by showing them the crash groups
that are related to their hardware or software (e.g., installed addons, antivirus, etc.)
configuration.
Chapter3
Why Did This Reviewed Code Crash?
An Empirical Study of Mozilla Firefox
A software crash refers to an unexpected interruption of software functionality in an
end user environment. Crashes may cause data loss and frustration for users. Frequent
crashes can decrease user satisfaction and cause them to leave. Practitioners need an
efficient approach to identify crash-prone code early on, in order to mitigate the impact
of crashes on end users. Nowadays, software organizations like Microsoft, Google, and
Mozilla are using crash collection systems to automatically gather field crash reports,
group similar crash reports into crash-types, and file the most frequently occurring crash-
types as bug reports.
Code review is an important quality assurance activity where other team members
critique changes to a software system. Among other goals, code review aims to identify
defects at early stages of development [1]. Since reviewed code is expected to have better
quality, one might expect that reviewed code would tend to cause few severe defects,
such as crashes. However, despite being reviewed, many changes still introduce defects,
including crashes. For example, Kononenko et al. [74] find that 54% of reviewed code
changes still introduce defects in Mozilla projects.
In this study, we intend to understand the reasons why reviewed code still led to
crashes. To achieve these goals, we mine the crash collection, version control, issue
tracking, and code reviewing systems of the Mozilla Firefox project. More specifically,
we address the following two research questions:
RQ1: What are the characteristics of reviewed code that is implicated in a crash?
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We find that crash-prone reviewed patches often contain complex code, and classes
with many other classes depending on them. Crash-prone patches tend to take a
longer time and generate longer discussion threads than non-crash-prone patches.
This result suggests that reviewers need to focus their effort on the patches with
high complexity and on the classes with a complex relationship with other classes.
RQ2: Why did reviewed patches crash?
To further investigate why some reviewed code crashes, we perform a manual classi-
fication on the purposes and root causes of a sample of reviewed patches. We observe
that the reviewed patches that crash are often used to improve performance, refactor
code, address prior crashes, and implement new features. These findings suggest that
software organizations should impose a stricter inspection on these types of patches.
Moreover, most of the crashes are due to memory (especially null pointer dereference)
and semantic errors. Software organizations can perform static code analysis prior
to the review process, in order to catch these memory and semantic errors before
crashes escape to the field.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 provides background
information on Mozilla crash collection system and code review process. Section 3.2
describes how we identify reviewed code that leads to crashes. Section 3.3 describes
our data collection and analysis approaches. Section 3.4 discusses the results of the
two research questions. Section 3.5 discloses the threats to the validity of our study.
Section 3.6 discusses related work.
3.1 The Mozilla Crash Collecting System and Code Re-
view Process
In this section, we describe approaches of Mozilla on crash report collection and code
review.
3.1.1 The Mozilla Crash Collection System
Mozilla integrates the Mozilla Crash Reporter, a crash report collection tool, into
its software applications. Once a Mozilla application, such as the Firefox browser, un-
expectedly halts, the Mozilla Crash Reporter will generate a detailed crash report and
send it to the Socorro crash report server [90]. Each crash report includes a stack trace
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Figure 3.1. An example of crash report in Socorro.
of the failing thread and the details of the execution environment of the user. Figure 3.1
shows an example Socorro crash report. These crash reports are a rich source of infor-
mation, which provide developers and quality assurance personnel with information that
can help them to reproduce the crash in a testing environment.
The Socorro server automatically clusters the collected crash reports into crash-types
according to the similarity of the top method invocations of their stack traces. Figure 3.2
shows an example Mozilla crash-type. The Socorro server ranks crash-types according to
their frequency, e.g., Socorro publishes a daily top 50 crash-types, i.e., the crash-types
with the maximum number of crash reports, for each of the recent releases of Firefox.
Socorro operators file top-ranked crash-types as issue reports in the Bugzilla issue
tracking system. Quality assurance teams use Socorro to triage these crash-related issue
reports and assign severity levels to them [9]. For traceability purposes, Socorro crash
reports provide a list of the identifiers of the issues that have been filed for each crash-
type. This link is initiated from Bugzilla. If a bug is opened from a Socorro crash, it
is automatically linked. Otherwise, developers can add Socorro signatures to the bug
reports. By using these traceability links, software practitioners can directly navigate
to the corresponding issues (in Bugzilla) from the summary of a crash-type in the web
interface of Socorro. Note that different crash-types can be linked to the same issue,
while different issues can also be linked to the same crash-type [70].
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Figure 3.2. An example of crash-type in Socorro.
3.1.2 The Mozilla Code Review Process
Mozilla manages its code review process using issue reports in Bugzilla. After writing
a patch for an issue, the developer can request peer reviews by setting the review? flag
on the patch. At Mozilla, the reviewers are often chosen by the patch author herself [58].
If the patch author does not know who should review her patch, they can consult a
list of module owners and peers. Senior developers can also often recommend good
reviewers. The designated reviewers need to inspect a patch from various aspects [120],
such as correctness, style, security, performance, and compatibility. Once a developer has
reviewed the patch, they can record comments with a review flag, which also indicates
their vote, i.e., in support of (+) or in opposition to (-) the patch. Mozilla applies
a two-tiered code review process, i.e., review and superreview. A review is performed
by the owner of the module or peer who has expertise in a specific aspect of the code
of the module [35]; while a superreview is required for certain types of changes, such
as significant architectural refactoring, API or pseudo-API changes, or changes that
affect the interactions of modules [139]. Therefore, to evaluate patches, there are four
possible voting combinations on a reviewed patch: review+, review-, superreview+,
and superreview-.
A code review may have several iterations. Unless the patch receives only positive
review flags (review+ or superreview+), it cannot be integrated into the VCS of Mozilla.
In this case, the patch author needs to provide a revised patch for reviewers to consider.
Some Mozilla issues are resolved by a series of patches. Since the patches are used
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to address the same issue, reviewers need to inspect the entire series of patches before
providing a review decision. In the trial review platform of Mozilla, ReviewBoard, the
patches of an issue are automatically grouped together [119]. Thus, in this study, we
examine the review characteristics at the issue level. Finally, the Tree Sheriffs [109] (i.e.,
engineers who support developers in committing patches, ensuring that the automated
tests are not broken after commits, and monitoring intermittent failures, and reverting
problematic patches) or the patch authors themselves will commit the reviewed patches
to the VCS.
3.2 Identifying Reviewed Code that Crashes
In this section, we describe our approach to identify reviewed code that is implicated
in a crash report. Our approach consists of three steps: identifying crash-related issues,
identifying commits that are implicated in future crash-related issues, and linking code
reviews to commits. Below, we elaborate on each of these steps.
3.2.1 Identifying Crash-related Issues
Mozilla receives 2.5 million crash reports on the peak day of each week. In other
words, the Socorro server needs to process around 50GB of data every day [135]. For
storage capacity and privacy reasons, Socorro only retains those crash reports that oc-
curred within the last six months. Historical crash reports are stored in a crash analysis
archive1. We mine this archive to extract the issue list, which contains issues that are
linked to a crash, from each crash event. These issues are referred as to crash-related
issues in the rest of this chapter.
3.2.2 Identifying Commits that are Implicated in Future Crash-related
Issues
We apply the SZZ algorithm [134] to identify commits that introduce crash-related
issues. First of all, we use Fischer et al.'s heuristic [47] to find commits that fixed a
crash-related issue I by using regular expressions to identify issue IDs from commit
messages. Then, we extract the modified files of each crash-fixing commit with the
following Mercurial command:
hg log --template {node},{file_mods}
1 https://crash-stats.mozilla.com/api/
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By using the CLOC tool [34], we find that 51% of the Firefox codebase is written in
C/C++. Although JavaScript and HTML (accounts for respectively 20% and 14% in
the code base) are the second and third most used languages. Code implemented by
these languages cannot directly cause crashes because it does not have direct hardware
access. Crash-prone Javascript/HTML changes are often due to the fault of parsers,
which are written in C/C++. Therefore, in this study, we focus our analysis on C/C++
code. Given a file F of a crash-fixing commit C, we extract C's parent commit C ′,
and use the diff command of Mercurial to extract F 's deleted line numbers in C ′,
henceforth referred to as rm_lines. Next, we use the annotate command of Mercurial
to identify the commits that introduced the rm_lines of F ′. We filter these potential
crash-introducing candidates by removing those commits that were submitted after I's
first crash report. The remaining commits are referred to as crash-inducing commits.
As mentioned in Section 3.1.2, Mozilla reviewers and release managers consider all
patches together in an issue report during the review process. If an issue contains mul-
tiple patches, we bundle its patches together. Among the studied issues whose patches
have been approved by reviewers, we identify those containing committed patches that
induce crashes. We refer to those issues as crash-inducing issues.
3.3 Case Study Design
In this section, we present the selection of our studied system, the collection of data,
and the analysis approaches that we use to address our research questions.
3.3.1 Studied System
We use Mozilla Firefox as the subject system because at the time of this study, only
the Mozilla Foundation has opened its crash data to the public [148]. It is also the reason
why in most previous empirical studies of software crashes (e.g., [72, 70]), researchers
analyzed data from the Mozilla Socorro crash reporting system [90]. Though Wang
et al. [148] studied another system, Eclipse, they could obtain crash information from
the issue reports (instead of crash reports). However, the exact crash date cannot be
obtained from the issue reports, which hampers our ability to apply the SZZ algorithm.
Dang et al. [41] proposed a method, ReBucket, to improve the current crash report
clustering technique based on call stack matching. The studied collection of crash reports
from the Microsoft Windows Error Reporting (WER) system is not accessible for the
public.
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Figure 3.3. Number of crash-inducing commits during each three months from March 2007
to September 2015. Periods with low number of crash-inducing commits are removed.
3.3.2 Data Collection
We analyze the Mozilla crash report archive. We collect crash reports that occurred
between February 2010 (the first crash recorded date) until September 2015. We collect
issue reports that were created during the same period. We only take closed issues into
account. We filter out the issues that do not contain any successfully reviewed patch
(i.e., patch with a review flag review+ or superreview+). To select an appropriate
study period, we analyze the rate of crash-inducing commits throughout the collected
timeframe (March 2007 until September 2015). Figure 3.3 shows the rate of crash-
inducing commits over time. In this figure, each time point represents one quarter (three
months) of data. We observe that the rate of crash-inducing commits increases from
January 2007 to April 2010 before stabilizing between April 2010 and April 2015. After
April 2015, the rate suddenly drops. Since the last issue report is collected in September
2015, there is not enough related information to identify crash-inducing commits during
the last months. Using Figure 3.3, we select the periods between April 2010 and April
2015 as our study period and focus our analysis on the crash reports, commits, and issue
reports during this period. In total, we analyze 9,761,248 crash-types (from which 11,421
issue IDs are identified), 41,890 issue reports, and 97,840 commits. By applying the SZZ
algorithm from Section 3.2.2, we find 1,202 (2.9%) issue reports containing reviewed
patches that are implicated in crashes.
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Figure 3.4. Overview of our approach to identify and analyze reviewed code that crashed
in the field.
3.3.3 Data Extraction
We compute metrics for reviewed patches and the source code of the studied system.
Figure 3.4 provides an overview of our data extraction steps. To aid in the replication
of our study, our data and scripts are available online.2
3.3.3.1 Review Metrics
For each reviewed patch, we extract the names of the author and reviewer(s), as
well as its creation date, reviewed date, patch size, and the votes from each of the
review activities. We also extract the list of modified files from the content of the
patch. Although main review activities of Mozilla are organized in Bugzilla attachments,
we can also extract additional review-related information from Bugzilla comments and
transaction logs. If a comment is concerned with an attachment like a patch, Bugzilla
provides a link to the attachment in the comment. We can use this to measure the
review discussion length of a patch. Bugzilla attachments only contain votes on review
decisions, such as review+ and review-. To obtain the date when a review request for
a patch was created, we search for the review? activity date in the issue discussion
history. As we consider all of the patches of an issue together, we use the mean to
aggregate patch-specific values to the issue-level. Unlike other systems, such as Qt [142],
Mozilla does not allow self-review, i.e., the author of a patch cannot act as a reviewer of
that patch. However, Mozilla patch authors may set the review+ score themselves, from
time to time, when reviewers are generally satisfied with the patch with the exception
of minor changes. Thus in this study, we remove the patch author from the reviewer
2 https://github.com/swatlab/crash_review
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list of each of the studied issues. More details on our review metrics are provided in
Section 3.4.
3.3.3.2 Code Complexity Metrics
To analyze whether reviewed code that crashed in the field is correlated with code
complexity, we compute code complexity metrics using the Understand static code anal-
ysis tool [126]. We wrote a script to compute five code complexity metrics for each
C/C++ file using Understand, i.e., Lines Of Code (LOC), average cyclomatic complex-
ity, number of functions, maximum nesting level, and the proportion of comment lines
in a file. More details on our complexity metrics are provided in Section 3.4.
3.3.3.3 Social Network Analysis Metrics
To measure the relationship among classes, we apply Social Network Analysis (SNA)
[54] to measure the centrality [127] of each C/C++ class, i.e., the degree to which other
classes depend on a certain class. A high centrality value indicates that a class is impor-
tant to a large portion of the system, and any change to the class may impact a large
amount of functionality. We compute centrality using the class-to-class dependencies
that are provided by Understand. We combine each .c or .cpp file with its related
.h file into a class node. We use a pair of vertices to represent the dependency rela-
tionship between any two mutually exclusive class nodes. Then, we build an adjacency
matrix [17] with these vertex pairs. By using the igraph network analysis tool [39],
we convert the adjacency matrix into a call graph, based on which we compute the
PageRank, betweenness, closeness, indegree, and outdegree SNA metrics.
3.4 Case Study Results
In this section, we present the results of our case study. For each research question,
we present the motivation, our data processing and analysis approaches, and the results.
RQ1: What are the characteristics of reviewed code that is implicated
in a crash?
Motivation. We intend to compare the characteristics of the reviewed patches that
lead to crashes (Crash) with those that did not lead to crashes (Clean). Particularly,
we want to know whether patch complexity, centrality, and developer participation in
the code review process are correlated with the crash proneness of a reviewed patch.
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Table 3.1. Code complexity metrics used to compare the characteristics of crash-inducing
patches and clean patches..
Metric Description Rationale
Patch size Mean number of lines of the patch(s)
of an issue. We include context lines
and comment lines because reviewers
need to read all these lines to inspect
a patch.
The larger the code changes, the easier
it is for reviewers to miss defects [74].
Changed file
number
Mean number of changed C/C++ files
in the issue fixing commit(s).
If a change spreads across multiple
files, it is difficult for reviewers to de-
tect defects [74].
LOC Mean number of the lines of code in
the changed classes to fix an issue.
Large classes are more likely to
crash [72].
McCabe Mean value of McCabe cyclomatic
complexity [83] in all classes of the is-
sue fixing commit(s).
Classes with high cyclomatic com-
plexity are more likely to lead to
crashes [72].
Function num-
ber
Mean number of functions in all classes
in the issue fixing commit(s).
High number of functions indicates
high code complexity [18], which
makes it difficult for reviewers to no-
tice defects.
Maximum
nesting
Mean of maximum level of nested func-
tions in all classes in the issue fixing
commit(s).
Code with deep nesting level is more
likely to cause crashes [72].
Comment ratio Mean ratio of the lines of comments
over the lines of code in all classes of
the issue fixing commit(s)
Reviewers may have difficulty to un-
derstand code with low ratio of com-
ment [59], thus miss crash-prone code.
The result of this research question can help software organizations improve their code
review strategy; focusing review efforts on the most crash-prone code.
Approach. We extract information from the source code to compute code complexity
and SNA metrics and from issue reports to compute review metrics. Tables 3.1 to 3.3
provide descriptions of each of the studied metrics.
We assume that changes to complex classes are likely to lead to crashes because
complex classes are usually more difficult to maintain. Inappropriate changes to complex
classes may result in defects or even crashes. The SNA metrics are used to estimate the
degree of centrality (see Section 3.3.3.3) of a class. Inappropriate changes to a class
with high centrality may impact dependent classes; thus causing defects or even crashes.
For each SNA metric, we compute the mean of all class values for the commits that
fix an issue. Regarding the review metrics, we assume that patches with longer review
duration and more review comments have higher risk of crash proneness. Since these
patches may be more difficult to understand, although developers may have spent more
time and effort to review and comment on them. We use the review activity metrics that
were proposed by Thongtanunam et al. [142]. In addition, we also take obsolete patches
3.4. CASE STUDY RESULTS 41
Table 3.2. Social network analysis (SNA) metrics used to compare the characteristics of
crash-inducing patches and clean patches. We compute the mean of each metric across the
classes of the fixing patch(es) within an issue. Rationale: An inappropriate change to a
class with high centrality value [127] can lead to malfunctions in the dependent classes; even
cause crashes [72]..
Metric Description
PageRank Time fraction spent to visit a class in a random
walk in the call graph. If an SNA metric of a
class is high, this class may be triggered through
multiple paths.
Betweenness Number of classes passing through a class among
all shortest paths.
Closeness Sum of lengths of the shortest call paths between
a class and all other classes.
Indegree Numbers of callers of a class.
Outdegree Numbers of callees of a class.
into account because these patches were not approved by reviewers. The percentage of
the obsolete patches that fix an issue can help to estimate the quality and the difficulty
of the patches on an issue, as well as developer participation.
We apply the two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test [57] to compare the differences in
metric values between crash-inducing patches and clean patches. We choose to use the
Mann-Whitney U test because it is non-parametric, i.e., it does not assume that metrics
must follow a normal distribution. For the statistical test of each metric, we use a
95% confidence level (i.e., α = 0.05) to decide whether there is a significant difference
among the two categories of patches. Since we will investigate characteristics on multiple
metrics, we use the Bonferroni correction [43] to control the familywise error rate of the
tests. In this study, we compute the adjusted p-value, which is multiplied by the number
of comparisons.
For the metrics that have a significant difference between the crash-inducing and clean
patches, we estimate the magnitude of the difference using Cliff's Delta [33]. Effect size
measures report on the magnitude of the difference while controlling for the confounding
factor of sample size [36].
To further understand the relationship between crash proneness and reviewer origin,
we calculate the percentage of crash-inducing patches that were reviewed by Mozilla
developers, external developers, and by both Mozilla and external developers. Previous
work, such as [114], used the suffix of an email address to determine the affiliation
of a developer. However, many Mozilla employees use an email address other than
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Table 3.3. Review metrics used to compare the characteristics of crash-inducing patches
and clean patches. We compute the mean metric value across the patches within an issue..
Metric Description Rationale
Review itera-
tions
Number of review flags on a reviewed
patch.
Multiple rounds of review may help to
better identify defective code than a
single review round [142].
Number of
comments
Number of comments related with a re-
viewed patch.
Review with a long discussion may
help developers to discover more
defects [142].
Comment
words
Number of words in the message of a
reviewed patch.
Number of
reviewers
Number of unique reviewers involved
for a patch.
Patches inspected by multiple review-
ers are less likely to cause defects [121].
Proportion of
reviewers writ-
ing comments
Number of reviewers writing comments
over all reviewers.
Reviews without comments have
higher likelihood of defect prone-
ness [142, 84].
Negative re-
view rate
Number of disagreement review flags
over all review flags.
High negative review rate may indicate
a low quality of a patch.
Response delay Time period in days from the review
request to the first review flag.
Patches that are promptly reviewed af-
ter their submission are less likely to
cause defects [121].
Review dura-
tion
Time period in days from the review
request until the review approval.
Long review duration may indicate the
complexity of a patch and the uncer-
tainty of reviewers on it, which may
result in a crash-prone patch.
Obsolete patch
rate
Number of obsolete patches over all
patches in an issue.
High proportion of obsolete patch indi-
cates the difficulty to address an issue,
and may imply a high crash proneness
for the landed patch.
Amount of
feedback
Quantity of feedback given from devel-
opers. When a developer does not have
enough confidence on the resolution of
a patch, she would request for feedback
prior to the code review.
The higher the amount of feedback, the
higher the uncertainty of the patch au-
thor, which can imply a higher crash
proneness.
Negative feed-
back rate
Quantity of negative feedback over all
feedback.
High negative feedback rate may imply
high crash proneness for a patch.
mozilla.com in Bugzilla, when they review code. To make our results more accurate,
we used a private API to examine whether a reviewer is a Mozilla employee.
Results. Table 3.4 compares the reviewed patches that lead to crash (Crash) to those
that do not crash (Clean). Statistically significant p-values and non-negligible effect size
values are shown in bold. Figure 3.5 visually compares crash-inducing and clean patches
on the metrics (after removing outliers because they can bury the median values), where
there is a statistically significant difference and the effect size is not negligible. In this
figure, the red bold line indicates the median value on the crash-inducing patches (or
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Figure 3.5. Comparison between crash-inducing patches (left part, grey) vs. clean patches
(right part, white). Since we removed outliers from the plots, the median values may not
correspond to the values in Table 3.4, which includes the outliers.
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Table 3.4. Median metric value of crash-inducing patches (Crash) and clean (Clean)
patches, adjusted p-value of Mann-Whitney U test, and Cliff's Delta effect size.
Metric Crash Clean p-value effect size
Code complexity metrics
Patch size 406 111 <0.001 0.53 (large)
Changed files 4.8 2.0 <0.001 0.49 (large)
LOC 1259.3 1124.5 0.2 
McCabe 3.0 3.0 0.5 
Function number 45.8 43.0 0.3 
Maximum nesting 3.0 3.0 1 
Comment ratio 0.3 0.2 <0.001 0.24 (small)
Social network analysis metrics
PageRank 4.4 3.2 <0.001 0.17 (small)
Betweenness 50,743.5 22,011.3 <0.001 0.16 (small)
Closeness 2.2 2.1 <0.001 0.12 (negligible)
Indegree 12.0 7.5 <0.001 0.15 (small)
Outdegree 27.3 26.0 0.02 0.05 (negligible)
Review metrics
Review iterations 1.0 1.0 0.001 0.03 (negligible)
Number of comments 0.5 0 <0.001 0.15 (small)
Comment words 2.5 0 <0.001 0.16 (small)
Number of reviewers 1.0 1.0 1 
Proportion of reviewers
writing comments
1 1 <0.001 0.10 (negligible)
Negative review rate 0 0 0.03 0.01 (negligible)
Response delay 14.2 8.1 <0.001 0.14 (negligible)
Review duration 15.2 8.2 <0.001 0.15 (small)
Obsolete patch rate 0 0 1 
Amount of feedback 0 0 0.03 0.02 (negligible)
Negative feedback rate 0 0 1 
clean patches) for a metric. The dashed line indicates the overall median value of a
metric. The width variation in each plot shows the variation of the data density.
For the code complexity metrics, crash-inducing patches have a significantly larger
patch size, higher number of changed files, and higher comment ratio than clean patches.
The magnitude of the differences on patch size and changed files is large; while the
magnitude of the differences on comment ratio is small. This result implies that the
related files of the reviewed patches that crash tend to contain complex code. These
3.4. CASE STUDY RESULTS 45
Table 3.5. Origin of the developers who reviewed clean patches and crash-inducing patches.
Origin Total Crash Crash rate
Mozilla 38,481 1,094 2.8%
External 2,512 55 2.2%
Both 897 53 5.9%
Total 41,890 1,202 2.9%
files have higher comment ratio because developers may have to leave more comments
to describe a complicated or difficult problem. Our finding suggests that reviewers
need to double check the patches that change complex classes before approving them.
Investigators also need to carefully approve patches with intensive discussions because
developers may not be certain about the potential impact of these patches.
In addition, crash-inducing patches have significantly higher centrality values than
clean patches on all of the social network analysis metrics. The magnitude of closeness
and outdegree is negligible; while the magnitude of PageRank, betweenness, and indegree
is small. This result suggests that the reviewed patches that have many other classes
depending on them are more likely to lead to crashes. Reviewers need to carefully inspect
the patches with high centrality.
Regarding the review metrics, compared to clean patches, crash-inducing patches
have significantly higher number of comments and comment words. This finding is in
line with the results in [74], where the authors also found that the number of comments
have a negative impact on code review quality. The response time and review duration on
crash-inducing patches tend to be longer than clean patches. These results are expected
because we assume that crash-inducing patches are harder to understand. Although
developers spend a longer time and comment more on them, these patches are still more
prone to crashes. In terms of the magnitude of the statistical differences, crash-inducing
and clean patches that have been reviewed only have a small effect size on number of
comments, comment words, and review duration; while the effect sizes of other statistical
differences are negligible.
Table 3.5 shows the percentage of the patches that were reviewed by Mozilla de-
velopers, external developers, and by both Mozilla and external developers. Regarding
the crash-inducing rate of the studied patches, the patches reviewed by both Mozilla
and external developers lead to the highest rate of crashes (5.9%). On the one hand,
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there are few patches that were reviewed by both Mozilla and external developers, this
result may not be representative. One the other hand, Mozilla internal members and
external community members do not have the same familiarity on a specific problem,
such collaborations may miss some crash-prone changes. We suggest patch authors to
choose reviewers with the same level of familiarity on the changed module(s) and the
whole system. In the future, we plan to further investigate the relationship between
crash proneness and the institution that the reviewers represent.
Reviewed patches that crash tend to be related
with large patch size and high centrality. These
patches often take a long time to be reviewed and
are involved with many rounds of review discus-
sions. More review effort should be invested on the
patches with high complexity and centrality values.
RQ2: Why did reviewed patches crash?
Motivation. In RQ1, we compared the characteristics of reviewed code that crashes
with reviewed code that does not crash. To more deeply understand why reviewed
patches can still lead to crashes, we perform a qualitative analysis on the purposes of
the reviewed patches that crash and the root causes of their induced crashes.
Approach. To understand why developers missed the crash-inducing patches, we ran-
domly sample 100 out of the 1,202 issues that contain reviewed patches that crash. If we
use a confidence level of 95%, our sample size corresponds to a confidence interval of 9%.
Inspired by Tan et al.'s work [140], we classify the purposes of patches (patch reasons)
into 13 categories based on their (potential) impact on users and detected fault types.
The incorrect functionality category defined by Tan et al. is too broad, so we break
it into more detailed patch reasons: incorrect rendering, (other) wrong functionality,
and incompatibility. In addition, since we do not only study defect-related issues as
Tan et al., we add more categories about the reason of patches, such as refactoring,
improvement, and test-only problem. Table 3.6 shows the patch reasons used in our
classification. We conduct a card sorting on the sampled issues with the following steps:
1) examine the issue report (the title, description, keywords, comments of developers,
and the patches). Two researchers individually classified each issue into one or more
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Table 3.6. Patch reasons and descriptions (abbreviation are shown in parentheses).
Reason Description
Security Security vulnerability exists in the code.
Crash Program unexpectedly stops running.
Hang Program keeps running but without response.
Performance
degradation (perf)
Functionalities are correct but response is slow or delayed.
Incorrect rendering
(rendering)
Components or video cannot be correctly rendered.
Wrong functional-
ity (func)
Incorrect functionalities besides rendering issues.
Incompatibility
(incompt)
Program does not work correctly for a major website or for a
major add-on/plug-in due to incompatible APIs or libraries,
or a functionality, which was removed on purpose, but is still
used in the wild.
Compile Compilation errors.
Feature Introduce or remove features.
Refactoring (refac-
tor)
Non-functional improvement by restructuring existing code
without changing its external behaviour.
Improvement (im-
prove)
Minor functional or aesthetical improvement.
Test-only problem
(test)
Errors that only break tests.
Other Other patch reasons, e.g., data corruption and adding logging.
categories; 2) created an online document to compare categories and resolved conflicts
through discussions; 3) discussed each conflict until a consensus was reached.
Then, from the results of the SZZ algorithm, we find the crash-related issues caused
by the patches of the sampled issues. Following the same card sorting steps, we clas-
sify the root causes of these crash-related issues into five categories, as shown in Table 3.7.
Results. Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of patch reasons obtained from our man-
ual classification. Among the reviewed patches that lead to crashes, we find that most
patches are used for improving Firefox' performance, refactoring code, fixing previous
crashes, and implementing new features. These results imply that: 1) improving per-
formance is the most important purpose of the reviewed patches that crash; 2) some
seemingly simple changes, such as refactoring, may lead to crashes; 3) fixing crash-
related issues can introduce new crashes; 4) many crashes were caused by new feature
implementations. The classification suggests that reviewers need to scrutinize patches
due to the above reasons, and software managers can ask a super review inspection for
these types of patches.
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Table 3.7. Crash root causes and descriptions.
Reason Description
Memory Memory errors, including memory leak, overflow,
null pointer dereference, dangling pointer, dou-
ble free, uninitialized memory read, and incorrect
memory allocation.
Semantic Semantic errors, including incorrect control flow,
missing functionality, missing cases of a functional-
ity, missing feature, incorrect exception handling,
and incorrect processing of equations and expres-
sions.
Third-party Errors due to incompatibility of drivers, plug-ins
or add-ons.
Concurrency Synchronization problems between multiple
threads or processes, e.g., incorrect mutex usage.
Figure 3.7 shows the distribution of our manually classified root causes. According to
the results, most crashes are due to memory and semantic errors. To further understand
the detailed causes of the memory errors, we found that 61% of these errors are as a
result of null pointer dereferences. By studying the issue reports of the null pointer
crashes, we found that most of them were eventually fixed by adding check for NULL
values, e.g., the issue #1121661.3 This finding is interesting because some memory
faults can be avoided by static analysis. Mozilla has planned to use static analysis
tools, such as Coverity [37] and Clang-tidy [31], to enhance its quality assurance. We
suggest that software organizations can perform static analysis on a series of memory
faults, such as null pointer dereference and memory leaks, prior to their code review
process. Our results suggest that static code analysis can not only help to mitigate
crashes but also certain security faults. Even though the accuracy of the static analysis
cannot reach 100%, it can help reviewers to focus their inspection efforts on suspicious
patches. In addition, semantic errors are also an important root cause of crashes. Many
of these crashes are eventually resolved by modifying the if conditions of the faulty code.
Semantic errors are relatively hidden in the code, we suggest reviewers to focus their
inspections on changes of control flow, corner cases, and exception handling to prevent
potential crashes. Software organizations should also enhance their testing effort on
semantic code changes.
3 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1121661#c1
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Figure 3.6. Distribution of the purposes of the reviewed issues that lead to crashes.
Reviewers should focus their effort on patches that
are used to improve the performance of the soft-
ware, refactor source code, fix crashes, and intro-
duce new features, since these types of patches are
more likely to lead to crashes. If possible, a su-
per review or inspection from additional review-
ers should be conducted for these patches. Mem-
ory and semantic errors are major causes of the
crashes; suggesting that static analysis tools and
additional scrutiny should be applied to semantic
changes.
3.5 Threats to Validity
Internal validity threats are concerned with factors that may affect a dependent variable
and were not considered in the study. We choose steady periods for the studied commits
by analyzing the distribution of crash-inducing commit numbers. We eliminate the
periods where the numbers of crash-inducing commits are relatively low because some
crash-inducing code has not been filed into issues at the beginning and at the end of our
collected data.
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Figure 3.7. Distribution of the root causes of the reviewed issues that lead to crashes.
The SZZ algorithm is a heuristic to identify commits that induce subsequent fixes.
To mitigate the noise introduced by this heuristic, we removed all candidates of crash-
introducing commits that only change comments or whitespace. We validate the accu-
racy of the algorithm by comparing changed files of a crash-inducing commit with the
information in its corresponding crash-related issue report. As a result, 68.1% of our
detected crash-inducing commits changed at least one file mentioned in the crashing
stack trace or comments of their corresponding issues. The remaining commits might
change a dependent class of the code in the stack trace, or developers do not provide
any stack trace in their corresponding issue reports. Therefore, we believe that the SZZ
algorithm can provide a reasonable starting point for identifying crash-prone changes.
Finally, in RQ1, we use some time-related metrics (e.g., review duration), which
measures the period since a review for a patch was requested until the patch was ap-
proved. Although a review duration of two months does not mean that developers really
spent two months to review a patch, it can reflect the treatment time of a development
team (including pending time, understanding time, and evaluation time) to the patch.
For example, when the review queue of a reviewer is long, her assigned patches may be
pending for a long time before she begins to inspect them [136].
Conclusion validity threats are concerned with the relationship between the treatment
and the outcome. We paid attention not to violate the assumptions of our statistical
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analyses. In RQ1, we apply the non-parametric test, the Mann-Whitney U test, which
does not require that our data be normally distributed.
In our manual classifications of root causes of the reviewed patches that crashes, we
randomly sampled 100 reviewed issues and the crashes that were induced. Though a
larger sample size might yield more nuanced results, our results clearly show the most
crash-prone types of patches, and the major root causes of the reviewed patches that
crash.
Reliability validity threats are concerned with the replicability of the study. To aid
in future replication studies, we share our analytic data and scripts online: https:
//github.com/swatlab/crash_review.
External validity threats are concerned with the generalizability of our results. In this
work, we study only one subject system, mainly due to the lack of available crash reports
and code review data. Thus, our findings may not generalize beyond this studied system.
However, the goal of this study is not to build a theory that applies to all systems,
but rather to empirically study the relationship between review activities and crash
proneness. Nonetheless, additional replication studies are needed to arrive at more
general conclusions.
3.6 Related Work
In this section, we discuss the related research on crash analysis and code review
analysis.
3.6.1 Crash Analysis
Crashes can unexpectedly terminate a software system, resulting in data loss and
user frustration. To evaluate the importance of crashes in real time, many software or-
ganizations have implemented automatic crash collection systems to collect field crashes
from end users.
Previous studies analyze the crash data from these systems to propose debugging
and bug fixing approaches on crash-related defects. Podgurski et al. [115] introduced an
automated failure clustering approach to classify crash reports. This approach enables
the prioritization and diagnosis of the root causes of crashes. Khomh et al. [70] proposed
an entropy-based approach to identify crash-types that frequently occurred and affect
a large number of users. Kim et al. [72] mined crash reports and the related source
code in Firefox and Thunderbird to predict top crashes for a future release of a software
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system. To reduce the efforts of debugging crashing code, Wu et al. [156] proposed a
framework, ChangeLocator, which can automatically locate crash-inducing changes from
a given bucket of crash reports.
In this work, we leverage crash data from the Mozilla Socorro system to quantitatively
and qualitatively investigate the reasons why reviewed code still led to crashes, and make
suggestions to improve the code review process.
3.6.2 Code Review & Software Quality
One important goal of code review is to identify defective code at early stages of
development before it affects end users. Software organizations expect that this process
can improve the quality of their systems.
Previous studies have investigated the relationship between code review quality and
software quality. McIntosh et al. [84, 85] found that low code review coverage, partic-
ipation, and expertise share a significant link with the post-release defect proneness of
components in the Qt, VTK, and ITK projects. Similarly, Morales et al. [89] found
that code review activity shares a relationship with design quality in the same stud-
ied systems. Thongtanunam et al. [142] found that lax code reviews tend to happen
in defect-prone components both before and after defects were found, suggesting that
developers are not aware of problematic components. Kononenko et al. [74] observed
that 54% of the reviewed changes are still implicated in subsequent bug fixes in Mozilla
projects. Moreover, their statistical analysis suggests that both personal and review par-
ticipation metrics are associated with code review quality. In a recent work, Sadowski
et al. [124] conducted a qualitative study on the code review practices at Google. They
observed that problem solving is not the only focus for Google reviewers and only a few
developers said that code review have helped them catch bugs.
The results of [84, 85, 142, 74, 124] suggest that despite being reviewed, many changes
still introduce defects. Therefore, in this study, we investigate the relationship between
the rigour of the code review that a code change undergoes and its likelihood of inducing
a software crash  a type of defect with severe implications. We draw inspiration from
these prior studies to design our set of metrics [142, 67]. We also draw inspiration from
Tan et al.'s work [140] to conduct a qualitative study by identifying the root causes of
the reviewed patches that induce crashes and the purpose of these patches.
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3.7 Conclusion
The code review process helps software organizations to improve their code quality,
reduce post-release defects, and collaborate more effectively. However, some high-impact
defects, such as crash-related defects, can still pass through this process and negatively
affect end users. In this chapter, we compare the characteristics of reviewed code that
induces crashes and clean reviewed code in Mozilla Firefox. We observed that crash-
prone reviewed code often has higher complexity and centrality, i.e., the code has many
other classes depending on it. Compared to clean code, developers tend to spend a
longer time on and have longer discussions about the crash-prone code; suggesting that
developers may be uncertain about such patches (RQ1). Through a qualitative analysis,
we found that the crash-prone reviewed code is often used to improve performance of
a system, refactor source code, fix previous crashes, and introduce new functionalities.
Moreover, the root causes of the crashes are mainly due to memory and semantic errors.
Some of the memory errors, such as null pointer dereferences, could be likely prevented
by adopting a stricter organizational policy with respect to static code analysis (RQ2).
In the future, we plan to investigate to which extent static analysis can help to mitigate
software crashes. We are also contacting other software organizations in order to study
their crash reports to validate the results obtained in this work.
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Chapter4
An Empirical Study of Patch Uplift in
Rapid Release Development Pipelines
The advent of continuous delivery and rapid release practices have significantly re-
duced the amount of stabilization time available for new features, forcing companies to
resort to innovative techniques to ensure that important features are released to the pub-
lic, in a timely manner and with a good quality. To cope with short release cycles, Mozilla
has re-organized its release process around four channels: a development channel named
Nightly, two stabilization channels (Aurora and Beta), and a main Release channel. Fea-
tures corresponding to a new release are developed on the Nightly channel over a period
of six weeks. After that, the code is transferred to Aurora, where it is tested by Mozilla
developers and contributors, for a period of six weeks, and then to Beta where it is tested
by a selected group of external users. Finally, mature Beta features are imported into the
main Release channel and delivered to end users. This pipelined process allows Mozilla
to avoid mixing the development of new features with the stabilization process, which
is particularly important given that integration operations are unpredictable [133], and
can significantly delay a release process, if not enough time is allowed for stabilization.
However, this well organized release process is frequently subverted by urgent patches,
implementing high-value features or critical fixes, that cannot wait for the next release
train. These features and fixes are directly promoted from the development channel to
stable channels (i.e., Aurora, Beta, and main Release), a practice called patch uplift.
Patch uplift is risky because the time allowed for the stabilization of uplifted patches is
reduced by six weeks for each skipped channel. Therefore, it is important to carefully
pick the patches that are uplifted and ensure that developers scrutinize them properly,
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to reduce the risk of regressions. There are a set of rules in place at Mozilla to govern
this uplift process. One of these rules is that patches uplifted to the Beta channel should
be (1) ideally reproducible by the QA team, so that they can be verified; (2) should have
been verified on Aurora/Nightly first; and (3) should not contain string changes (i.e.,
changes in the text which is visible to users). However, despite these rules, multiple
uplifted patches still introduce regressions in the code. Hence, it is unclear ifandhow
the rules are enforced at Mozilla and why certain uplifted patches introduce post-release
bugs.
In this chapter, we conduct a series of quantitative and qualitative analyses to un-
derstand the decision making process of patch uplift at Mozilla and the characteristics
of uplifted patches that introduce regressions. Overall, we analyze 33,664 issue reports
(corresponding to 7,267 uplift requests) in 17 versions of Firefox over a period of two
years and answer the following research questions:
RQ1: What are the characteristics of patches that are uplifted?
We observed that most patches are uplifted to resolve wrong functionalities or crashes.
Rejected uplift requests required longer decision time than accepted requests. We at-
tribute this difference to the high complexity of these rejected patches (since complex
patches require longer time for risk assessment). Last but not least, release man-
agers tend to trust patches that concern certain specific components, andor that are
submitted by certain specific developers.
RQ2: How effective are uplift operations?
4% of the subject uplifts did not effectively address the problems but were later
reopened, duplicate or cloned into another issue, or required additional uplifts to fix
the issue. Two major root causes were observed from the ineffective uplifts: the uplifts
only partially fixed the issues or caused regressions. Higher proportion of ineffective
uplifts were detected from the Release channel than from Aurora and Beta.
RQ3: What are the characteristics of uplifted patches that introduced faults in the sys-
tem?
From our analysis, we observed that uplifted patches that lead to faults tend to have
larger patch size; suggesting that developers and release managers need to carefully
review patch candidates for uplift with a large amount of changes, before allowing
for their uplift. Most faulty uplifts are due to semantic or memory-related errors.
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We also observed that patches related to certain components andor submitted by
certain developers are more likely to cause faults.
RQ4: Are regressions caused by uplift more severe than the bugs that were fixed with
the uplift?
Through a manual analysis, we observed that 37.5% of the Beta fault-inducing up-
lifts caused a more severe regression, i.e., regression that is more severe than the
problems they aimed to address. No more severe regression was found from the
examined Release uplifts, perhaps due to a more strict uplift policy and code review
process on this channel.
RQ5: Could some of the regressions have been prevented through more extensive testing
on the channels?
We considered regressions to be possibly preventable if they were reproducible not
only by the issue reporter and were found either on a widely used feature/website/con-
figuration or via Mozilla's telemetry. We manually examined a sample of regressions
due to Beta and Release uplifts, and found that 25% of the regressions due to Beta
uplifts and 30% of the regressions due to Release uplifts could have been possibly
prevented.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 provides
background information about patch uplift. Section 4.2 describes the design of our case
study. Section 4.3 presents the results of the case study. Section 4.4 discusses threats to
the validity of this study. Section 4.5 summarizes related works.
4.1 Mozilla Patch Uplift Process
This section describes the Mozilla patch uplift process and the rules governing this
process.
Firefox follows a pipelined release process [71], with four release channels (Nightly,
Aurora, Beta, and Release). New feature work is done on the Nightly channel, while
Aurora and Beta serve as stabilization channels, and the Release channel is used to
deliver the software to end users. Every six weeks, there is a merge day, when the
code from a less stable channel flows into a more stable one (e.g., the Nightly code is
moved in the Aurora repository). Most of the development work is performed in the
Nightly channel, where patches can be committed after a normal review process. For
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the stabilization channels, a different process for committing patches has been put in
place (i.e., patch uplift), to keep the channels as stable as possible (as code committed
to Aurora and Beta is closer to be released to users). Patches with important features
or severe fault fixes that cannot wait for the entire process are promoted directly from
the development channel to one of the stable channels, skipping the stabilization phase
on one or more channels.
The lifecycle of an uplifted patch can be summarized as follows: developers write
a patch, which gets reviewed by one or more reviewers. After a successful review, the
patch is committed to the Nightly channel. If developers (or other stakeholders) believe
that the patch is particularly important (e.g., it fixes a frequent crash, or a performance
issue), they can ask for approval to uplift the patch to one (or more) of the stable
channels, i.e., Aurora, Beta, or Release.
Release managers (who are independent and different from reviewers) are responsible
for deciding which patches can be uplifted. They can either accept or reject the patch
uplift request, after a careful consideration of the risks involved.
The more a channel is stable, the higher is the bar for approval of uplift requests.
Below we present an excerpt of the rules in place at Mozilla on the different channels.
 Aurora: Uplifts to the Aurora channel are less critical, as they still have consider-
able time for stabilization. The rules are not strict in this case: no new features are
accepted; no disruptive refactorings; no massive code changes; no string changes,
unless the localization team is aware and has approved; they must be accompanied,
if possible, by automated tests.
 Beta: Uplifts to the Beta channel are more critical, as they have less time for
stabilization. In addition to the rules outlined for Aurora, the changes uplifted to
the Beta channel should be (1) ideally reproducible by QA, so that they can be
verified; (2) they should have been verified on Aurora/Nightly first; and should not
contain (3) changes to the user-visible strings in the application (as those require
a very high effort and time to be localized, since Mozilla relies on volunteer con-
tributors). The uplifted changes can be proven performance improvements, fixes
to important crashes, fixes for recent regressions. The closer to the release date,
the stricter the release managers should be in enforcing the rules.
 Release: Uplifts to the Release channel are generally discouraged, as they require
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a new version to be built and released to users. Possible uplifts are fixes for major
top crashes, security issues, functional regressions with a very broad impact.
Once a patch is accepted for uplift, Tree Sheriffs [109] (i.e., engineers responsible
for supporting developers in committing patches and ensuring that the automated tests
are not broken after commits, monitoring intermittent failures and backing out patches
in case of test failures) or the developers themselves can commit it to the stabilization
channel(s) for which the patch was approved.
4.2 Case Study Design
In this section, we describe the data collection and analysis approaches that we used
to answer our five research questions.
4.2.1 Data Collection
We collected, from the Mozilla issue tracking system (Bugzilla), all issues marked as
resolved or verified in the Firefox and Core products between July 2014 (release date of
Firefox 31.0) and August 2016 (release date of Firefox 48.0). In total, there are 35,826
issue reports in our dataset.
Mozilla developers use customized Bugzilla flags to request for patch uplifts. These
flags have the form approval-mozilla-CHANNEL, where CHANNEL can be Aurora, Beta,
or Release. The postfix of the flag is set to a question mark (?) when a developer asks
for an uplift, to a minus sign (-) if the release manager rejects the uplift, and to a plus
sign (+) if the release manager approves the uplift. We relied on these flags to identify
uplifted patches. At Mozilla, release managers usually inspect all patches in an issue
report before deciding whether they can be uplifted together. Thus, in this work, we
considered uplift characteristics at the issue level. If an issue contains multiple patches,
we bundled the patches together. To study the patch uplift process, we need to consider
a period of time during which the practice was well established at Mozilla. To decide
on this period, we computed the amount of patches that were uplifted each month, over
our initial period of July 2014 to August 2016. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of
the number of uplifts in three Firefox's release channels during this period. We did not
consider uplifts that concern the Pocket component, as the inclusion of Pocket (which
is a third-party add-on) in Firefox, a one-time event, might introduce noise in our data.
In Figure 4.1, each time point represents a period of one month (we can see that the
Release channel did not receive any uplift in May and November 2015). Figure 4.1 shows
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Figure 4.1. Number of uplifts during each month from July 2014 to August 2016. Periods
with low number of uplifts or not covering all the three channels are removed.
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Figure 4.2. Overview of our data processing approach.
that the number of uplifted patches increased from July 2014 to August 2014 and then
became stable from September 2014 to August 2016. Based on this distribution, we
selected the period between September 2014 and August 2016, for our study. In other
words, we limited our dataset to only issue reports and commits that occurred within
this period. Between September 2014 and August 2016, we study in total 33,664 issue
reports, in which there are 7,267 uplift requests: 285 to Release, 2,614 to Beta, and 4,368
to Aurora.
4.2.2 Data processing
Figure 4.2 shows a general overview of our approach. We describe each step of the
approach below. The corresponding data and scripts are available online at: https:
//github.com/swatlab/uplift-analysis.
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4.2.2.1 Identification of Fault-related Issues
Mozilla uses Bugzilla to manage and track its issues. All types of issues, whether
they are faults or new features, are managed in this system. Unlike JIRA [147], which
offers the possibility to distinguish between issues using a tag, Bugzilla does not provide
issue type information. Therefore, our first processing task is to differentiate issues that
are related to faults, from new feature requests or improvements. To automatically
identify fault-related issues, we used a keyword-based heuristic to search information in
the title, description, flags, and user comments of each issue report. Our list of keywords
includes: crash, regression, failure, leak, steps to reproduce (STR), and hang. The full
list is available at: https://github.com/swatlab/uplift-analysis.
To ensure the accuracy of our detection on fault-related issues, we manually vali-
dated a sample of our results. From a total of 33,664 issue reports, we randomly selected
a sample of 380 issue reports, which corresponds to a confidence level of 95% and a
confidence interval of 5%. Two researchers read each of the 380 issue reports indepen-
dently and classified them into fault-related and other categories. We then compared
their classification results and observed that 41 issue reports were classified into different
categories by the two researchers. To resolve these discrepancies, we created an online
document for the 41 issues; allowing all of the researchers to comment and discuss the
issues. After this round, a consensus was reached for 35 out of the 41 issues. For the
remaining 6 issues, we organized a meeting and discussed the classification of each of
them until a consensus was found. The result of our manual classification shows that
our keyword-based heuristic achieves a precision of 87.3% and a recall of 78.2%, when
classifying issues into fault-related (the true class) and other (the false class) categories.
4.2.2.2 Identification of Fault-inducing Patches
We used the SZZ algorithm [134] to identify patches (these patches could be fault-
fixing patches or patches related to features or improvements) that introduced faults in
the system. First, we used Fischer et al.'s heuristics [47] to map each studied issue to
its corresponding patch(es) (i.e., commits). This heuristic consists in looking for issue
IDs in commit messages using regular expressions. Next, for each fault-related issue, we
used the following Mercurial command to extract the list of files that were changed to
fix the issue:
hg log template {commit},{file_mods},{file_dels}
In this step, we only considered modified and deleted lines, since added lines could not
have been changed by prior commits. We denoted an issue's fault-fixing file by Ffix.
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Then, for each changed file ffix | ffix ∈ Ffix, we used Mercurial's annotate command
as follow to check which prior commits changed the lines that were modified by the
fault-fixing commits. The SZZ algorithm assumes that the fault is located in these lines.
hg annotate commit -r f_fix -c -l -w -b -B
We refer to the obtained commits as fault-inducing candidates. Finally, we examined
whether a fault-inducing candidate was submitted before the creation date of its cor-
responding fault-related issue report. If so, we considered the candidate to be a fault-
inducing commit, and its related issue to be a fault-inducing issue.
4.2.2.3 Identification of Duplicate Issues
There has not been an approach that can identify duplicate issues1 with 100% ac-
curacy. Two general threads of approaches were proposed in previous works. The first
thread of approaches ranks the similarity between one given issue and other issues in
a dataset, such as [123, 138, 149]. The other thread predicts whether two given issue
reports are duplicate or not, such as [62, 137, 143]. Inspired by these works, we designed
the following approach, which is customized for our dataset.
1. For each subject issue report, we extracted its short description (i.e., title) and
long description (i.e., first comment). We performed stemming and stop word
removal against these raw texts.
2. As [137, 143], we used Okapi BM25 algorithm [154] (referred as BM25 in the rest of
the chapter) to rank of the similarity between any pair of issues: {(issuei, issuej) |
i 6= j, issuei ∈ uplift bugs, issuej ∈ all bugs}. In a given pair of (issuei, issuej),
we respectively calculated the similarity between their titles and their descriptions.
As there are in total 33,664 studied issues and 4,958 unique uplifted issues2, we
should perform (33664 − 4958) × 4958 + 4958 × (4958 − 1) ≈ 167M comparisons
(for titles and descriptions respectively). In each of these comparisons, the BM25
algorithm yields a score of similarity, the higher the score the closer the two pieces
of information (i.e., titles or descriptions).
3. We ranked the BM25 scores for all pairs of issues by descending order. We removed
the pairs where the BM25 scores is 0. The rest of the results were considered as du-
plicate issue candidates. We intended to manually examine the correctness of each
1 In this study, duplicate issues indicate different issues that aim to address the same problem,
rather than DUPLICATE in the Bugzilla sense, which means identical issues.
2 There are in total 7,267 studied uplift requests, but some requests are across multiple channels.
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title (respectively description) pair by carefully analyzing the whole issue reports.
There are 8.1 million pairs of duplicate issues candidates, our manual validation
cannot cover all these but can only focus on the most likely candidates. First,
we narrowed down our manual analysis scope to the top 1,000 candidates because
correct duplicate cases can hardly be observed beyond the top 1,000 candidates
(in which the highest BM25 value is 97.5, and the lowest value is 29.1) through
a preliminary analysis. Second, we designed a heuristic to further filter out the
pairs in which the two issue reports are not linked to each other: if Issue A is
never mentioned in Issue B (either in one of the comments, or in the Blocking,
Depends On, See Also fields), we considered the two issues to be not linked
(meaning that, in practice, developers did not notice any relationship between the
issues). To calculate the false positive rate of this heuristic, we manually examined
the top 50 and 100 other randomly selected candidates, and found that only two
correct duplicate pairs were misclassified by the unlinked heuristic. As a result,
137 candidates survived this step. Our manual validation was then performed on
these candidates.
4. Since we separately performed Steps 2 and 3 on the issue titles and descriptions,
we combined the results and removed redundancies. We also removed the pairs
where an issue is a clone of another one. From the obtained results, we only keep
the duplicate pairs where the duplicate issue were opened or resolved after the
original patch had been uplifted.
Compared to any fully automated approach, our approach can achieve a very high
precision because all of the reported duplicate issue pairs have been carefully examined
by (by understanding the whole context of the issue reports). Although we cannot
guarantee a 100% recall, we believe that our reported results covers all possible cases
where the titles (respectively descriptions) of a pair of issues are textually similar to
each other. In fact, text processing is the base of most aforementioned approaches.
BM25 is considered as an advanced measure of ranking similarities, which has a higher
performance than the traditional TF-IDF algorithm [143]. Some approaches, such as
[137, 143], used additional information (e.g., priority, product, and version fields from
the analyzed issue reports), but such information cannot help to retrieve more possible
candidate (i.e., it cannot increase the recall). In this work, we only ignored the issue
pairs where the titles or descriptions have no relevance (i.e., BM25 value is 0) or have
little relevance (i.e., the two issues are not linked and the BM25 value is weak).
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Table 4.1. Developer experience and participation metrics (m1 - m5).
Metric mi Description Type and range
Developer
experience
1 Number of previous commits of the patch
developer.
Integer, from 0 to
43639.
Reviewer
experience
2 Number of previous commits of the patch
reviewer.
Integer, from 0 to
43691.
Number of
comments
3 Number of comments in the issue report. Integer, from 3 to
1359.
Comment
words
4 Average number of words in the com-
ments to an issue.
Integer, from 0 to
2199.
Review dura-
tion
5 Time period (in days) from a patch's sub-
mission until its approval.
Float, from 0.0 to
around 406.67.
Table 4.2. Uplift process metrics (m6 - m8).
Metric mi Description Type and range
Landing
delta
6 Time elapsed (in days) between when the
patch was applied to the Nightly ver-
sion and when the developer asked for
approval of an uplift. The value can
be negative, as sometimes developers re-
quest uplift before their patch is applied
to Nightly.
Float, from -41.59
to around 153.73.
Response
delta
7 Time elapsed (in days) between when the
developer asked for approval for the uplift
and when the release manager decided
(approved or rejected).
Float, from 0.0 to
around 31.23.
Release delta 8 Time elapsed (in days) between when the
developer asked for approval for the uplift
and the date of the following release.
Float, from 0.0 to
around 42.76.
4.2.2.4 Mining Issue Reports
We mined several kinds of metrics from Bugzilla issue reports: information about the
review process (e.g., how long a review took, how many reviewers inspected a patch),
information about the uplift process (e.g., whether an uplift was accepted, how long
before a release manager decided to accept or reject an uplift request), the developer
assigned to an issue, and the component(s) affected by an issue.
4.2.2.5 Computing Metrics
To capture the characteristics of patches that were uplifted, we computed the 22
metrics described in Tables 4.1 to 4.5. These metrics correspond to the following five
dimensions:
1. Developer experience and participation metricsOur rationale for computing
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Table 4.3. Sentiment metrics (m9 - m10).
Metric mi Description Type and range
Developer
sentiment
9 The highest negative sentiment score in
the developers' comments on an issue.
Integer, from -5 to
0.
Owner senti-
ment
10 The highest negative sentiment score in
module owners' comments on an issue.
Integer, from -5 to
0.
Table 4.4. Code complexity metrics (m11 - m19).
Metric mi Description Type and range
Patch size 11 Number of lines in a patch (excluding test
patches).
Integer, from 0 to
301114.
Test patch
size
12 Number of lines in a test patch. Integer, from 0 to
127155.
Prior
changed
times
13 Number of previous commits that modi-
fied the same files that the patch is mod-
ifying.
Integer, from 0 to
114051.
LOC 14 Average lines of code in all files in a patch. Integer, from 0 to
27727.
Average cy-
clomatic
15 Average cyclomatic complexity of the
functions in a file.
Integer, from 0 to
128.
Number of
functions
16 Average number of files' functions in a
patch.
Integer, from 0 to
3878.
Maximum
nesting
17 Average maximum level of nested func-
tions in all files in a patch.
Integer, from 0 to
13.
Comment
ratio
18 Average ratio of the lines of comments
over the total lines of code in all files in
a patch.
Integer, from 0 to
99.
Module num-
ber
19 Number of modules (as defined by
Mozilla in [102]) involved by a patch.
Integer, from 0 to
76.
these metrics is that patches written or reviewed by experienced developers may
have a higher chance to be accepted for uplift, and may be less fault-prone. Long
comments and long review durations may indicate the complexity of an issue and
developers' uncertainty about it, which may explain its rejection or fault-proneness.
2. Uplift process metricsWe computed metrics capturing the uplift process for the
following reasons. Release managers may be more inclined to accept patches with
higher landing delta (as the more time a patch has been on the Nightly channel,
the more time it has been tested by Nightly users). Patches with low release delta
are likely to be refused uplifts, since patches that are developed closer to the date
of release might pose more risk (as there is less time to fix potential regressions).
Patches with low response delta may also be rejected (since developers have less
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Table 4.5. Code centrality (SNA) metrics (m20 - m22).
Metric mi Description Type and range
PageRank 20 Time fraction spent to visit a node (i.e.,
file) in a random walk in the call graph.
Float, from 0.0 to
1158.91.
Betweenness 21 Number of classes passing through a node
among all shortest paths.
Float, from 0.0 to
6.2e+07.
Closeness 22 The average length of the shortest path
between a node and all other nodes.
Float, from 0.0 to
3.21.
time to evaluate the risks associated with the patch). Patches with low landing
delta, release delta, and low response delta may also lead to faults if uplifted.
3. Sentiments We computed sentiment metrics because we believe that sentiments
can affect uplift decisions and their success rate: for example, a release manager
who is not happy about a patch might be less willing to accept it. From each
studied issue, we extract developers' comments to compute their sentiments. We
leverage the sentiment mining tool, SentiStrength [87], to estimate the extent of
developers' positive and negative sentiments toward a specific issue. As one of the
state-of-the-art sentiment mining tool, SentiStrength is easy to apply and it has
achieved a reasonable performance in prior work [87, 144]. To adapt this tool to
the software engineering context, we ignored a group of words that have negative
meanings in general but do not represent any negative sentiment in Bugzilla dis-
cussions, e.g., bug, error, issue, regression, failure, fail, leak, crash3. To further
filter out irrelevant information from the comments, we used regular expressions
to ignore hyperlinks and referred texts (i.e., lines starting with >). In addition
to developers' sentiments, we also computed module owners' sentiments.
4. Code Complexity Previous work, such as [72], has shown that complex code is
likely to introduce faults. We calculated code complexity metrics to understand
how uplifting decisions and their success are affected by the complexity of the
uplifted patches. We extracted the files changed in each patch and use the static
code analysis toolUnderstand [126] to calculate the following complexity metrics on
the files: lines of code (LOC), average cyclomatic complexity, number of functions,
maximum nesting, and ratio of the comment lines over the total code lines.
5. Code centrality (SNA) metrics Kim et al. [72] observed that functions close
to the centre of a call graph are likely to experience more faults. Hence, we
3 Please refer to our data repository to see the whole list of ignored words:
https://github.com/swatlab/uplift-analysis
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computed metrics capturing the centrality of functions involved in uplifted patches
and uplifted patch candidates. We used the network analysis tool, igraph [39], in
combination to Understand [126], as in [5], to compute the following Social Network
Analysis (SNA) metrics: PageRank, betweenness, and closeness. When computing
complexity and SNA metrics, we only considered the C/C++ code since Firefox
contains 86% of C/C++ code. Computing code complexity and SNA metrics is
a very time-consuming task. Instead of computing the metrics for each patch, we
computed metrics by releases and map a given patch to its latest major release
as in our previous work [5]. To make the metric results as precise as possible, we
considered all major releases from Firefox 32.0 until Firefox 48.0, which cover the
system's history from September 2014 until August 2016.
4.3 Case Study Results
This section presents and discusses the results of our five research questions. For
each question, we discuss the motivation, the approach designed to answer the question,
and the findings. To get a deeper insight of the patch uplift process, we perform both
quantitative and qualitative analyses for each research question.
RQ1: What are the characteristics of patches that are uplifted?
Motivation. This question aims to understand the characteristics of patches that are
uplifted. We are particularly interested in understanding what differentiates patch uplifts
among different channels. Although Mozilla has published rules to guide the patch uplift
process [106], it is unclear if and how these rules are enforced in practice. The answer
to this research question can help discover hidden factors that affect the uplift process,
and help software practitioners make this process more predictable.
1) Quantitative Analysis
Approach. Using the metrics from Tables 4.1 to 4.5, we statistically compared
22 numerical characteristics of patch uplift candidates that were accepted and those
that were rejected. As Mozilla release managers take a whole issue report into account
during the uplift process (see Section 4.2.1), we calculated the average values of the code
complexity and SNA metrics for all patches in a subject issue report.
For each of the 22 metrics mi, we formulated the following null hypothesis:
H01i : there is no difference between the values of mi for patch uplift candidates that were
accepted and those that were rejected, where i ∈ {1, . . . , 22}
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Table 4.6. Accepted vs. rejected patch uplift candidates.
Channel Metric Accepted Rejected p-value Effect size
Aurora Comment ratio 0.1 0.2 0.03 small
Landing delta 0.4 3.0 0.02 small
Response delta 0.9 2.4 1.80e-05 medium
Beta LOC 529.0 1,046.8 9.27e-04 small
Cyclomatic 2.0 3.0 0.04 negligible
# of functions 20.0 35.2 9.62e-04 small
Comment ratio 0.1 0.2 8.86e-05 small
Betweenness 2,789.0 20,586.3 0.01 negligible
PageRank 1.4 1.7 0.01 negligible
Max. nesting 2.3 3.0 7.72e-03 negligible
Module number 1.0 1.0 7.13e-03 negligible
Response delta 0.7 1.0 6.28e-04 small
Release Response delta 0.02 3.1 1.39e-12 large
We used the Mann-Whitney U test [57] to accept or reject these hypotheses. The
Mann-Whitney U test is a non-parametric statistical test that measures whether two in-
dependent distributions have equally large values. We used a 95% confidence level (i.e.,
α = 0.05) to accept or reject the hypotheses. Since we performed more than one com-
parison on the same dataset, to reduce the chances of obtaining false-positive results, we
used Bonferroni correction [43] to control the familywise error rate. Concretely, we calcu-
lated the adjusted p-value, which is multiplied by the number of comparisons. Whenever
we obtained statistically significant differences between metric values, we computed the
Cliff's Delta effect size [32] to measure the magnitude of the difference. Given a result of
the Cliff's Delta, d, we use the following thresholds to decide its magnitude: |d| < 0.147
negligible, |d| < 0.33 small, |d| < 0.474 medium, otherwise large [122]. In the fol-
lowing, we report only the metrics for which there is a statistically significant difference
between accepted and rejected patch uplift candidates.
Results. Table 4.6 summarizes differences between the characteristics of patches
that were accepted for an uplift and those that were rejected. We show the median
value of accepted and rejected uplifts for each metric, as well as the p-value of the
Mann Whitney U test and the effect size. For all three channels, rejected uplifts have
longer response delta (m7) than accepted uplifts. We attribute this outcome to the high
complexity of the rejected patches, which required longer time for risk assessment. We
summarize the different results among the channels as follows:
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 Aurora: We observed that rejected uplift requests have significantly higher landing
delta; this might imply that the rejected patches are landing at the end of the
Aurora cycle, and so have less time for stabilization. Also, rejected uplift requests
have higher ratio of comment in the source code, although we expected that a
higher comment ratio might help release managers understand the code. A high
comment ratio could also indicate a high code complexity. Release managers may
hesitate to release patches with complex code ahead of schedule.
 Beta: Compared to accepted patches, rejected patches tend to have higher code
complexity in terms of LOC and number of functions, as well as higher SNA values
in terms of PageRank. This result is expected, because we assume that complex
code and code connected with many other classes is less likely to be accepted for
urgent releases. As in the Aurora channel, rejected patches also contain code with
higher ratio of comment. Although accepted and rejected patches have significant
differences on some other metrics such as cyclomatic complexity, the magnitude of
these differences is negligible.
According to the results, we can only reject H017 , meaning that the re-
sponse delta can significantly affect the decision to uplift a patch or not.
The impact of other metrics, including code complexity and SNA metrics, is
channel dependent.
We quantified the acceptance rate of uplift requests for different components and
observed that certain components enjoy a 100% acceptance rate (perhaps because they
rarely experienced faults); while other components have lower acceptance rates (perhaps
because they are inherently more complex, e.g., the implementation of JavaScript, or
because release managers have had bad experience with some of them). This difference
between the acceptance rates of components is more pronounced in the Release chan-
nel. Some components that are involved in a large number of uplifts (e.g., Audio/Video,
Graphics, and DOM components) also have the lowest acceptance rate. Perhaps de-
velopers of those components tend to ask for uplifts more often, prompting a negative
reaction from release managers who may feel that they take too many risks.
2) Qualitative Analysis
Since we did not observe significant structural differences between the code of patch uplift
candidates that were rejected and those that were accepted, we conducted a qualitative
study to identify and compare the reasons behind successful and failed patch uplift
requests.
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Table 4.7. Uplift reasons and descriptions (abbreviations are shown in parentheses).
Reason Description
Security Security vulnerability exists in the code.
Crash Program unexpectedly stops running.
Hang Program keeps running but without response.
Performance
degradation (perf)
Functionalities are correct but response is slow or delayed.
Incorrect rendering
(rendering)
Components or video cannot be correctly rendered.
Wrong functional-
ity (func)
Incorrect functionalities besides rendering issues.
Web incompatibil-
ity (web comp)
Program does not work correctly for a major website or many
websites due to incompatible APIs or libraries, or a function-
ality, which was removed on purpose, but is still used in the
wild.
Add-on or plug-in
incompatibility
(addon comp)
Program does not work correctly for a major add-on/plug-
in or many add-ons/plug-ins due to incompatible APIs or li-
braries, or a functionality, which was removed on purpose, but
is still used in the wild.
Compile Compiling errors.
Feature Introduce or remove features, including support adding.
Improvement (im-
prove)
Minor functional or aesthetical improvement.
Test-only problem
(test)
Errors that only break tests.
Other Other uplift reasons, e.g., data corruption and license incom-
patibility.
Approach. From 2,384 uplifted issues in the Beta channel and 231 uplifted issues in
the Release channel, we randomly chose respectively 459 and 154 issues as our samples
(which correspond to a confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of 5%). Inspired
by Tan et al.'s work [140], we classified the uplift reasons into 14 categories based on
their (potential) impact and detected fault types. Some of Tan et al.'s categories are
too broad, such as incorrect functionality. We broke them into more detailed uplift
reasons, e.g., incorrect functionality is split to incorrect rendering and (other) wrong
functionality. Some of Tan et al.'s categories, such as data corruption, are with too few
occurrences. We combined them into the other category. Table 4.7 shows the uplift
reasons used in our classification. We performed a card sorting on each of the sampled
issues. By studying the issue report, two researchers individually classified each issue
into one or multiple uplift reasons (some uplift may be due to multiple reasons). Then we
compared their classifications and resolved conflicts through discussions. We discussed
each conflict until an agreement was reached.
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Figure 4.3. Distribution of uplift reasons in Beta.
To connect uplift reasons with the risk of regression, we will show the distribution of
the faulty uplifts for each uplift reason.
Moreover, to identify organizational factors that play a role in patch uplift decisions,
we interviewed three of the current five Mozilla release managers (the other remaining
two were new to the role) one at a time (to avoid them influencing each other), asking
them the following questions:
1. Which factors do you take into account when deciding about an uplift?
2. Are there differences in how you handle uplifts in different channels, and what are
the differences?
3. How do you decide which developers you can trust?
After this first more structured interview with the questions above, we performed
a semi-structured one, showing the results of our quantitative analysis to the release
managers and asking them for their feedback.
The questions of both the interviews were open-ended, so we had to perform an
analysis to extrapolate interesting elements and to group together similar ones (e.g., if
an interviewee mentioned a really important issue reported multiple times as being one
of the factors and another mentioned a bug affecting many users, we considered these
factors to be the same and grouped them together in Importance of the issue).
Results. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the distribution of the uplift reasons, as well
as the distribution of fault-inducing uplifts and clean uplifts for each reason. We ob-
served that, in the Beta channel, most patches are uplifted because of a wrong func-
tionality, crash, security vulnerability, incompatibility with some major websites, or to
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Figure 4.4. Distribution of uplift reasons in Release.
introduce/remove a feature. Most regressions are introduced by the uplifts that resolved
wrong functionalities, crash, and security issues. For some uplift reasons, including im-
provement, resolving add-on/plug-in incompatibility and compiling errors, few patches
lead to faults in our studied sample. However, a high percentage of patches resolving
performance and rendering problems introduced new regressions.
In the Release channel, we observed the same top five uplift reasons. Compared
to the Beta channel, there are fewer regressions; implying that these uplifted patches
may have been more carefully scrutinized, the rules for approval on the Release channel
being more strict. The fault-inducing patches only concentrated on five uplift categories:
crash, hang, security, performance degradation, and incorrect rendering. Especially,
most patches for incorrect rendering lead to future faults. These results suggest that,
although developers prudently uplift patches in the Release channel, they still need to
carefully review patches belonging to the aforementioned categories in order to prevent
delivering faults to users.
Through the interview, we learn that release managers take into account several
factors when deciding whether to approve or reject a patch uplift request.
1. Importance of the issue. This is measured through the impact that rejecting the
uplift would have on users.
2. Risk associated with the patch. Release managers share the same view on the risks.
They generally trust developers' words, unless they have had bad experiences with
them (e.g., developers who caused regressions and did not fix them); they evaluate
the risk of the patch by looking at its size and complexity, the presence/absence of
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automated tests, the reviewers of the patch. In case of doubts, release managers
consult other release managers or engineering managers to get a clearer picture.
3. Timing of the uplift in the Aurora/Beta cycle. They tend to trust more patches
that have been in Nightly for some time and patches that are far from the next
release date. They almost always accept uplifts requested during the first weeks
of the Aurora cycle.
4. Verification of the patch. In particular for more stable channels, they make sure
that the patch has been verified to actually fix the problems it was supposed to
fix. If needed, they ask QA to manually verify the patch. If it is a patch that fixes
a Nightly crash, before uplifting the patch to Aurora, they will verify if users are
no longer reporting the crash.
They remarked that the uplift bar gets higher as they are getting closer to release. After
the middle point of the Beta cycle, they only accept patches fixing high security issues,
high-volume crashes, severe recent regressions, severe performance issues or memory
leaks.
We presented the release managers with the results of our quantitative and qualitative
analysis and collected the following observations.
They found that the response delta information is interesting. After thinking
about it, they all gave us similar replies. When they are evaluating a complex issue and
are still undecided, they will not make the call immediately. One release manager said
that when I reject something, I won't make the call immediately. I will think about it
before doing it, in case I change my mind or new facts are coming in the equation".
Regarding the landing delta, they were surprised, as they thought they were more
likely to accept patches with a higher landing delta (that is, patches that have been in
Nightly for longer). They have also said that they are almost always accepting patches
during the first four weeks of the Aurora cycle, which would explain this discrepancy (as
those patches have a small landing delta).
The interviewed release managers also told us that they take into account the fault-
proneness of components when making uplift decisions; which is in line with what we
found (some components have a smaller acceptance rate). One release manager told us
that some components always come out as causing the most regressions, e.g., graphics
layers, DOM". Regarding the trust in developers, they all mentioned the assessment of
risk as one of the first factors. One release manager explained that when they seem really
overconfident or aren't telling me the whole story I lose some trust", another one stated
74 CHAPTER 4. PATCH UPLIFT IN RAPID RELEASE DEVELOPMENT
that some developers are taking a lot of risks, some other less and are super reactive
to fix potential fallout". This finding is consistent with the uplift criteria followed at
Facebook [158], where release managers tend to trust developers who introduced less
regressions in the past.
Regarding uplift reasons, release managers were not surprised that test and compile
changes are less frequent than others. They argued that these kinds of changes are really
hard to move from the Nightly channel to a stabilization channel (build or test failures,
unless they happen on really particular configurations, are noticed as soon as a patch is
applied, since tests are run for every changeset). For the same reasons, they were not
surprised that the uplift regressions are rarely compile-related.
Release managers argued that the information about the distribution of uplift reasons
is useful for their future decision-making. They were initially surprised to see that crash
and security-related uplifts often caused regressions, but they thought that the urgency
of those fixes might degrade their quality. They were also interested in the results
regarding the categories where a high proportion of uplift patches caused regressions
(e.g., performance uplifts). They said that they will start to take this information into
account when deciding about uplifts, and will be more careful with the uplifts in those
categories.
Patches accepted for uplift tend to have lower code
complexity in development channels. Release man-
ager tend to take a longer time to decide when
rejecting patches than when accepting them. The
top four reasons for uplift are wrong functionality,
crash, security vulnerability, incompatibility with
major websites. Release managers take decisions
based on their past experience with developers or
code components, focusing on the importance of
the uplift, then the risk associated with it, then the
timing of the uplift in the release cycle, then on its
verification by QA.
RQ2: How effective are uplift operations?
Motivation. Previous studies showed that some issues cannot be effectively fixed by
one patch, but need additional fixing efforts. These issues can be detected by seeking
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reopened [86], cloned [141], duplicate, or resolved by multiple patches [113]
(which also includes backouts made by tree sheriffs, [110]) issues. In this research
question, we want to examine whether it happens that patch uplift operations require
multiple attempts (we refer to such uplifts as ineffective uplifts). Since such outcome
is not desirable, it would be useful to help developers identify the characteristics of such
patch uplifts, so that they can take the necessary steps to avoid reoccurrences of issues
addressed by uplift operations.
Approach. To identify issues that were reopened, we used the REOPENED Bugzilla
resolution type. To identify issues that were cloned, we used a regular expression to
match the following pattern, which Bugzilla adds automatically when a user clones a
bug.
+++ This bug was initially created as a clone of Bug #ISSUE_ID +++
To identify issues that were fixed by more than one uplift, we used regular expressions
to detect uplifts in issue reports (see Section 4.2.1), and initially marked issues where at
least two uplifts occurred (at a distance of at least three days between them). We chose
three days because the distance between two beta builds is three days. A shorter time
would likely have caught simple follow-up fixes that we are not interested in. A longer
time would likely have missed some cases of multiple uplifts.
From the obtained results, we removed the issues that were reopened or cloned before
their corresponding patches had been uplifted. We also removed the issues with multiple
uplifted patches, which were actually uplifted together (or at the same time) or where
one of the multiple uplifts was a simple test-only fix (identified by a=test-only in the
commit message). From the user side, these issues were resolved by only one shot.
To identify issues duplicate of a previous issue fixed by patch uplift, we used the
approach described in Section 4.2.2.3.
For each identified and verified issue that was not effectively fixed by an uplift, two
researchers independently card sorted the root causes of the ineffective uplift into one
or multiple categories. They first defined categories separately, and then merged similar
categories into one. Next, they standardized the category names as shown in Table 4.8.
Finally, they used these standardized categories to compare their classification differences
and resolve conflicts until reaching an agreement for each of the issues.
Results. Table 4.9 shows the number of ineffective uplifts detected from the three
development channels. Since some patches were uplifted into multiple channels, the
table also shows the unique number of the ineffectively uplifted patches in a specific
manner (e.g., reopened, cloned, or duplicate). Figure 4.5 depicts the root causes of the
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Table 4.8. Root causes of the ineffective uplifts.
Category Description
Not fixed The issue was completely not fixed, i.e., the up-
lifted patch did not have any effect.
Partially fixed The issue was only partially fixed, i.e., the uplifted
patch had an effect but did not completely resolve
the problem.
Need more QA The uplifted patch had not gone through enough
manual verification.
Need more tests There were no tests added with the uplifted patch,
but they were required.
Diagnostics An uplift was made to gather more data on a prob-
lem, then another uplift was made to actually fix
it.
Regressions The uplifted patch caused other defects.
Test failure The uplifted patch did not pass a certain test.
Build failure The uplifted patch caused a build error.
Other Other reasons, e.g., an issue was fixed by an up-
lift, but then appeared again because of another
patch; or the patch depended on other patches to
be uplifted first.
ineffective uplifts and shows the prevalence of each root cause. In this figure, if the patch
of an issue was uplifted to multiple channels, we only counted it once. In general, 196
out of the 4,958 (4%) studied issues were not effectively fixed by one patch
uplift and required additional efforts. In previous studies, Park et al. [113] and An
et al. [6] respectively detected 32.8% and 23.8% general Mozilla issues (in different time
periods) that were resolved by multiple patches. Shihab et al. [131] detected 6.5% to
26% reopened issues from Eclipse, Apache HTTP, and OpenOffice. Compared to these
results, uplifted patches are more likely to fix a problem in one shot than other patches,
even though we analyzed ineffective uplifted patches from different angles, including
reopened, cloned, duplicate issues, and issues fixed by multiple uplifts. This implies that
uplifted patches have a better general quality than other patches.
The original uplifted patches did not completely fix the problem is the
most frequent root cause behind the issues that were ineffectively fixed and
were later reopened, cloned, or duplicate. An example of such case is issue
#1156182; the original uplifted patch of issue #11561824 only fixed the crash problem
on Windows. The issue was reopened to further fix crashes on Linux.
Leading to regressions is another important frequent root cause of the
4 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1156182
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Table 4.9. Number of ineffective uplifts in the three channels.
Aurora Beta Release Unique count
Reopened 70 49 10 77
Cloned 28 16 3 32
Duplicate cre-
ated after an
uplift
15 10 2 16
Duplicate re-
solved after an
uplift
5 3 2 7
Resolved by
multiple uplifts
50 42 3 78
issues that were reopened, cloned, and were resolved by multiple uplifts. An
example of such case is issue #1044975; after uplifting and landing a patch to the Aurora
and Release channels to fix crashes of issue #10449755, developers noticed an increase
of crashes with another stack trace in the field. They had to uplift another patch to
address the regressions.
In addition, among the ineffective uplifts, 27.5% of the issues were reopened after
patch uplifts because these patches did not resolve the issues at all. 18.1% of the issues
were resolved by multiple uplifts because their first uplifted patch did not pass a test case.
Test and build failures happen because the patch from the Nightly version is applied to
an earlier version (Beta or Aurora), so the rest of the code might be different. In the
current workflow, the uplift is published only after the uplift is accepted. In other words,
build or test failures can only be detected after an uplift is approved. If a developer does
not fix a problem quickly enough, the uplift might be published later than it could have,
thus missing one or more Beta builds (which are made twice a week), which means
reducing the time dedicated to manual testing. In the data we have collected, build or
test failures caused on average around four days lost on Aurora and around three days
lost on Beta. This means loosing four days of testing on Aurora, and almost one week of
testing on Beta (since there are only two Beta builds per week). We suggest that Mozilla
performs uplift simulations, i.e., notifying developers whether their patch causes build
or test failures as soon as they request an uplift, instead of after the uplift is approved.
Moreover, we observed that 9 out of the 77 reopened issues did not completely
get resolved, which were further filed as cloned or duplicate issues. For example,
issue #11540036 was created due to crashes in the drawing method DrawingCon-
5 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1044975
6 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1154003
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diagnostics: 1.2%
need more tests: 5.0%
need more QA: 1.2%
regressions: 20.0%
other: 3.8%
not fixed: 27.5%
test failure: 3.8%
partially fixed: 37.5%
(a) Reopened.
diagnostics: 3.1%
not fixed: 3.1%
other: 9.4%
partially fixed: 71.9%
regressions: 12.5%
(b) Cloned.
not fixed: 12.5%
other: 6.2%
partially fixed: 75.0%
regressions: 6.2%
(c) Duplicate created after an uplift.
not fixed: 14.3%
partially fixed: 85.7%
(d) Duplicate resolved after an uplift.
build failures: 6.0%
diagnostics: 4.3%not fixed: 2.6%
other: 19.8%need more tests: 0.9%
partially fixed: 10.3%
regressions: 37.9%
test failure: 18.1%
(e) Resolved by multiple uplifts.
Figure 4.5. Root causes of the ineffective uplifts.
text::FillRectangle. After uplifting a patch to the Aurora and Release channels, de-
velopers still observed a high volume of crashes with the same signature. To address the
missing edge cases of these crashes, developers cloned the issue into issue #11625207.
This finding inspired us to investigate whether the cloned and duplicate issues were re-
solved in the same version as their original issues or resolved in a later version. We found
that 23 out of the 54 (32+15+7) cloned or duplicate issues were resolved in the same
version as their original issues, and the other 32 issues were resolved in a later version.
In this study, we only target for closed issues, but during our manual analysis, we
observed that some issues fixed by uplifted patches have not been eventually closed.
For example, issue #12973908 was created as a follow-up to the crashes fixed in issue
#12801109. Issue #1297390 has not been closed because the crash volume decreased
again to a relatively low level. The priority of this issue were adjusted to P3, i.e., would
like to fix, but waiting for resources [98]. Although it would be interesting to investi-
7 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1162520
8 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1297390
9 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1280110
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gate how many issues fixed by ineffective uplifts have been completely and eventually
resolved, we can hardly get an exact answer because first, our subject dataset is dated
from September 2014 to August 2016. Answering this question is beyond the scope of
our study. Second, developers and testers can hardly know whether the most recent
patch has covered all possible aspects to fix a certain issue, in other words, a fixed
problem may come back again in the future. A lesson from this finding is that some
issues are more difficult to get fixed than others. If an issue has recurred in the field, a
proper follow-up is required even after the issue has been closed.
Regarding the differences of the ineffective uplift among channels, we observed that
153 out of the 4,368 (3.5%) Aurora uplifts, 112 out of the 2,614 (4.3%) Beta uplifts, and
16 out of the 285 (5.6%) Release uplifts were ineffective. Although the strictness of the
uplift rules increases from Aurora, Beta, and to Release, the prevalence of ineffective
uplifts does not decrease accordingly in these channels. The percentages vary among
different kinds of ineffective uplifts, in particular not fixed uplifts account for 0.5% in
Aurora, 0.9% in Beta, and 2.5% in Release. A possible reason could be that patches
uplifted to the Release channel are aimed at more critical problems, which might be
harder to fix. We looked in more detail at the not fixed cases in Release. It turns
out that these uplifts indeed often fix very hard issues that occur in not-easily repro-
ducible scenarios (even though they affect many users), thus developers are forced to
fumble around in the dark, attempting tentative fixes that sometimes do not work at
all. However, we still suggest that release managers enhance the review effort on the
Release uplifts, because these patches are targeted to the most stabilized version and
most users of the product. Releasing updates to them without fixing the issues might
be counterproductive.
According to our results, we suggest that developers and testers should carefully
inspect whether a patch has completely resolved an issue and verify whether the patch
has covered all possible scenarios of the issue. They also need to examine whether the
patch would lead to new problems (i.e., regressions) before requesting for uplift. Some
ineffective uplifts (such as those due to test and build failures) can be prevented by
performing uplift simulations.
We have shown the results to the release managers, who observed that many times
in order to mitigate risk and especially for very urgent issues, they actually request
developers to either implement a workaround or a partial fix, postponing a full fix (and
potential refactorings) for a subsequent release.
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4% of the issues fixed by patch uplift were not ef-
fectively resolved but were later reopened, cloned,
duplicated, or fixed by additional uplifts. Two fre-
quent root causes were identified from our man-
ual analysis, i.e., the original uplifts only partially
fixed the issues or caused regressions. Sometimes
release managers specifically request partial fixes in
order to mitigate risk.
RQ3: What are the characteristics of uplifted patches that introduced
faults in the system?
Motivation. In RQ2, we studied ineffective uplifts, i.e., uplifted patches that need
additional fixing efforts. We observed that leading to regressions is one of the reasons
of these ineffective uplifts. In this research question, we focus on the uplifted patches
that introduced new regressions. These patches not only decrease the users-perceived
software quality, but also increase development costs, since developers, testers and release
managers have to rework the faulty patches. In Firefox' Aurora, Beta and Release
channels, we found respectively 8.8%, 8.3%, and 7.9% of uplifted patches that introduced
regressions in the system. Understanding the characteristics of these fault-inducing
uplifts can help software organizations focus their QA and code review efforts on specific
kinds of uplifts to prevent users' frustration.
1) Quantitative Analysis
Approach. To discover all possible fault-inducing uplifts, we applied the SZZ algo-
rithm (described in Section 4.2.2.2) on all fault-fixing changes to identify uplifted patches
that introduced a fault in the system. Next, we classified the uplifted patches into two
groups: fault-inducing uplifts and clean uplifts. We used the 22 metrics listed in Tables
4.1 to 4.5 to assess the differences between these two groups. For each (mi) metric, we
tested the following hypothesis:
H02i : there is no difference between the values of mi for uplifted patches that intro-
duced a fault in the system and those that did not.
Similar to RQ1, we used the Mann-Whitney U test and Cliff's Delta effect size to
accept or reject the hypotheses, and assessed the magnitude of the differences between
fault-inducing uplifts and clean uplifts. We also tested the hypotheses for all three
channels.
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Table 4.10. Fault-inducing uplifts vs. clean uplifts.
Channel Metric Faulty Clean p-value Effect size
Aurora Patch size 155.0 34.0 5.59e-65 large
Prior changes 362.5 164.0 3.80e-10 small
LOC 903.6 457.4 2.23e-06 small
Cyclomatic 2.5 2.0 1.08e-06 small
# of functions 34.3 17.0 2.25e-06 small
Max. nesting 2.7 2.0 5.14e-04 negligible
Comment ratio 0.2 0.1 4.00e-15 small
Module number 2.0 1.0 2.99e-24 small
Closeness 1.5 1.2 2.78e-13 small
Betweenness 45,221.9 880.7 2.65e-14 small
PageRank 1.7 1.4 1.95e-15 small
# of comments 26.0 20.0 1.76e-09 small
Developer exp. 28.5 10.0 1.19e-18 small
Reviewer exp. 9.0 2.0 6.63e-09 small
Comment words 10.0 2.0 9.08e-07 small
Developer senti. -3 -3 8.92e-04 negligible
Owner sentiment -2 -1 1.66e-04 negligible
Beta Patch size 141.0 32.0 6.44e-33 large
Prior changes 268.0 156.5 1.02e-03 small
LOC 895.5 476.3 1.66e-03 small
Cyclomatic 2.5 2.0 3.69e-03 small
# of functions 37.0 18.0 3.13e-03 small
Max. nesting 2.7 2.2 0.01 negligible
Comment ratio 0.2 0.1 4.61e-05 small
Module number 2.0 1.0 7.45e-12 small
Closeness 1.6 1.2 2.87e-07 small
Betweenness 35,661.7 1,327.8 6.00e-08 small
PageRank 1.7 1.4 1.08e-06 small
# of comments 28.0 22.0 1.18e-04 small
Comment words 8.0 3.0 0.04 negligible
Developer exp. 29.0 10.0 1.33e-08 small
Reviewer exp. 10.0 2.0 3.35e-05 small
Owner sentiment -2 -1 4.14e-03 small
Release Patch size 108.0 27.0 2.07e-03 large
Results. Table 4.10 summarizes differences between the characteristics of uplifted
patches that introduced a fault in the system and those that did not. We observed that
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fault-inducing uplifts have significantly larger patch size (m11) than clean ones, across all
three channels. The effect size of the difference is large. This implies that patches with
larger modifications are more likely to introduce a regression if uplifted. We observed
the following on the different channels:
 On Aurora and Beta channels, fault-inducing uplifts tend to have more complex
code in terms of LOC, cyclomatic complexity, number of functions, and number
of modules. These patches often contain classes that are connected to many other
classes, in terms of closeness, betweenness and PageRank. Fault-inducing uplifts
also tend to have higher comment ratios and tend to change files that were changed
more frequently. Interestingly, fault-inducing uplifts are frequently submitted by
developers or reviewers with high experience. Fault-inducing uplifts also have a
larger amount of comments than clean uplifts. A large number of comments may
be a sign that developers are struggling with the patch, which may explain the high
fault-proneness. Although fault-inducing uplifts and clean uplifts also display other
significant differences (as shown in Table 4.10), the magnitude of these differences
is negligible.
 For the Release channel, we do not observe a significant difference between fault-
inducing uplifts and clean uplifts for the above metrics.
Overall, we rejected H0211 , i.e., fault-inducing uplifts have larger patch size
than clean uplifts. Release managers should pay attention to large patches
and reviewers should scrutinize them carefully. Although the effect of other
characteristics is channel dependent, in Aurora and Beta, we observed that
patches with high complexity and centrality tend to lead to faults. Uplift
requests submitted by experienced developers and reviewers also tend to
lead to regressions.
Similar to RQ1, we examined patch uplifts per component, and observed that patch
uplifts affecting certain components (e.g., Graphics component) are more likely to cause
regressions than others. Some of the components with the highest fault-inducing rates
also have a low approval rate; probably because the release managers were acting based
on their previous experiences with those components (for example, the Web Audio com-
ponent). Components like the Audio/Video, which are involved in multiple patch uplift
operations, also have the highest fault-inducing rates; these components would be inher-
ently more prone to faults because of their complexity, or technical debt.
We made a similar observation regarding developers' submitting uplift requests.
Many developers who submitted multiple uplift requests appear in the list of devel-
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Table 4.11. Fault reasons and descriptions.
Reason Description
Memory Memory errors, including memory leak, overflow, null
pointer dereference, dangling pointer, double free,
uninitialized memory read, and incorrect memory al-
location.
Semantic Semantic errors, including incorrect control flow, miss-
ing functionality, missing cases of a functionality, miss-
ing feature, incorrect exception handling, and incor-
rect processing of equations and expressions.
Third-party Errors due to incompatibility of drivers, plug-ins or
add-ons.
Concurrency Synchronization problems between multiple threads or
processes, e.g., incorrect mutex usage.
Compile Compile-time errors.
Other Other errors.
opers with high fault-inducing rates; perhaps, by uplifting more patches, they are taking
more risks.
2) Qualitative Analysis
To understand the root cause of faults in uplifted patches, we conducted a qualitative
study.
Approach. We manually examined uplifted patches (from the samples selected in
RQ1) that introduced faults, and classified the reasons behind the faults. Inspired by
the work of Tan et al [140], we defined seven possible root causes for uplift faults (as
shown in Table 4.11). We identified respectively 132 and 17 fault-inducing uplifts from
the Beta and Release samples chosen in RQ1, and performed a card sorting to classify
each of the faults into one or multiple causes. As in RQ1, two researchers individually
read the issue reports and their fault-fixing patches to understand the root causes of the
faults (i.e., the reason why their corresponding uplifted patches caused the faults) and
classified these root causes along our seven categories. Similar to RQ1, disagreements
were resolved through discussions.
We also interviewed release managers, asking them the following question: What are
the characteristics of fault-inducing patches that you are not currently taking enough into
account but could be considered in the future?
Results. Figure 4.6 depicts the distribution of the reasons why fault-inducing up-
lift introduced regressions. In both channels, semantic and memory-related errors are
dominant root causes of the uplift regressions. With a detailed check on the patches, we
found that many memory errors are due to null pointer dereference and memory leak.
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Figure 4.6. Reasons of fault-inducing uplifts.
In addition, incompatibility of plug-ins and drivers also cause uplift regressions in both
channels. Concurrency issues are ranked as a popular cause for Beta's uplift regressions,
but we did not find any example of this category in the Release channel. In general,
our results suggest that, when uplifting a patch, release managers need to care-
fully check for potential faults on the program's semantic meaning, memory
operations, synchronization, and third-party extension's compatibility.
In the interview, all the release managers agreed that it would be beneficial
for them to have more detailed information about the complexity of the
patches they are asked to evaluate and more information about the history
of the components involved in these patches. This resonates with our findings.
Release managers were surprised to see that fault-inducing patches were more likely to
be written by more experienced developers and reviewed by more experienced reviewers.
They guessed that these developers/reviewers are assigned to more complex tasks with
more complex solutions. A release manager told us that if you call in the big guns, then
it's a warning sign.
The fault categorization was also interesting for the release managers, who told us
that Mozilla is about to employ more static analysis tools (e.g., Coverity [37]) and to
move some of their code from C++ to a safer language (e.g., Rust). It is promising for
them to see how many memory and concurrency faults can be avoided by using these
techniques, and how many semantic and third-party faults can be reduced by enhancing
code review or testing efforts.
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Uplifted patches that introduced regressions in the
code are more complex than clean uplifts, and
they tend to change a higher number of lines of
code. Most regressions are caused by patch uplifts
aimed at fixing wrong functionalities and crashes.
The most common root causes of faults in uplifted
patches are semantic and memory errors.
RQ4: Are regressions caused by uplift more severe than the bugs that
were fixed with the uplift?
Motivation. In RQ3, we found that some uplift patches lead to regressions. For these
patches, following an observation from the release managers, we are curious to compare
their potential impact with the impact of the regression they lead to. We would suggest
developers to carefully uplift certain kinds of patches if the patches have often caused
more severe problems than what they intended to address.
Approach. We performed a manual analysis on the uplifted patches that were examined
in RQ3. For each of these patches, two researchers independently identified: 1) the
problem the patch aims to address (noted as original problem), and 2) the impact of the
regression the patch caused (noted as regression problem). To facilitate the comparison
on the severity level between the original problem and the regression problem, we merged
some of the categories (which have the same severity) defined in Table 4.7 as in Table
4.12. We also ranked the severity among different uplifted reasons (or regressions).
In some cases, the uplift and regression problems belong to the same category, but
they affect users to a different extent. For example, issue #105979710 (which was uplifted
to address a hang problem) caused a regression as issue #123978911 (which is a crash
problem). Although crash and hang are considered to have the same level of severity, the
first issue only happened during test runs, whereas the second one can be reproduced
by users. To reduce any biases in the above rule, we also carefully examined the severity
of the issues that belong to different categories. For example, issue #107519912 (which
was uplifted to add a mock GMP plugin for testing) caused issue #116091413 (which is
10 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1059797
11 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1239789
12 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1075199
13 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1160914
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Table 4.12. Categories of uplift reasons and regression impact. The severity is ranked by
descending order (1 represents the most severe reason; while 6 represents the least severe
reason).
Reason Description Severity
Security Same as security in Table 4.7. 1
Crash crash + hang. 2
Broken functional-
ity (func)
func + web compat + addon compat + ren-
dering.
3
Performance degra-
dation (perf)
Same as perf in Table 4.7. 4
Improvement or
new feature (im-
prove)
improve + feature. 5
Compile or test
problem (compile)
compile + test. 6
Other Same as other in Table 4.7. 6
Figure 4.7. Whether the regression an uplift caused is more severe than the problem the
uplift aims to address.
(a) Beta channel.
more: 37.5%
same: 17.0%
less: 45.5%
(b) Release channel.
same: 33.3%
less: 66.7%
a crash). Although the latter is a crash, it only affects the plugin used for testing, i.e.,
it has no impact on end users. Thus, we considered that the former is more important.
Results. Figure 4.7 depicts the proportion of uplifted patches that caused a more, same,
or less severe regression. Tables 4.13 and 4.14 show the frequency and probability of a
regression that an uplift on the Beta or Release channel can lead to.
In the Beta channel, more than one third (37.5%) of the manually ex-
amined uplifted patches led to a regression that is more severe than the
problem they intended to address. Most of these patches were used to introduce
improvements or new features (but caused crashes/hangs and broken functionalities),
to fix broken functionalities (but caused crashes/hangs), or to fix performance degra-
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Table 4.13. The frequency and probability of a regression that an uplift in the Beta channel
can lead to (rows in italic indicates that the regression is more severe than the problem the
uplift intended to address).
Uplift Regression Frequency Probability
compile crash 2 0.67
compile compile 1 0.33
crash crash 24 0.50
crash func 13 0.27
crash compile 5 0.10
crash perf 3 0.06
crash other 2 0.04
crash security 1 0.02
func func 35 0.57
func crash 14 0.23
func perf 7 0.11
func compile 4 0.07
func other 1 0.02
improve crash 7 0.37
improve func 7 0.37
improve compile 2 0.11
improve perf 2 0.11
improve security 1 0.05
perf func 5 0.50
perf crash 4 0.40
perf perf 1 0.10
security func 8 0.33
security crash 7 0.29
security security 5 0.21
security compile 2 0.08
security other 1 0.04
security perf 1 0.04
dation (but caused crashes/hangs and broken functionalities). In addition, we observed
that crash/hang and broken functionality are the most frequent and the most probable
regressions, which ranked as the top regression for each type of the analyzed uplifts. Es-
pecially, 50% of the patches uplifted to fix a crash caused other crashes, and 50% of the
patches uplifted to fix a broken functionality broke other functionalities. Regarding the
patches uplifted for security vulnerabilities (which have the worst impact on users), 21%
of them caused other severity vulnerabilities and 29% of them caused crashes/hangs.
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Table 4.14. The frequency and probability that an uplift in the Release channel can lead
to.
Uplift Regression Frequency Probability
crash func 6 0.55
crash crash 5 0.45
func func 1 0.50
func perf 1 0.50
security func 2 0.50
security security 2 0.50
In the Release channel, none of the examined uplifted patches led to
a regression that is more severe than the problem the patches intended to
address. This result is expected because patches uplifted for the Release channel should
have been more strictly reviewed and approved. The examined patches are only used to
fix security vulnerabilities, crashes/hangs, and broken functionalities, which respected
the uplift rules for the Release channel. 33.3% of these patches led to a regression as the
same type of problem they intended to address. All these patches have a high probability
to cause a new broken functionality.
In general, developers and release managers should carefully uplift patches that aim
to fix security vulnerabilities, crashes/hangs, or broken functionalities because these
patches may lead to the same kind of problems they intend to address and these problems
have the worst impact on end users. Uplifting patches that aim to introduce improvement
(or new features) or to fix performance degradation should also be prudently inspected
because these patches may cause regressions that are more severe than the problem they
intended to address. Although none of the examined patches that were uplifted to the
Release channel caused a more severe regression than what they intended to address,
around half of the patches fixing the top severe problems (i.e., crash/hang or severity
problems) caused other severe problems. More QA effort needs to be invested on these
patches, to avoid releasing severe regression to users.
Release managers were, as one might have predicted, happy to see our results re-
garding the release channel, but were not surprised because, compared to other chan-
nels, release uplifts are inspected with more QA efforts and are more carefully approved.
When using the metrics listed in Tables 4.1 to 4.5 to compare the differences between
Beta uplifts that caused more severe regressions than they fixed and other manually
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analyzed Beta uplifts14, we observed that the former uplifts tended to happen closer to
the release date and tended to have a shorter review duration (but these results are not
statistically significant as the sample we analyzed is probably small). Release managers
thought that these patches might have been uplifted in a rush and under pressure, which
would explain both the closeness to the release date and the short review duration.
More than one third of the fault-inducing Beta up-
lifts, but none of the Release uplifts, led to a re-
gression that is more severe than the problem they
aimed to address.
RQ5: Could some of the regressions have been prevented through more
extensive testing on the channels?
Motivation. Given the results of RQ2, we set out to find whether any regressions could
actually have been prevented by more extensive testing on the stabilization channels.
In this research question, we tried to identify, from a selected sample of regressions
that hit users, which issues were reproducible and how they were found by Mozilla. Our
result can inform developers and release managers whether more extensive testing efforts
would be effective in preventing regressions and how many regressions could possibly be
prevented. It should be noted that there is an important trade-off that release managers
take into account when deciding about uplifts: the necessity of shipping features as fast
as possible versus the need to not introduce regressions. More extensive testing efforts
might improve the second aspect, but hamper the first.
Approach. To identify regressions that were shipped to users (that is, the regres-
sions caused by patches that were uplifted to a version of Firefox and fixed only in
a later version of Firefox; for example, a patch that is uplifted to Firefox 57 and
causes a regression that is only fixed in Firefox 58), we used Bugzilla status flags
(cf_status_firefox), which specify the status of the issue for a given Firefox ver-
sion (e.g., cf_status_firefox48 set to affected means that the issue affects Firefox
48). In particular, affected means that the issue exists for the given version; wontfix
means that the issue exists and that Mozilla does not plan on fixing it for that specific
version; fixed means that the issue is fixed in the given version; verified means that
14 Please refer to the detailed comparison in our data repository:
https://github.com/swatlab/uplift-analysis
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Table 4.15. How an uplift regression is reproducible.
Reproducible Description
By all Everybody was able to reproduce.
By some Somebody was able to reproduce (depending for
example on the version of a driver, or a specific
version of an operating system, and so on).
By the re-
porter only
Nobody else except the reporter was able to repro-
duce.
By no one Nobody was able to reproduce (and the issue was
found, for example, by analyzing crash reports).
Table 4.16. How a regression was found.
Found Description
By tooling The issue was found by fuzzing or static analysis.
By developers The issue was found by Mozilla developers (by
code inspection, by running tests that were not in-
cluded in Firefox' test suites, or by running special
tools such as Valgrind or ASan) or by an external
developer (e.g., a security researcher).
On a widely used
feature/website/-
config
The issue was found by a user (an end-user, a
volunteer, or a website developer) on a widely
used feature, on a widely used website, or in a
widespread configuration.
On a rarely used
feature/website/-
config
The issue was found by a user on a rarely used
feature or rarely used website or on an uncommon
configuration.
Via telemetry The issue was found by analyzing crash reports or
performance measurements from the field.
the issue is fixed in the given version and is also verified to be fixed either by the re-
porter, QA, a volunteer, or a developer who could reproduce the problem (but not by
the developer who fixed it). Given an uplift fixing Issue A and a resulting regression
tracked in Issue B, we identified it as being shipped to users if Issue A was set as fixed
or verified in an earlier version than Issue B.
We then manually analyzed the identified regressions, categorizing both whether an
issue was reproducible and how the issue was found. We have analyzed all Release
regressions, and a representative sample of 152 Beta regressions (which corresponds to
a confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of 5%).
Table 4.15 and Table 4.16 show and describe how an uplift regression is reproducible
and how it was found. We considered the regressions as possibly preventable by additional
testing if they were not only reproducible by the issue reporter and were found either
on a widely used feature/website/config or via telemetry. If they were reproducible
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not reproducible: 8.2%
not reproducible (except by reporter): 4.1%
reproducible: 74.0%
reproducible (but not by everyone): 5.5%
unknown: 8.2%
(a) Beta channel.
not reproducible: 8.3%
not reproducible (except by reporter): 8.3%
reproducible: 75.0% reproducible (but not by everyone): 8.3%
(b) Release channel.
Figure 4.8. Whether the regressions caused by an uplift were reproducible.
developers: 27.4%telemetry: 17.8%
rarely used feature/
website/config: 12.3%
tooling: 19.2%
widely used feature/
website/config: 23.3%
(a) Beta channel.
developers: 33.3%
telemetry: 16.7%
rarely used feature/
website/config: 16.7%
tooling: 8.3%
widely used feature/
website/config: 25.0%
(b) Release channel.
Figure 4.9. How the regressions caused by uplifts were found.
only by the issue reporter, additional testing would not help. The regressions found via
telemetry could be prevented if the data (crash reports and measurements) were analyzed
in a timely manner (for example if there was an alerting system in place). We considered
the regressions as not easily preventable, if they were reproducible but found on a rarely
used feature/website/configuration, or found via telemetry but not reproducible, since
manual testing is likely going to focus on widely used features/websites/configurations
rather than seldom used ones, and issues noticed via telemetry are harder to fix if they
cannot be reproduced. We consider the remaining regressions as hardly preventable:
the regressions found by tooling could hardly be prevented, as the specific tooling was
not available at the time the uplift was made (they could be prevented now that it is
available); the regressions found by developers (e.g., by code inspection) could hardly
be prevented by additional testing. They could, in some cases, be mitigated by more
detailed code reviews.
Results. Figure 4.8 shows the proportion of reproducibility on the regressions. On Beta,
58 out of 73 regression issues were reproducible by all or by some developers, 9 were not
reproducible or reproducible only by the reporter. The reproducibility of the remaining
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6 regressions cannot be identified. On Release, 10 out of 12 were reproducible by all or
by some developers, 2 were not reproducible or reproducible only by the reporter. To
summarize, 79.5% of the regressions caused by Beta uplifts and 83.3% of the
regressions caused by Release uplifts were reproducible.
Figure 4.9 shows the distribution of ways through which the regressions were found
by Mozilla. In Beta, 20 regressions were found by developers, 14 were found by tooling,
13 were found via telemetry, 17 were found by users on widely used features/websites/-
configurations, 9 were found on rarely used features/websites/configurations. In Release,
4 were found by developers, 1 was found by tooling, 2 were found via telemetry, 3 were
found by users on widely used features/websites/configurations, 2 were found on rarely
used features/websites/configurations.
Between the two channels, both the reproducibility and how the issues were found
have similar characteristics (i.e., the proportions are very similar), as can be seen from
the figures mentioned above.
In order to understand the share of regressions that could have possibly been pre-
vented, we compare the numbers of the possibly preventable, not easily preventable, and
hardly preventable regressions in each channel. In Beta, 20 regressions (around
30%) could have been possibly prevented according to our definition; 13 re-
gressions (around 20%) could not be prevented easily; 34 regressions (around 50%) could
hardly be prevented. In Release, 3 regressions (around 25%) could have been
possibly prevented according to our definition; 3 regressions (around 25%) could
not be prevented easily; 6 regressions (around 50%) could hardly be prevented. We
notice that the proportions are similar between the two channels; meaning that our
discussion applies to both channels.
From these results, we suggest that developers and release managers should:
1. Try to detect issues via telemetry as early as possible (e.g., using alerting systems),
so that they can also be fixed in time;
2. Perform more QA on the stabilization channels, e.g., trying more diverse configu-
rations, as around 24% of the issues were reproducible and found on widely used
features.
Coming back to the trade-off aspect we briefly discussed in the Motivation part, it
applies to our suggestions too. An effective alerting system should not need to collect
data for too long before being able to produce alerts, otherwise if release managers had
to wait in order to check whether there are alerts, the release process would be slowed
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down (in this case, a higher number of users on the stabilization channels might help
because the more users the more quickly data is available to make decisions). The same
applies to QA, in the best case scenario the QA efforts should be increased in a parallel
way or should be more directed towards widely used features, to avoid slowing down the
release process.
Release managers have recently introduced changes to avoid regressions like these
to go unnoticed: Mozilla now performs QA on the Nightly channel for new features
directly when they are introduced. This allows more time to detect regressions and to
fix them. We found (not a statistically significant result probably due to the small size
of the sample) that the possibly preventable issues tend to have been on Nightly for
longer (higher landing delta), but tend to be uplifted later, closer to the release date
(lower release delta)15. Given the additional QA on the Nightly channel, the situation
of regressions (at least for the issues that could possibly be prevented by additional QA)
may be improved soon. Verifying the potential improvement will be a part of our future
work.
25% to 30% of the regressions due to Beta and
Release uplifts could be possibly prevented because
they can be reproduced not only by the issue re-
porter but also by developers and were found on
widely used feature/website/configuration or via
the Mozilla telemetry.
4.4 Threats to Validity
In this section, we discuss the threats to validity of our study following the guidelines
for case study research [157].
Construct validity threats are concerned with the relationship between theory and
observation. In this study, the construct validity threats are mainly due to measurement
errors. In RQ2, to find ineffective uplifts, we looked for cases where an issue linked to
the uplift had been, after the uplift operation, reopened, cloned, duplicate, or resolved
by multiple patches. To prevent false positive results due to this heuristic, we took a
series of measures to remove noisy results from our dataset (see the Approach part of
RQ2) and manually examined all candidates of ineffective uplifts. We believe that the
15 Please refer to the detailed comparisons in our data repository:
https://github.com/swatlab/uplift-analysis
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eventually included results have a high precision. In addition, some correct candidates
might not be detected by our heuristic, i.e., the false negatives. For example, some
ineffective uplifts can be beyond our expected cases (such as reopened, cloned or dupli-
cated issues) or mislabelled by developers in Bugzilla. However, instead of finding all
possible ineffective uplifts, the aim of this research questions is to identify precise and
representative ineffectively uplifted patches, analyzing their characteristics and propose
methods for software practitioners to avoid them. In RQ3, we observed that uplifted
patches with more lines of code are more likely to be fault-inducing. This result is not
surprising if we assume that the fault density is uniformly distributed in the studied
system. Nevertheless, as suggested by previous studies, software practitioners should
always carefully approve patches modifying a large number of lines.
Internal validity threats concern factors that affect the independent variable with
respect to causality. Since we do not draw any casual conclusion, threats to the internal
validity are not applicable for our study.
Conclusion validity threats concern the relationship between the treatments and the
outcome. We paid attention not to violate the assumptions of the statistical tests that
we performed. Specifically, in RQ1 and RQ3, we applied non-parametric tests that
do not require making assumptions on the distribution of our dataset. We used Sen-
tiStrength as the sentiment detection tool. We compared the performance of this tool
with SentiStrengthSE [61], the version tailored for software engineering, and obtained
the same results, i.e., no significant differences between accepted and rejected uplifts
in any channel, and only a small effect size of the differences on the module owners'
sentiment between clean and fault-inducing uplifts. Another reason why we prefer Sen-
tiStrength over SentiStrengthSE is that the former tool can be used from the command
line and can be easily integrated into our automated scripts. On the contrary, currently
the latter tool can only be executed from a user interface. In addition, when ingesting
a large dataset such as the one we used in this study, the latter tool cannot be as easily
deployed into a distributed environment. Before conducting the case study, we limited
our studied dataset within a duration that covers consecutive series of relatively sta-
ble periods on all the three uplift channels. In addition, we used a keyword matching
heuristic to identify fault-related issues. We manually validated a random sample of
380 issues. Whenever there were diverging opinions, we set up a meeting and discussed
the issue until a consensus was reached. As a result, we found that our heuristic can
achieve a precision of 87.3% and a recall of 78.2%, when identifying fault-related issues.
Moreover, we performed manual classifications on the uplift reasons, the root causes of
uplift regressions and reoccurrences, the reproducibility of the uplift regressions, and the
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way by which developers were discovered the regressions. We also manually compared
the severity of the issues that the uplifts intended to address with the severity of the
regressions that they led to. To mitigate potential bias that may result from our sub-
jective opinions, we also discussed on each of our classification conflicts until reaching
a consensus. However, as any other taxonomic study, we cannot guarantee a 100% of
accuracy on our classification results. Future replications are welcomed to validate our
work. Last, we used a heuristic to detect issues that duplicate a previous issue fixed
by uplifted patches, which was inspired by Tian et al.'s approach [143]. Besides the
automated detection, we manually confirmed every case used in our analyses to answer
RQ2. Although some true positive cases might have been missed, the goal of RQ2 is
not to find all duplicate cases, but to understand why some uplifted patches did not
completely resolve a problem and re-occurred in the field.
External validity threats are concerned with the generalizability of our results. In
this study, we only considered Mozilla Firefox. First, Mozilla Firefox is the most studied
system for issues related to rapid releases; moreover, the system's data are publicly avail-
able. We also have the opportunity to perform both quantitative and qualitative analyses
(including the interviews with release managers) on this system. However, we should rec-
ognize that our findings may not be generalizable to other systems. In the future, we plan
to collaborate with other software organizations, to validate and extend the results of
this work. In addition, more studies on other systems with other programming languages
are desirable to further validate our results. To facilitate future replication studies, we
share our datasets and scripts at: https://github.com/swatlab/uplift-analysis.
Another issue is that, in the manual classification, although we randomly chose our sam-
ples by applying a confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of 5%, our samples
might not precisely reflect the distributions of the uplift reasons andor root causes of
uplift regressions on the whole Firefox dataset. Further investigations on larger data
sets are desirable.
4.5 Related Work
Patch uplift is an activity performed during the release engineering process. Hence,
in this section, we present and discuss relevant literature on release engineering.
Release engineering encompasses all the activities aimed at building a pipeline that
transforms source code into an integrated, compiled, packaged, tested, and signed prod-
uct that is ready for release [2].
Since the adoption of the rapid release model [71] by Mozilla in 2011, a plethora
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of studies have focused on the impact of rapid release strategies on software quality.
Khomh et al. [71] compared crash rates, median uptime, and the proportion of post-
release bugs between the versions of Firefox that followed a traditional release cycle and
those that followed a rapid release cycle. They observed that short release cycles do
not induce significantly more bugs. However, compared to traditional releases, users
experience bugs earlier during software execution. Nevertheless, they also observed that
post-release bugs are fixed faster under the rapid release model. Khomh et al. observed,
in their extended work [69], that one of the major challenges of fast release cycles is the
automation of the release engineering process. Da Costa et al. [40] studied the impact of
Mozilla's rapid release cycles on the integration delay of addressed issues. They found
that, compared to the traditional release model, the rapid release model does not deliver
addressed issues to end users more quickly, which is contrary to expectations. Adams
et al. [3] analyzed the six major phases of release engineering practices and proposed
a roadmap for future research, highlighting the need for more empirical studies that
validate the best practices and assess the impact of release engineering processes on
software quality.
Another important aspect of release engineering that has been investigated by the
community is the integration of urgent patches that are used to fix severe problems,
such as frequent crashes or security bugs, or to introduce important features. Urgent
patches break the balance between new feature work and software quality, and hence
could lead to faults and failures. Hassan et al. [56] investigated emergency updates
for top Android apps and identified eight patterns along the following two categories:
updates due to deployment issues and updates due to source code changes. They
suggest to limit the number of emergency updates that fall in these patterns, since they
are likely to have a negative impact on users' satisfaction. In a recent work, Lin et
al. [78] empirically analyzed urgent updates in 50 most popular games on the Steam
platform, and observed that the choice of the release strategy affects the proportion of
urgent updates, i.e., games that followed a rapid release model had a higher proportion
of urgent patches in comparison to those that followed the traditional release model.
Rahman et al. [117] examined the rush to release period on Linux and Chrome. They
observed that experienced developers are often allowed to make changes right before
stabilization occurs and these changes are added directly to the stabilization line. They
also found that there is a rush in the number of commits right before a new release is
added to the stabilization channel, to add final features. In a following work, Rahman
et al. [116] observed that feature toggles [82] can be effectively turned off faulty urgent
patches, which limits the impact of faulty patches.
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To the best of the authors' knowledge, none of these prior works has empirically in-
vestigated how urgent patches in the rapid release model affect software quality in terms
of fault-proneness, and how the reliability of the integration of urgent updates could be
improved. This study fills this gap in the literature by investigating the reliability of the
Mozilla's uplift process, since uplifted patches are urgent updates.
4.6 Conclusion
Mozilla follows a rapid release model, which uses 18 weeks to deliver fault fixes and
new features to users. Frequently, certain patches that fix critical issues, or implement
high-value features are promoted directly from the development channel to a stabilization
channel, because they are too urgent and cannot wait for the next release train. This
practice, known as patch uplift, is risky because the time allowed for the stabilization of
the uplifted patches is short. In average, 8% of uplifted patches introduced a regression in
the code of Firefox. In this chapter, we investigated the decision making process of patch
uplift at Mozilla and observed that release managers are more inclined to accept patch
uplift requests that concern certain specific components, andor that are submitted by
certain specific developers (RQ1). We found that 4% of the issues fixed by patch uplift
were not effectively resolved but were later reopened, cloned, duplicated, or fixed by
additional uplifts. Two frequent root causes were identified from our manual analysis,
i.e., the original uplifts only partially fixed the issues or caused regressions (RQ2). We
examined the characteristics of uplifted patches that introduced regressions in the code
and found that they are more complex than clean uplifts, and they tend to change a
higher number of lines of code. Most regressions are caused by patch uplifts aimed at
fixing wrong functionalities and crashes. The most common root causes of faults in
uplifted patches are semantic and memory errors (RQ3). In addition, through a manual
analysis on a sample of the uplifts that introduced regressions, we found that more than
one third of the fault-inducing Beta uplifts led to a regression that is more severe than the
problem they aimed to address (RQ4). Last but not least, we observed that 25% to 30%
of the regressions due to Beta and Release uplifts could be possibly prevented because
they can be reproduced not only by the issue reporter but also by developers and were
found on widely used feature/website/configuration or via the Mozilla telemetry (RQ5).
We hope that software organizations take our findings and suggestions as a reference to
improve their uplift (or urgent patch approval) strategy.
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Chapter5
An Empirical Study of DLL Injection
Bugs in the Firefox Ecosystem
5.1 Introduction
Firefox, since its inception, has always provided APIs to extend the functionality
of the browser. There has been an evolution of methods to extend the functionality
towards safer and more stable methods (starting from plugins such as Flash, moving to
XUL/XPCOM extensions, then ending with JavaScript/HTML WebExtensions). While
Firefox and other equivalent browsers provide public APIs for extending functionality,
a lot of third-party software (i.e., software that adds code into another software) still
employ DLL injection techniques, i.e., techniques that forces host software (i.e., software
that allows other software to extend its functionality) to run arbitrary code by making it
load a dynamic-link library (DLL). By injecting arbitrary code, third-party software can
extend the functionality of the host software without limits. However, injecting arbitrary
code, while it is a very powerful technique, can easily cause severe bugs, such as crashes,
in the host software. As can be seen in [96], bugs arising from injection can be indeed
severe and widespread as to delay or cause revisions of entire software releases.
To the best of our knowledge, there has not been an empirical study towards un-
derstanding the DLL injection landscape, why third-party software vendors still employ
these techniques despite the availability of safer alternatives, the root causes of DLL in-
jection bugs, and proposing solutions to reduce them. This motivated us to conduct this
work, in which we analyzed DLL injection bugs that occurred from July 2015 to August
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2017 in the Firefox ecosystem. In particular, our study aims to answer the following
three research questions:
RQ1: What are the characteristics of the bugs caused by DLL injections?
We observed that most of the DLL injection bugs led to severe problems. Out of the
103 studied bugs, 93 bugs (90.3%) caused crashes (among them, 47 bugs (45.6%)
crashed Firefox while the browser was starting) and four bugs (3.9%) made the
browser hang (i.e., losing responses from users' requests). By analyzing the types
of the third-party software, we found that 57 bugs (55.3%) derive from antivirus
software, 19 from hardware vendor drivers, and 10 from malware.
RQ2: Which factors triggered the DLL injection bugs?
To further understand the root causes of DLL injection bugs, we surveyed third-
party vendors who caused the bugs. From their responses, we learnt that third-party
software uses a variety of techniques (including standard Windows DLL injection
techniques and proprietary techniques) to inject DLLs into the host software. DLL
injection bugs can be triggered by injection engine errors, compiler/runtime incom-
patibility, or version incompatibility between the host and third-party software.
RQ3: What would be the potential solutions to reduce such DLL injection bugs?
In the survey, we also asked questions about the potential solutions that could reduce
DLL injection bugs. From the answers, we realized that DLL injection should not
be outright blocked from the ecosystem because it could be useful under certain
circumstances, e.g., when antivirus software intercepts suspicious processes. Host
and third-party software vendors should strengthen their collaboration. Host software
vendors should extend the features of the extension API (as a safer alternative to DLL
injection) and can build a publicly accessible validation test framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides background
knowledge on the Firefox ecosystem as well as the risks and countermeasures of DLL
injection in the system. Section 5.3 describes the design of the case study. Section 5.4
shows and analyzes the results of the case study. Section 5.5 discusses the implications
of our findings. Section 5.6 discusses the threats to the validity of our study. Section 5.7
summarizes related work, and Section 5.8 draws conclusions.
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5.2 Background
5.2.1 Firefox Ecosystem
There are several ways third-party developers have been able to extend the function-
ality of Firefox: a) themes; b) plugins; c) extensions; d) DLL injection.
Themes are only allowed to change UI elements of the browser, thus they are very
limited.
The API used to build plugins, NPAPI (Netscape Plugin Application Programming
Interface), has been introduced by Netscape in 1995, and later adopted by most major
browsers. NPAPI plugins declared content types that they could handle. When the
browser was not natively able to handle that content type, it would load the appropriate
plugin and let it run. NPAPI plugins are binary plugins, and they have been slowly
deprecated for security reasons (e.g., Chrome dropped NPAPI plugins in September
2015, Firefox dropped all NPAPI plugins except Flash in March 2017 and will drop
Flash too in 2019).
Since its inception, Firefox has also allowed third-party developers to extend the
functionality of the browser through JavaScript/HTML APIs by writing extensions.
Extensions are either self-hosted, or hosted on a Mozilla website called AMO (ad-
dons.mozilla.org). When hosted on AMO, they undergo code review by Mozilla employ-
ees and/or volunteers. Since Firefox 44 (released in January 2016), Mozilla introduced
a signing requirement where all extensions (either self-hosted or hosted on AMO) must
be signed by Mozilla in order to be installable in Firefox (with the objective of reducing
malware). This means that all extensions since Firefox 44 undergo code review.
Initially, extensions had access to browser internals (using XUL/XPCOM APIs);
meaning that they could introduce technical debt into Firefox itself, as Mozilla developers
could not easily modify Firefox internal code that was being used by extensions.
To ease development and to make extensions higher level (which would allow Mozilla
to change their internal APIs without breaking existing extensions), Mozilla later in-
troduced an extension SDK (JetPack). Behind the hood, JetPack extensions were still
using XUL/XPCOM APIs.
A new set of APIs, the WebExtensions API [99], was later introduced in alpha state in
November 2015, then in stable state since August 2016. Since November 2017, following
a major rewrite of the browser which would have made many extensions incompatible,
all extensions are required to use the WebExtensions API, which is an API supported by
many major browsers (Firefox, Edge, and Chromium-based browsers). The advantage of
such a common API is that developers only need to write a single extension and it will
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(modulo implementation differences) work on multiple browsers seamlessly, much like
the web. The WebExtensions API is more restrictive than the old APIs, but also more
secure and stable, and with better performance characteristics [95] [94]. Moreover, since
these extensions are not allowed to use Firefox internal APIs, they cannot introduce
technical debt as the old extension APIs used to do.
Another way that third-party developers use to extend the functionality of the
browser (and of other software) is DLL injection.
5.2.2 Risks of DLL Injection and Countermeasures
By employing DLL injection, third-party developers are able to inject in the Firefox
process any type of code, whose behaviour was not intended nor anticipated by Mozilla
developers.
DLL injection is a powerful technique as it allows third-party developers to extend
the functionality of the host software however they want, but it can be very risky. The
injected code can, for example, use internal functions of the host software, without the
knowledge of the host software developers, thus causing crashes or other problems when
the host software removes or changes the behaviour of those functions. In order to use
internal functions of the host software, some injected code depends on the binary layout
of the host software, which changes for every specific build. If there are no mitigations
in place, the injected code can cause crashes for every new release of the host software.
Figure 5.1 shows an excerpt of some buggy code injected in Firefox by a software using
an open source library, EasyHook1. This is one of the few examples that can be shown,
as usually the injection techniques are proprietary. In this example, Firefox is the host
software (whose functionality is extended) and the software using the EasyHook library
is the third-party software (which injects its code into Firefox). The process of the third-
party software used the CreateRemoteThread function2 to create a thread that runs
in the Firefox process address space. The thread would call the Injection_ASM_x86
function, which first loads the library to inject (line 11), then tries to find the entry
point of the library using the GetProcAddress function (AcLayers!NS_Armadillo::
APIHook_GetProcAddress(), from the Windows DLL: AcLayers.dll) (line 19). This is
where the crash occurs: the address to the GetProcAddress function was retrieved by
the third-party software in its process, but then called in the Firefox process, expecting
it to have the same function and at the same address. Since Firefox does not load
1 https://github.com/EasyHook/EasyHook
2 https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/processthreadsapi/nf-
processthreadsapi-createremotethread
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1 public Injection_ASM_x86@0
2 Injection_ASM_x86@0 PROC
3 ; no registers to save, because this is the thread main function
4 ; save first param (address of hook injection information)
5
6 mov esi, dword ptr [esp + 4]
7
8 ; call LoadLibraryW(Inject->EasyHookPath);
9 push dword ptr [esi + 8]
10
11 call dword ptr [esi + 40] ; LoadLibraryW@4
12 mov ebp, eax
13 test eax, eax
14 je HookInject_FAILURE_A
15
16 ; call GetProcAddress(eax, Inject->EasyHookEntry);
17 push dword ptr [esi + 24]
18 push ebp
19 call dword ptr [esi + 56] ; GetProcAddress@8
20 test eax, eax
21 je HookInject_FAILURE_B
Figure 5.1. An example of DLL injection performed by RoboSizer.
AcLayers.dll, this function does not exist in its process. EasyHook later fixed the
bug by retrieving the address of the function from the remote process, rather than the
process doing the injection.
Other software employed a very similar technique to the one used by EasyHook,
but using apphelp!StubGetProcAddress() instead (from the Windows DLL ap-
phelp.dll. Again, the technique is not used by Firefox). AcLayers.dll and apphelp.dll
are both part of Windows, providing fixes for backward compatibility. GetProcAd-
dress is usually part of kernel32.dll (which is loaded in every process), but for such
software, Windows was probably shimming the API for compatibility, redirecting to
apphelp.dll or AcLayers.dll.
Mozilla later totally blocked this kind of injection mechanism which uses CreateR-
emoteThread (ironically, the code blocking this kind of injection mechanism triggered
a bug in another third-party software, an antivirus, which was later fixed by the vendor).
Using public APIs rather than DLL injection is preferable. Besides the aforemen-
tioned examples, there are other reasons:
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1. Since the WebExtensions API is supported by multiple browsers, the extension
code only needs to be written once but can be deployed to different major browsers;
2. The public API is controlled by the browser vendor, who has information on the
API's usage and can decide when to deprecate it (and when not to);
3. The extensions are written in JavaScript and HTML, just like normal web pages,
which implies a very reduced chance of crashing the browser compared to the
binary code that is injected with DLL injection;
4. Should an extension cause a problem, the browser can easily recover (e.g., by
reloading the extension). Instead, when an injected DLL causes a problem, it will
likely lead to an unrecoverable situation.
Mozilla has been applying a blocklisting policy to react to bugs caused by third-
party DLLs [111]. If a DLL causes a severe andor widespread bug (such as an easily
reproducible startup crash), Mozilla will, in parallel: a) try to contact the vendor of the
third-party DLL and ask them to solve the problem; b) start preparing a blocklisting
addition to block the DLL; c) attempt to reproduce the problem with its own quality
assurance (QA) resources, if the third-party software is publicly available.
In order to solve the problem, third-party vendors usually request crash dumps from
Mozilla, which often cannot be shared with external people for privacy reasons (the
dumps might contain personal information of Firefox users). Mozilla may share crash
dumps with third-party vendors only in the two following situations: 1) when Mozilla's
QA manages to reproduce the crash; 2) when Mozilla manages to get in contact with
users who can reproduce the crash (users can optionally leave their contact details when
they submit a crash via Socorro, i.e., Mozilla's automated crash reporting system) and
the users agree to the sharing of crash dumps.
If the third-party software is publicly available, Mozilla will prepare modified Firefox
builds that block the offending DLLs. Sometimes blocking a DLL is not easily feasible,
as some DLL injection techniques operate at the kernel level. Sometimes blocking DLLs
can cause more severe problems than the ones caused by the DLL itself. Hence, the
blocklisting addition has to be tested first. If blocklisting works and does not cause re-
gressions, Mozilla will apply the blocklisting patch, uplift it (i.e., publish the patch ahead
of the normal release cycle [25]), and, if the problem is widespread enough, generate a
new release build to ship to users.
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5.3 Case Study Design
In this section, we describe the data collection, design of the survey, and analysis
approaches that we used to answer our three research questions.
5.3.1 Data Collection
From the Mozilla bug tracking system, Bugzilla [150], we searched bug reports that
were created between July 2015 and August 2017. We chose this time window because
the WebExtensions API was introduced in September 2015, and our study started in
August 2017. In this work, we did not limit the analysis on already resolved bugs, because
some bugs were closed as WONTFIX or WORKSFORME, for example, if a DLL injection bug
was deemed too hard to fix for very little benefit or if the influence of a DLL injection
bug drastically decreased after the opening of the bug. From all the bugs in the studied
time period, we selected the ones that matched at least one of the following rules:
 the Bugzilla component of the bug is the one Mozilla uses to track bugs caused by
third-party software (External Software Affecting Firefox::Other);
 the title of the bug contains one of the keywords: .dll, virus, malware or
adware;
 the whiteboard of the bug contains the text AV, which Mozilla uses to mark some
bugs caused by antiviruses.
We then manually analyzed the results of the search to filter out false positives,
obtaining 103 bugs caused by external software through DLL injection.
The AV- and malware-specific rules only helped increasing our dataset slightly (5
out of 103 bugs), so our results should not be biased towards those kinds of software.
Within the results from the other generic rules, we also found AV- and malware-specific
bugs.
5.3.2 Data Processing
We manually identified a series of characteristics from the 103 bugs obtained in
Section 5.3.1. Table 5.1 shows the names and the descriptions of the characteristics.
To reduce biases in the manual identification, two researchers separately collected the
characteristics before comparing their results together. They created an online document
to discuss any divergence until reaching an unanimous decision. In addition, we wrote
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Table 5.1. Characteristics of the bugs caused by third-party software.
Characteristic Description
Manually collected characteristics
Bug impact Whether a bug broke the functionality of the browser, caused a
crash (or startup crash), or caused a hang.
Software name Name of the software that caused a bug. If no software name is
mentioned in a bug report, we marked as unknown.
Software type Type of the external software, e.g., antivirus, malware, and hard-
ware vendor driver.
How resolved How a bug is resolved, e.g., fixed by the vendor, or blocked by
Mozilla.
Reproducibility Whether a bug can be reproduced by the QA of Mozilla or third-
party vendors.
Automatically collected characteristics
Percentage of DLL
users
Percentage of Firefox users who also have the third-party software.
Fixing time How many days it took for a bug to be fixed since its first occur-
rence. We cannot retrieve the first occurrence date for some bugs,
we have to use the time period from the creation date until the
fixed date to estimated these bugs' fixing time.
Tracked or block-
ing
Whether a bug was ever tracked for a release or was blocking a
release. More information about Mozilla tracking flags and how
they are used in the release management process can be found in
[105].
scripts to automatically extract some other characteristics as shown in the bottom of
Table 5.1.
5.3.3 Survey
To further understand the root cause of the DLL injection bugs and how the bugs
were resolved, we designed a survey intended for the 58 vendors who caused these bugs.
However, we could not find the contact information of 14 vendors (including the malware
producers) from Bugzilla or through an online search. Hence, we ended up contacting
only 44 vendors. Among them, 12 vendors answered all or part of our questions, which
corresponds to a response rate of 27%. As we aim to propose potential solutions to
reduce this kind of bugs, we also asked these software vendors questions on improving
the reliability when adding their code into Firefox.
In our survey, we only used open questions. Participants could choose all or a part
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of the questions to answer. Our questions were designed to better understand the DLL
injection landscape: what techniques are used, what kinds of bugs can arise, why DLL
injection is still used as an extension mechanism despite the presence of safer techniques.
Here are the questions we used in the survey:
Q1. What is the injection mechanism that you used?
Q2. Do you know the root cause of this bug?
Q3. If the bug is resolved from your part, do you remember the way by which you
resolved this bug?
Q4. Since Mozilla is encouraging other organizations to produce their software as an
extension, is there any specific reason why you are still using the way of DLL
injection to add functionalities into Firefox?
Q5. Would you be open to switching to an extension-based solution if Mozilla gave
you the API you needed?
Q6. Do you run QA with pre-release versions of Firefox (e.g., Firefox Beta)?
Q7. Do you have any suggestions to improve the Mozilla API extension?
A possible approach to mitigate the DLL injection issues is to adopt a whitelist
solution. Instead of reacting to DLL injection issues by blocklisting misbehaving DLLs,
Mozilla could proactively block all DLLs except good" ones. The vendors in the whitelist
would need to be more careful and perform QA in order to be in the whitelist. Once a
whitelisted DLL causes a problem, it will be removed from the whitelist. Also, developers
using the WebExtensions API would effectively be exempt and would always be in the
whitelist. Besides reducing bugs, Mozilla expects that this mechanism can push third-
party software vendors to use the WebExtensions API, which can also avoid crashes in
the third-party code taking down Firefox [96].
To evaluate how this solution would be received by third-party vendors, we asked
additional questions to the vendors who have answered our initial questions. During
this work, we consulted some Mozilla developers by email and added these follow-up
questions based on their suggestions.
Q8. In your opinion, what would be a solution to allow for an effective integration of
third-party code into software like Firefox?
108 CHAPTER 5. DLL INJECTION BUGS IN THE FIREFOX ECOSYSTEM
Q9. Some software vendors are moving to instruct users to uninstall third-party soft-
ware after a crash, what do you think of such practice?
Q10. When Firefox rolls out new content security features, it often runs into compat-
ibility issues with third-party suites that leverage injection. What steps do you
think Firefox should take to prevent these issues with your product(s) in the
future?
Q11. What support might you be willing to provide to avoid these issues in the future?
Q12. If Firefox blocks third-party injection associated with your product, what side
effects do you anticipate? Would this potentially break your software product(s)?
Could this break Firefox?
Q13. Some vendors are considering introducing a whitelist that only allows reliable
DLLs to be installed. Would the whitelist be an incentive to adopt the cross-
browser WebExtensions API? (products using the extension API are always
whitelisted)
Q14. Would the existence of a whitelist be an incentive for your company to do more
QA with Firefox?
Q15. Would your company try to circumvent the whitelist? If yes, how would you do
it?
5.4 Case Study Results
We present the results of our case study and discuss the implications of these results.
5.4.1 (RQ1) What are the characteristics of the bugs caused by DLL
injections?
According to Mozilla telemetry3, large shares of Firefox users are also users of soft-
ware employing DLL injection to extend Firefox functionality. Each major third-party
software can be installed on between 1% and 15% of Firefox users' machines. Severe bugs
affecting a DLL from a third-party software that is installed on 15% of users' machines
(or even 1%) can be very concerning for Mozilla.
3 https://wiki.mozilla.org/Telemetry
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Table 5.2. Impact of the DLL injection bugs (some bugs have more than one impact).
Bug impact Occurrence Proportion
startup crash 47 45.6%
crash (unknown) 25 24.3%
crash 21 20.4%
broken functionality 8 7.8%
hang 4 3.9%
plugin crash 2 1.9%
Table 5.3. Types of the DLL injection software.
Software type Occurrence Proportion
antivirus 57 55.3%
hardware vendor driver 19 18.4%
malware 10 9.7%
multimedia tool 4 3.9%
screen reader 3 2.9%
other 3 2.9%
IME 2 1.9%
download manager 2 1.9%
desktop customization 1 1.0%
file hosting service 1 1.0%
accessibility 1 1.0%
Table 5.2 shows the distribution of the impact of the DLL injection bugs. Out of the
103 studied bugs, 93 bugs (90.3%) caused browser crashes, i.e., the browser unexpectedly
terminates. Among them, 47 bugs (45.6%) caused crash during the browser startup
(the most severe type); 21 (20.4%) crashed while the browser was running; we could
not deduct the type of crash from the other 25 bugs (24.3%) (i.e., uptime unknown).
Besides, two bugs (1.9%) crashed a browser plugin. In addition, four bugs (3.9%) caused
hangs, i.e., the browser does not respond to users' requests. Only eight bugs (7.8%) have
lower severity. They break the browser's expected functionality. The overall impact of
the DLL injection bugs are severe, which can negatively affect users' trustfulness on the
quality of the browser. From the side of users, they may not know whether the severe
problems (such as crashes) are caused by the host software itself (Firefox in this case)
or by its interaction with third-party software (usually they will just assume it is the
host software, since that is the one which crashes, even if the crash stems from injected
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Table 5.4. How the DLL injection bugs were fixed (some bugs were fixed by more than
one resolution).
Resolution Occurrence Proportion
fixed by the vendor 24 23.3%
worksforme 18 17.5%
not yet resolved 18 17.5%
blocklisted 16 15.5%
duplicate 12 11.7%
wontfix 8 7.8%
workaround 5 4.9%
invalid 2 1.9%
fixed by switching to
WebExtension
2 1.9%
fixed bug in firefox 1 1.0%
code). If the problems are kept unresolved for a long time, users may switch to other
equivalent products. Especially for startup crashes, where users cannot use the browser
at all, nor automatically update it to a newer version when a fix is released by Mozilla.
The only options for them are to manually reinstall Firefox after a fix is released, wait
for an update of the third-party software, or switch to use another browser.
Table 5.3 shows the types of the DLL injection software. More than half of the
bugs (57, i.e., 55.3%) are from antivirus software, 19 (18.4%) are from hardware vendor
drivers, 10 (9.7%) are from malware, and 17 (16.5%) are from other software, including
multimedia tools, screen readers, input method tools (IME), and download managers.
Overall, except for a small amount of malware and purpose-unidentified software, most
bugs are derived from DLLs that provide useful features to users.
Table 5.4 shows how the DLL injection bugs were resolved (or not resolved). 58 bugs
(56.3%) were not actually resolved by the time of this study. Some of the bugs were closed
with a label as WORKSFORME (bugs can no longer be reproduced), INVALID
(bugs are in the third-party software and with low enough severity), WONTFIX (due
to low or decreased volume of impact), or DUPLICATE (duplicate of another resolved
bug). Unfortunately, the labels are not always used consistently (for example, bugs with
very low impact are sometimes resolved as INVALID and sometimes as WONTFIX).
Besides, five bugs (4.9%) were fixed by employing workarounds (temporary and ugly
solutions). For the bugs that were actually resolved, 16 (15.5%) were fixed by Mozilla
by blocklisting the offending DLLs; 24 (23.3%) of them were fixed from the vendor side.
Only two bugs (1.9%) were resolved by switching to using Mozilla's WebExtension API
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Figure 5.2. Distribution of the bug fixing time. Each bin represents a period of six weeks,
e.g., the first bin means bugs fixed within six weeks (i.e., one release cycle).
as recommended. Merely one bug (1%) was not due to the DLL vendors but due to
defects of Firefox. From the result, we observe that a weak percentage of the bugs
can be resolved by the host software itself (Firefox). Third-party vendors' efforts and
collaboration are important to keep the Firefox ecosystem healthy. Moreover, few third-
party vendors have adopted Mozilla's recommendation of using the WebExtensions API.
Figure 5.2 depicts the time period (in six weeks periods) during which the DLL
injection bugs were resolved. In this figure, we only considered the 81 bugs that were
closed by the time of this study. 40 bugs were fixed within a period of six weeks; meaning
that nearly half of the DLL injection bugs can be fixed before the next release. 55 bugs
were resolved within 18 weeks, a full release cycle from Nightly to Release. End users can
benefit from the resolution of these bugs within three releases (a new version is released
every six weeks). However, we also observed 10 bugs that were not resolved for more
than one year. Moreover, 22 other bugs have never been resolved until the writing of this
paper. Long resolution time of DLL injection bugs challenges users' trustfulness not only
to the third-party software, but also, and in many cases even more, to the host software.
To maintain the health of the ecosystem, both sides of the host and third-party software
need to actively and effectively discover and resolve bugs. We found that some bugs,
such as Bug #1268470, were resolved late because at the time of reporting the bug, it
affected only a small number of users. When the bug started affecting more users, it
attracted Mozilla's attention.
Although Bugzilla has priority/importance fields, they are used inconsistently by
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different developers and different teams, thus cannot be relied upon to infer the impor-
tance of a given bug. In order to evaluate the actual severity of the bugs, we analyzed
the Bugzilla tracking flags that are used by Release Managers during the release pro-
cess [105]. We found that 32 bugs (31.1%) were tracked or blocking for a release at
least once. These kinds of bugs are particularly important because they either have
been closely monitored by release managers for possible resolution in a Firefox release
(tracked bugs: 24, 23.3%) or have been marked as blocking (must be fixed before
shipping) a Firefox release (blocking bugs: 8, 7.8%). To put it into perspective, we can
compare these percentages with the overall ones: 3390 tracked bugs (around 0.037%)
and 165 blocking bugs (around 0.002%). This means that DLL injection bugs, even
though expectedly rarer than other bugs, are often more severe than other bugs. We
also compared the fixing times of DLL-injection blocking/tracked bugs with those of
generic blocking/tracked bugs. In addition, we found that the average fixing time is
around 3.4 times higher for DLL-injection tracked bugs than generic tracked bugs (for
blocking bugs the average is 2.8 times higher). However, the differences are not statisti-
cally significant based on the Mann-Whitney U test [57]. One reason is that there are
too few samples in our dataset.
Finally, 26 (25.2%) of the DLL injection bugs could be reproduced by Mozilla or
third-party vendor's QA, four (3.9%) of the bugs could not be reproduced, and we
cannot identify whether the rest 73 bugs (70.9%) could be reproduced or not. For
bugs that were reproducible, additional QA performed by either Mozilla or the third-
party vendors before a Firefox release could have prevented the bug from hitting users.
Among the aforementioned eight blocking bugs (account for 7.8%), five of them could
be reproduced by Mozilla or third-party QA, one of them could not be reproduced, and
we cannot identify the reproducibility for the remaining two bugs. If more in-depth QA
was part of the envisioned whitelist policy of Mozilla, many of these blocking bugs could
have been resolved before they became blocking.
93 bugs (90.3%) of the DLL injection bugs led to
crashes. 57 bugs (55.3%) of the bugs are from an-
tivirus software, 19 (18.4%) of them from hardware
vendor drivers, and 10 (9.7%) from malware. 1%
to 15% of Firefox users also have some of the soft-
ware that caused these bugs.
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Table 5.5. Statistics on the survey participants (all participants are from different vendors).
Question Participants Software type (and its frequency)
1 12 antivirus (7) screen reader (1)
unknown (1) internet downloader (1)
media recorder (1) hardware vendor driver (1)
2 12 antivirus (7) screen reader (1)
unknown (1) internet downloader (1)
media recorder (1) hardware vendor driver (1)
3 10 antivirus (5) screen reader (1)
unknown (1) internet downloader (1)
media recorder (1) hardware vendor driver (1)
4 11 antivirus (7) screen reader (1)
unknown (1) hardware vendor driver (1)
5 7 antivirus (3) screen reader (1)
unknown (1) hardware vendor driver (1)
6 6 antivirus (2) screen reader (1)
unknown (1) hardware vendor driver (1)
7 5 screen reader (1) unknown (1)
hardware vendor driver (1) media recorder (1)
8 5 antivirus (3) media recorder (1)
9 4 antivirus (3) media recorder (1)
10 4 antivirus (3) media recorder (1)
11 4 antivirus (3) media recorder (1)
12 4 antivirus (3) media recorder (1)
13 4 antivirus (3) media recorder (1)
14 5 antivirus (3) media recorder (1)
15 4 antivirus (3) media recorder (1)
5.4.2 (RQ2) Which factors triggered the DLL injection bugs?
Firefox is an open source browser. Its crash and bug reports are also open to the
public. Developers and researchers can leverage these resources to understand the root
causes of most bugs. However, through our manual analysis, none of the DLL injection
software that caused bugs in Firefox is open source. Thus, we cannot understand the
root causes of these bugs from source code. As we observed in RQ1, many subject
bugs, which were eventually resolved, were fixed by the software vendors or blocked by
Mozilla. In both cases, Mozilla did not know the triggers. Although the third-party
vendors knew the triggers of the bugs they resolved, they rarely mentioned them in the
bug reports. In other words, bug reports cannot help us to understand the bugs' root
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causes either. Therefore, to answer this research question, we decided to ask the software
vendors themselves. In the rest of this section, we will show the vendors' responses to the
corresponding survey questions and discuss these responses. Table 5.5 shows statistics on
the participants for each survey question. In this table, we respectively provided the total
number of participants who answered a question, types of these participants' software,
and number of participants for each type of software. All the reported responses are
from closed source software vendors. Due to privacy reasons, we may have hidden some
confidential details.
DLL injection mechanisms used by the software vendors (Q1).
We received 12 responses to the question related to the injection mechanisms used on
Firefox. Two general kinds of mechanisms can be identified from the responses: stan-
dard Windows techniques and proprietary techniques. Among the eight responses on
the standard techniques, seven participants explained the detail of their technique, one
participant only mentioned that their DLL injection technique is standard for the Win-
dows OS. Here we quote our participants' answers to this question: It's just a standard
Shell Extension that runs when folks use the open/save dialogues. We use SetWin-
EventHook [129] from user32.dll. We used a general mechanism (SetWindowsHookEx
[128]) to inject other processes in order to be able to influence window creation flags
in case the user decides to not be disturbed in Game Mode / Do Not Disturb Mode.
AppInit_dll [10] registry entry. CreateRemoteThread+LoadLibrary [38, 80].
Three participants said that they used proprietary techniques, but none of them
revealed details. Two other participants did not directly answer this question but said
that the injection mechanism is irrelevant to the bugs. Overall, third-party software
uses a variety of techniques to inject DLLs into the host software.
Root causes of DLL injection bugs and resolution mechanisms (Q2, Q3).
Our second and third questions concerned the root causes of the bugs and how the bugs
were resolved. Nine participants explained the root causes of the bugs caused by their
injected software. 10 participants explained the resolution process of the bugs caused by
their injected code. Some bugs were caused by the injection engine. The participants
said: Bug in hook engine. Legacy code not covered by automatic tests., Problem was
internal to the hooked functionality and likely not dependent on Firefox code. The DLL
vendors resolved the bugs by fixing their injection code.
Compiler or runtime incompatibility is another cause mentioned: Our compiler
wasn't C++ 11 compliant and therefore introduced a race initialization of a mutex.
(Our DLL) was incompatible with C++ runtime, shipped with Windows 8.0 x64. It is
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not depend of upgrade or clear installation of FF (Firefox). In addition, it should not
depend from browser, for crash it is enough Windows 8.0 x64 C++ runtime and any
browser.. Participants did not provide detailed information about the resolution of this
problem. We suppose that upgrading the compiler would address the bugs.
Some other bugs were due to generic programming mistakes, which were later resolved
and made the DLL work again. One participant explained: It was a mistake regarding
64 and 32 bit values in our code base. bad_alloc wasn't caught in our code.
In addition, bugs can also occur when users forcibly loaded old extensions to newer
versions of Firefox and disabled compatibility checks ... (Old versions of Firefox) missed a
check for NULL on one of interface queries. The issue started to persist after significant
changes in Mozilla interfaces. To reduce this kind of bugs, the host software can alert
users to upgrade their old version of the third-party software, and warn them of the
potential consequences of the incompatibilities on the host/third-party software versions.
Based on our observations, most bugs are due to injection engine problems,
compiler/runtime incompatibility, or version incompatibility between the
host and third-party software. This finding corroborates what we found in RQ1:
most bugs are in third-party software's code and thus cannot directly be fixed by Mozilla.
In many cases, DLL injection bugs are triggered by
injection engine errors, compiler/runtime incom-
patibility, or version incompatibility between the
host and third-party software.
5.4.3 (RQ3) What would be the potential solutions to reduce such
DLL injection bugs?
Unreliability challenges all software ecosystems. To reduce potential crashes caused
by third-party software, from September 2018, Chrome will try to block most third-party
software that injects code into it [30] (Chrome developers claim that users with soft-
ware that injects code into Windows Chrome are 15% more likely to experience crashes).
The organization hopes third-party software can switch to use the recommended We-
bExtensions API to run code inside Chrome processes. Mozilla is also trying to reduce
bugs caused by third-party software, while avoiding outright blocking, by introducing a
whitelist to allow only DLLs, which are proved reliable, to inject code into Firefox. With
the same expectation as Chrome, Mozilla hopes that this measure can make third-party
software vendors switch from DLL injection to WebExtensions, which is considered as
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a more reliable way to interact with Firefox. In this paper, by analyzing survey partic-
ipants' answers, we want to discuss whether the whitelist is the best solution to reduce
bugs from third-party software, and whether there are better alternatives to it.
Reasons provided for not adopting WebExtensions (Q4).
First, we wanted to know the reasons why many third-party vendors are still using the
way of DLL injection, although WebExtensions have been available for a while (in alpha
state since Firefox 42, released in 2015-11-03; in a stable state since Firefox 48, released
in 2016-08-02). This corresponds to Question #4 in the survey. 11 participants answered
this question. Multiple participants mentioned that their DLL is not specifically designed
for Firefox but is also being used for other host software, e.g., Our software is not just
used for FF (Firefox). It is a general purpose audio recorder. Users choose which
application they wish to target. For these vendors, migrating to WebExtensions would
not be interesting because it requires extra efforts to refactor the existing code.
Another reason is that some vendors cannot use WebExtensions to achieve their
goal, e.g., We must be able to gather content from Firefox. The most efficient way
being to inject. Extensions are not suitable for Screen Reading software such as ours.
An antivirus vendor said: We provide secure input feature in our product, which means
that no one can intercept symbols, which user input in browser fields. The task could
not be done on Windows OS without kernel driver and injected dll in browser. Another
antivirus vendor explained: As hackers always inject, while we are reducing to minimize
our injections, we cannot totally eliminate them. This would partially explain why a
big percentage of DLL injection bugs derive from antivirus software. Due to the above
two reasons, if a host software banned DLL injections, the vendors will have to find other
feasible hosts.
Moreover, some participants indicated the disadvantages of WebExtensions, e.g.,
The main disadvantage we find is that WebExtensions can be easily disabled (for a user
with admin-rights, and in a Windows workgroup environment). We had taken this route
of injecting a DLL to enforce URL filtering even in such environments. Again, DLL
injection is currently the most suitable way for such vendors.
Only one participant is willing to accept WebExtensions, but they also said that
WebExtensions cannot fulfill some particular purposes, which is inline with the afore-
mentioned observations.
In general, some DLL vendors do not want to adopt WebExtensions, be-
cause they do not target for one specific host software, and the features
currently offered by the WebExtensions API are still limited for some pur-
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poses. One participant told us that their organization has thoroughly analyzed the
pros and cons about using WebExtensions. However, they still keep using DLL injection
because they don't see any way how and why to stop injecting there (in order to pro-
tect our users, which is our business). We cite their analysis here and hope that host
software organizations can take this as a reference to improve the extension API andor
communicate better about their advantages.
In comparison with injection, extension has much worse deployment possibilities  the
installation process is cumbersome (you can't install the extension silently without user
interaction which is a major UX problem, you can't protect the extension from unin-
stalling, you'd need to check for browser reinstalls and install again etc).
Also, it's possible to write the extension, but since the API is limited (everyone saw the
2/3 of extensions being removed from new Firefox because of API problems) and the
model is also asynchronous, which kinda gets in a way what would AV product need.
And the next point against extensions is a need for three different extensions for three
browsers  although they all use WebExtensions, they're quite different. And MSIE is
still there, with stronger presence than Edge.
Migration from code injection to WebExtensions (Q5).
Q5 is about whether third-party vendors are open to switch to WebExtensions if Mozilla
gave them the needed API. Seven participants answered this question. One participant,
who is the one saying that WebExtensions can be easily disabled, simply said Yes.
Those vendors targeting multiple hosts answered No, because Mozilla doesn't control
the surface area we modify.
A participant suggested that if different host software organizations can standard-
ize their APIs, third-party vendors will be more willing to migrate. It depends on the
functionality and if there are general, OS runtime based standard mechanisms already
available. It makes no sense to have two different implementations of the same func-
tionality.
Other participants' attitude is rather open, but they doubt whether Mozilla can pro-
vide the specific API they require. For example, I doubt that the extension mechanism
would be sufficient for our requirements. However, we, Mozilla, and other vendors are
actively considering other ways that software such as ours would not have to inject to
gather this content.
We are combatting malware and exploits though, which work in a low-level way,
directly manipulating Firefox code and interacting with the operating system. It is quite
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unlikely that a high-level extension (i.e., JavaScript) can be used to detect and mitigate
all those threats reliably.
Actually, we prefer to use `standard' means whenever possible ... The main concern
is, how do you expose the API without any malicious software using it.
Overall, although some third-party vendors are open to adopt WebExten-
sions API, they doubt whether the API can fulfill their requirements.
Quality assurance of injected code (Q6).
Six participants answered whether they run QA with pre-release versions of Firefox.
Four participants said Yes, one of them further explained: but not as often as we would
like. The other two said No. In our opinion, running QA against each version of the
host software is necessary. The vendors who neglect this process may miss bugs in the
ecosystem. In this case, the whitelist would be an effective measure to penalize the
vendors who do not test their software well and frequently have bugs.
Suggested improvements to the WebExtensions API (Q7).
Q7 encourages participants to suggest improvements for the WebExtensions API. One
participant wished that (Mozilla) can provide a mean to get the HWND [155] of a
window from within the extension. This suggestion is in line with the doubts on the
functionality offered by the WebExtensions API.
Another suggestion is about the reliability of the API itself: Some of the mechanisms
(of WebExtensions) do not work ... We opened a bug (on this problem). Therefore,
completely blocking DLL injection may not be the best solution because if a third-party
vendor can neither use DLL injection nor program against an available/reliable API,
they have to give up the host software and find other platforms. However, if all browsers
move to reduce DLL injection, third-party software will be forced to gradually transition
to WebExtensions.
To further discuss the solutions of reducing DLL injection bugs, we will analyze the
answers on the follow-up questions. Some of the questions are targeted for the upcoming
whitelist by Mozilla. Only five participants answered these questions. Their answers may
not be representative, but can be used as a reference for host and third-party software
to improve the reliability of an ecosystem. In the following of this section, we will cite
their answers and discuss the implications.
Allow an effective integration of third-party software into another software
(Q8).
Our follow-up questions start by how to allow an effective integration of third-party
software into another software. Our participants answered as follows: Certainly the
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most common extensions can and should be handled by a plugin API like WebExtensions.
Additionally, having a link to AMSI (Anti-Malware Scan Interface) by Microsoft would
make sense. But generally, what Windows supports should be also supported by Firefox,
which also includes code injection. For monitoring the process state on a system level,
sometimes there are no other options that would come to my mind.
Use of extensions is the most effective method. However, in enterprise environment,
admin would want to enforce use of certain extensions (without allowing a user to disable
it). Browsers allow enforcing certain extension through group policy in domain environ-
ment. However, we have a lot of SMB (small and midsize business) customers who don't
have domain-network environments. Solving that requirement is tricky.
There (should be) an extensive QA verification process in place that includes Firefox
test scenarios and a working collaboration with Mozilla. One proven approach to improve
the code quality of external components is to establish a publicly accessible validation
test framework that provides the test scenarios an extension has to pass and where test
scenarios are updated, based on observances with field issues.
If they can provide an API (e.g., callback) that will be available only for registered
whitelisted DLLs, we can move to that model instead of our current model and reduce
even more compatibilities issues.
Based on their answers, besides the extension API, third-party software vendors
believe that DLL injection should also be kept as an option since it is legally supported
by the operating system. The collaboration between host and third-party software is
necessary to ensure the quality of an ecosystem. Particularly, a publicly accessible
validation test framework can help standardize the QA for both parties. Moreover, the
upcoming whitelist seems to be a favourable solution for some third-party vendors.
Whether suggest users to uninstall third-party software after a crash (Q9).
We then were curious to know the opinions of third-party vendors on the practice that
some host software (e.g., Chrome [30]) will suggest users to uninstall third-party software
after a crash. We received a favourable opinion If an app crashes on your machine then
sure uninstall it. Makes complete sense. Not all machines are created equal. versus
multiple against opinions I consider this generally to be a bad practice, especially when a
crash can't be clearly attributed to a particular third-party software  which is usually not
possible in an automated way. They put their customers at risk, since the legitimate
(e.g., antivirus) will be removed ... If I were malware, I will use this functionality to
ask users to remove any 3rd party mechanisms that prevent me from doing whatever I
need. Uninstalling third-party solution isn't a long term solution.
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From the answers, we can see that this is a complex problem. First, such suggestions
may become false alarms to users because a host vendor cannot simply decide whether
a crash is due to the third-party or the host software itself. Second, in the Mozilla
ecosystem, many crashes are caused by antivirus software. If such antivirus software
is uninstalled, malware may take advantage of this. Facing a third-party software
related crash, we suggest that host vendors warn users about the potential
risks of running the third-party software (e.g., by showing the number of
crashes) but also remind them of the risks of removing it. Besides, host ven-
dors should investigate whether the crash happens with other equivalent host software.
Moreover, host vendors should always make efforts to improve the reliability of their
platform if necessary, because if users value the importance of the third-party software
and find it working well with other hosts, they may uninstall the host software instead.
Incompatibilities between host and third-party software (Q10, Q11).
Q10 and Q11 are about the way to prevent incompatibilities between host and third-
party software when the host software rolls out new content security features. Our
participant suggested: Notify us like they did when there is an issue. Worked well last
time. We have a fix rolled out very quickly when we were made aware of the issue.
Browser vendors can closely work with security vendors to bring about more stable,
secure browser ecosystem.
A preview of such functionality to test it in our labs will be highly appreciated (with
enough leeway and documentation to have the time for the vendors to adapt their code).
In the meanwhile, the participants told us that they are willing to take the following
measures from their part. We always try and fix any issues with our software when they
are reported to us. We do this as soon as we were alerted to the problem.
Regular compatibility testing of latest aurora/beta releases of various browsers from
our side along with our product and addresses any issues found.
We are willing, and already testing, any beta and post beta releases. But if we can
get documentation and enough time, we can commit to have our code ready and tested
by the release date (or if push comes to shove, temporarily some remove functionality to
accommodate browsers releases).
Overall, we learnt that many third-party vendors are making efforts on compatibility
testing and bug fixing for each (pre-) release. A good communication between
host and third-party software would help to reduce incompatibilities due
to new security features. Mozilla can provide some preview and necessary
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documentation of the new features to the trusted (i.e., whitelisted) vendors
(for compatibility testing) before the features are released to users.
Blocking of third-party DLLs (Q12).
Blocking third-party DLLs is one the of measures host software is using. Let us look at
the potential side effects analyzed by third-party vendors.
Our users would not be able to target FireFox ... and would probably use another
browser.
Practically I wouldn't anticipate any side effects, although theoretically it could affect
the stability of Firefox, our software products or even the whole operating system.
It will break our protections and cause frauds associated with the removed protections,
can crash our browser components and probably Firefox as well.
This will break our ability to scan HTTPS URLs for malware/phishing links.
Again, according to the respondents, blocking DLLs would not be the best
way to resolve DLL bugs. Before doing this, host software vendors should be
aware of any potential and serious side effects. This is the reason why in Mozilla's
blocklisting policy the blocks are always applied after careful consideration and testing,
and also why outright blocking might pose problems if not handled well.
Enforcing a whitelist (Q13, Q14).
Some host software vendors are considering to put the DLLs into the whitelist if the
DLL software is also using the standard extension API.
On the one hand, some third-party vendors agreed that such whitelist bonus is an
incentive for them to adopt the extension API, but these vendors have already consid-
ered/started to migrate to the API. Yes ... (the whitelist bonus will be) along with the
ability to enforce addons in certain scenarios. We already adapting to the best of our
ability the WebExtension API. We also moved to that methods on other browsers.
On the other hand, some others are not interested in this bonus because I am un-
aware that we can extract audio from a browser using this API and The WebExtensions
API has simply different use cases than the ones we are currently implementing. There-
fore I don't think it makes sense to mix that up. The benefit of the whitelist bonus still
needs to be verified in the future.
Some participants agreed that the existence of a whitelist will be an incentive for them
to do more QA. For the two participant who did not agree, one thought that their current
QA processes are sufficient. The other one absolutely denied potential benefits from
the whitelist: A whitelist approach is inferior as it holds back the extension ecosystem
overall, in my opinion. A proactive approach providing extensive and frequently updated
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test scenario framework support covering known problematic techniques is superior.
Therefore, we also need future evidences to answer this question.
Bypassing the whitelist (Q15).
About our last question, no participant plans to circumvent the whitelist, even for the
vendors who insist to use DLL injection.
No, because it won't be a long term solution.
We would not for legal reasons. We do not circumnavigate anything. This question
is quite hypothetical right now. Likely we would respect Firefox's policy and not try to
actively circumvent anything like this by technical means, but instead we may notify our
users about this and suggest to move to another browser. Depending on the exact method
of implementation, it's questionable if we'd be affected by such a whitelist though.
If we will be on the white list, why should we (circumvent it)?
However, we do not know whether malware producers would try to circumvent the
whitelist (our guess is that they probably would), since we are not able to contact any
of them. Also, we cannot be sure that the answers to this question are actually honest,
given that circumventing the whitelist might be illegal and would be a direct challenge
against Mozilla. Clearing out this doubt will be a part of our future work, once we
collect enough field data on the whitelist.
Completely blocking DLL injection might not be
the best strategy to reduce bugs caused by third-
party software. Instead, host software vendors
should strengthen their collaboration and commu-
nication with third-party vendors, and build a pub-
licly accessible validation test framework. To at-
tract third-party vendors to use the standard ex-
tension API, host software should improve the
API's reliability and functionality (i.e., available
functions). A whitelist might be beneficial, but
more empirical evidences are needed to support this
claim.
5.5 Discussion
In a software ecosystem, pursuing user satisfaction is one of the most important goals
for both host and third-party vendors. However, to achieve this goal, some host and
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guest vendors are taking conflicting measures. In the previous section, we have observed
that, on the one hand, some host vendors are (even completely) blocking third-party
software added through DLL injection and are suggesting users to uninstall unreliable
software. On the other hand, some third-party vendors are not willing to adopt host
vendors' advice and new solutions because once their extensions cannot work with the
host software, they claim that they will suggest users to migrate to another host. We
believe that in an ecosystem, host and third-party vendors should not consider their
benefit as a zero-sum game, but a win-win game. To satisfy and hold their common users,
host and third-party vendors should strengthen their collaboration along all aspects of
the development of the ecosystem, including (but not limited to) testing, bug fixing,
feature introducing, and API evolution.
In this work, we choose DLL injection as subject because some host software vendors
realize that this technique often caused bugs (even crashes) and can be exploited by
attackers. However, besides DLL injection and a standard extension API, there are
other ways to add third party code into another software, such as Flash. As a resource
consuming and outdated technique, Flash has been made click-to-play in both Firefox
and Chrome since 2017, and will be completely blocked in all browsers by 2019 (2020
for Firefox ESR), so we do not study it in our work. Comparing the reliability among
different extension techniques will be a part of our future work.
5.6 Threats to Validity
Construct validity threats are concerned with the relationship between theory and
observation. Studying DLL injection bugs in an ecosystem is a new research topic. As
far as we know, there has not been a theory behind this. However, before conducting
the empirical study, we learnt some assumptions through our contact with Mozilla de-
velopers, but observed opposing results. For example, some Mozilla developers thought
that the WebExtensions API can fulfill most of the purposes. They guessed that some
third-party vendors are not willing to migrate to the API because the vendors do not
want to spend time to modify their existing code. However, multiple of our survey par-
ticipants indicated that their purposes cannot be satisfied by the current WebExtensions
API. Moreover, to reduce DLL injection bugs, host vendors are taking measures, e.g.,
blocking DLL injection, suggesting users to uninstall unreliable extensions. By ana-
lyzing feedback from third-party vendors, we realize that many of these measures could
be harmful for end users and even the host vendors themselves.
Internal validity threats concern factors that may affect a dependent variable and were
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not considered in the study. Some of our observations derived from the 12 survey re-
sponses. Although these responses cannot represent all third-party vendors' opinions,
they provided us valuable information to understand the root causes of the DLL injec-
tion bugs and to propose potential solutions to reduce the bugs occurrence. The most
important reason is that such information cannot be discovered from any open source
repositories, such as Mozilla bug reports, crash reports, or commit logs. Besides, we
studied all the 103 DLL injection bugs reported during the past two years. These bugs
were caused by 58 different vendors, among which, 44 vendors were contacted. 12 survey
participants represent a 21% coverage of all subject third-party vendors and 27% survey
response rate (which is higher than the average response rate in questionnaire-based
software engineering studies, i.e., 5%, according to Singer et al.'s finding [132]).
Conclusion validity threats concern the relationship between the treatments and the
outcome. When investigating the characteristics of the DLL injection bugs, we man-
ually classified DLL bugs into different categories. To reduce any biases during this
process, we did not predefine any category. For each characteristic, two researchers in-
dependently made their classification before comparing their results and resolving each
of the discrepancies. Despite this, we cannot guarantee a 100% accuracy on our classifi-
cation result. To help future studies validate our result, we share our dataset online at:
https://github.com/swatlab/dll_injection. Some of the important observations
are based on the survey responses. To reduce any possible biases, besides our discussion
and analyses, we cited participants original answers. Readers can use this information
to validate our conclusion and discover more insight. When compiling the survey re-
sponses, we hid some details due to privacy reasons. For example, we did not make a
table showing which participant answered which question because this way may disclose
information that participants do not wish to publish. In the survey, we only use open
questions, because first, our subject problem has not been empirically studied before,
i.e., there is no reference to help us predefine options for the answers. Second, predefined
answers may bias and limit participants' judgement. In this work, we are open to receive
any unexpected ideas that can lead us to a better understanding of the subject problem.
External validity threats are concerned with the generalizability of our results. In this
work, we choose Mozilla Firefox as subject ecosystem because other equivalent ecosys-
tems either lack relevant data or will try to completely block DLL injection soon (e.g.,
Chrome). We believe that Firefox is a large-scale representative ecosystem, which con-
tains various and diverse DLL software (refer to the software types discussed in RQ1).
In addition, Firefox possesses some public resources that we cannot benefit from other
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host vendors, such as bug reports, where we can also often see decision processes in play,
and third-party vendors' contacts. Nevertheless, the results and conclusion of our work
may not be generalized to other environments. Future studies are required to validate
and complement our findings. Researchers can also use our shared dataset to replicate
this study: https://github.com/swatlab/dll_injection.
5.7 Related Work
5.7.1 Software Ecosystems
When a software organization increasingly allows other software to join and extend
its software platform, an ecosystem is gradually formed. Many software organizations
have realized that either creating or joining into such an ecosystem can be beneficial
because they no longer have to produce an entire system but only need to work for a
part of it. Recently, we have seen an increase in the number of software ecosystems
and the number of research studies that have focused on them. Bosch [20] observed
the emerging trend of the transition from traditional software product lines to software
ecosystems and proposed actions required for this transition. He also discussed the im-
plications of adopting a software ecosystem approach on the way organizations build
software. Hanssen [55] conducted an empirical study of the CSoft system, which transi-
tioned from a closed and plan-driven approach towards an ecosystem. He observed that
transitioning to a software ecosystem improved the cross organizational collaboration
and the development of a shared value (i.e., technology and business) in the collabora-
tion. Jansen et al. [64] discussed the challenges of software ecosystems at the levels of
software ecosystems themselves, software supply network, and software vendors. This
early work provided a guideline for software vendors to make their software adaptable to
new business models and new markets, and help them to choose appropriate strategy to
succeed in an ecosystem. Later on, Van Den Berk et al. [146] built models to quantita-
tively assess the status of a software ecosystem as well as the success of decisions taken
by the host vendors in the past.
Researchers have also empirically studied various popular open source ecosystems,
including Linux kernel (e.g., [145]), Debian distribution (e.g., [49, 51]), Eclipse (e.g.,
[151, 21]), and R (e.g., [48]) ecosystems. The host software in these ecosystems are
respectively operating system, integrated development environment, and mathematical
software. However, as far as we know, there is no previous study that empirically in-
vestigates a browser-based open source ecosystem (e.g., Firefox, Chrome). Although
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Liu et al. [79] studied the extension security model of Chrome and Karim et al. [68]
studied the Jetpack Extension Framework of Mozilla, their research focused on the ex-
tension techniques rather than on the ecosystems. We contribute to filling this gap by
conducting an empirical study of DLL injection bugs in the Firefox ecosystem. Another
difference between our work and these previous works [79, 68] is that DLL injection is
completely arbitrary, i.e., a third-party software can execute whatever it requires; while
the extension API can constrain third-party software's behaviour.
5.7.2 DLL Injection
DLL injection is one of the popular ways to insert code into other software. It can
force a process to load external code in a manner that the author of the process does
not anticipate or intend. Leveraging the DLL injection technique, Andersson et al. [8]
proposed a framework to detect code injection attacks [152]. Lam et al. [76] proposed
an approach that uses DLL injection to isolate the execution of the incoming email
attachments and web documents on a physically separate machine rather than on the
user machine. Their approach can help reduce the risk that user machines are attacked.
Berdajs et al. [16] analyzed the limitations of multiple existing DLL injection techniques
(including CreateRemoteThread, proxy DLL, Windows hooks, using a debugger, and
reflective injection) and introduced a new approach that combines DLL injection and
API hooking (a technique by which we can modify the behaviour and flow of an API
call [60]). The improved approach can inject code even when the application is not fully
initialized.
As DLL injection allows a program to inject arbitrary code into arbitrary pro-
cesses [153], malware producers can also take advantage of this technique to exploit
computers. Jang et al. [63] proposed an approach to help identify malicious DLLs in
Windows. Windows maintains a list of all loaded modules, including DLL modules.
Some software checks this list to detect DLLs injected from another process and take
corresponding measures, e.g., block it if a DLL is suspicious. However, an approach
called Reflective injection [45] can inject DLLs in a stealthy manner, which increases the
difficulty of detecting suspicious DLLs.
Like a double-edged sword, DLL injection is a useful (even indispensable) program-
ming technique, but can also cause severe damages due to its arbitrary nature. To the
best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any existing work that empirically studied
the root causes and counterplans of the bugs or defects caused by DLL injection. Partic-
ularly, in a software ecosystem, this kind of bugs can hardly be predicted but can affect
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a large number of users. To help software practitioners understand the root causes of
DLL injection bugs and propose solutions to reduce them, we conduct this case study
on the Firefox ecosystem.
5.8 Conclusion
In a software ecosystem, DLL injection allows third-party software to forcibly load
arbitrary code into the host software. This technique may cause severe problems, such
as crashes and hangs. In this paper, we quantitatively and qualitatively studied DLL in-
jection bugs in the Firefox ecosystem. We found that: most of the subject bugs (93 bugs,
i.e., 90.3%) led to crashes, and 57 (55.3%) of them were caused by antivirus software
(RQ1). Various DLL injection mechanisms were applied by third-party vendors; the
triggers of the bugs can be engine errors, compiler/runtime incompatibility, or version
incompatibility between the host and third-party software (RQ2). Completely banning
DLL injection might not be the best strategy because some software (e.g., antivirus)
relies on this technique. Collaboration between host and third-party software vendors
could help reduce DLL injection bugs; host software vendors should extend the features
of the extension API (as a safer alternative of adding functionalities onto the host soft-
ware) and build a publicly accessible validation test framework (RQ3). In the future,
we plan to investigate whether the upcoming whitelist can further help reduce DLL
injection bugs.
128 CHAPTER 5. DLL INJECTION BUGS IN THE FIREFOX ECOSYSTEM
Chapter6
Conclusion
In this thesis we showed that the development and the use of machine learning and
data mining techniques can support several software engineering phases, ranging from
crash handling, to code review, to patch uplifting, to software ecosystem management.
We presented the motivation behind our work, we explained the approach we fol-
lowed, and we presented the challenges we faced. To validate our thesis, we conducted
several studies tackling different problems in an industrial open-source context, focus-
ing on the case of Mozilla. We have also applied some of the results presented in the
dissertation in the same industrial open-source context, at Mozilla, by either providing
tools to actors involved in the software development process or contributing to changes
in processes.
6.1 Contributions
During the course of this dissertation, we made a series of contributions to the state of
the art in machine learning and data mining techniques applied to software engineering.
We summarize the major ones in the following.
6.1.1 Automatic analysis of groups of crashes for finding correlations
In Chapter 2, presenting our work from [28], we found that analyzing crash reports
in an automated manner can help developers in fixing crashes, by removing manual
analysis burden from developers, or by finding properties that would have been really
difficult to find with manual analysis, or can give clues in the characterization of crashes.
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Software organizations can use these data mining techniques to speed up and simplify the
resolution of crashes and to reduce the amount of manual tedious work for developers.
6.1.2 Relation between code review and crashes
In Chapter 3, presenting our work from [7], we found that some high-impact defects,
such as crash-related defects, can still pass through the review process and negatively
affect end users. We compared the characteristics of reviewed code that induces crashes
and clean reviewed code in Mozilla Firefox. We observed that crash-prone reviewed
code often has higher complexity and centrality, i.e., the code has many other classes
depending on it. Compared to clean code, developers tend to spend a longer time on and
have longer discussions about the crash-prone code; suggesting that developers may be
uncertain about such patches. Through a qualitative analysis, we found that the crash-
prone reviewed code is often used to improve performance of a system, refactor source
code, fix previous crashes, and introduce new functionalities. Moreover, the root causes
of the crashes are mainly due to memory and semantic errors. Some of the memory
errors, such as null pointer dereferences, could be likely prevented by adopting a stricter
organizational policy with respect to static code analysis.
6.1.3 Patch uplift in rapid release development processes
In Chapter 4, presenting our work from [24] and [25], we found that in average, 8%
of uplifted patches introduced a regression in the code of Firefox. We investigated the
decision making process of patch uplift at Mozilla and observed that release managers are
more inclined to accept patch uplift requests that concern certain specific components,
andor that are submitted by certain specific developers. We found that 4% of the
issues fixed by patch uplift were not effectively resolved but were later reopened, cloned,
duplicated, or fixed by additional uplifts. Two frequent root causes were identified
from our manual analysis, i.e., the original uplifts only partially fixed the issues or
caused regressions. We examined the characteristics of uplifted patches that introduced
regressions and found that they are more complex than clean uplifts, and they tend to
change a higher number of lines of code. Most regressions are caused by patch uplifts
aimed at fixing wrong functionalities and crashes. The most common root causes of
faults in uplifted patches are semantic and memory errors. In addition, through a manual
analysis on a sample of the uplifts that introduced regressions, we found that more than
one third of the fault-inducing Beta uplifts led to a regression that is more severe than
the problem they aimed to address. Last but not least, we observed that 25% to 30%
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of the regressions due to Beta and Release uplifts could be possibly prevented because
they can be reproduced not only by the issue reporter but also by developers and were
found on widely used feature/website/configuration or via the Mozilla telemetry.
6.1.4 DLL injection bugs in the Firefox ecosystem
In Chapter 5, presenting our work from an article that is currently under submis-
sion, we found that most of the subject bugs (93 bugs, i.e., 90.3%) led to crashes, and 57
(55.3%) of them were caused by antivirus software. Various DLL injection mechanisms
were applied by third-party vendors; the triggers of the bugs can be engine errors, compil-
er/runtime incompatibility, or version incompatibility between the host and third-party
software. Completely banning DLL injection might not be the best strategy because
some software (e.g., antivirus) relies on this technique. Collaboration between host and
third-party software vendors could help reduce DLL injection bugs; host software ven-
dors should extend the features of the extension API (as a safer alternative of adding
functionalities onto the host software) and build a publicly accessible validation test
framework.
6.2 Implications
The implications of our dissertation are important for both researchers and prac-
titioners. Our work shows that machine learning and data mining techniques can be
leveraged to improve software engineering processes, supporting several of their phases.
6.2.1 Crash handling
The part of our work on automatically analyzing groups of crashes for finding corre-
lations, presented in Chapter 2, shows that practitioners can use data mining techniques
to improve their understanding of crashes, and automate it effectively, making better
use of their automated crash reporting systems. Researchers could find improvements
on our proposed algorithm, or improvements for the crash clustering phase which is at
the basis of our proposed techniques. Moreover, they could find additional possible ap-
plications for our correlations results (or investigate the ones suggested in Section 2.3.2),
for example to try to automatically reproduce field crashes in a controlled environment.
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6.2.2 Code review and crash-related defects
The part of our work on the relation between code review and crashes, presented
in Chapter 3, shows that practitioners can use the results of our study to inform their
review processes, increasing the scrutiny for risky patches and decreasing it for less risky
ones. Researchers could find ways to automatically detect patches that would require
more scrutiny, and they could propose ways to automate parts of the review process
to ease prevent crash-related defects (for example, by investigating the effects of static
analysis tools).
6.2.3 Uplift/urgent patches processes
The part of our work on patch uplift in rapid release development processes, presented
in Chapter 4, shows that practitioners can use the results of our study to inform their
uplift processes: for example, release managers can be more careful when deciding about
certain kinds of patches and QA processes could be modified to prevent regressions at
an earlier stage for uplifts. Researchers could propose automated ways to help release
managers in their decisions, employing the data which can be collected on the uplift
process.
6.2.4 Software ecosystems
The part of our work on DLL injection bugs in the Firefox ecosystem, presented
in Chapter 5, shows practitioners that increasing collaboration between developers of
host software and developers of software extending it might help in reducing bugs and
improving the quality of both host and guest software. Researchers could perform similar
studies applied to other ecosystems to corroborate our findings and expand the number
of responses from third-party developers, moreover they can investigate whether other
ways adopted by other software organizations to mitigate DLL injection bugs could be
more or less effective.
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